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ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; 



OR, 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 



■» 



ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; 



OR, 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 



STranslateir from tfje (German of 

DR. FRANCIS THEREMIN, 



BY 

WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD, 

PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT. 



NEW-YORK: 

JOHN WILEY, 161 BROADWAY; 
13 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON. 

X850. 



\ 



*^ 



-<.*> 

^4*° 



Entered 'according to Act of Congress in the year 1850, . 

BY JOHN WILEY, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New- York. 



J. P. Wright, Printer, 
74 Fulton st., N. Y. 



CONTENTS 



Preface, by the Translator vii 

BOOH X. 

Chap. I. — Design and Use of the Proposed Investigation. 1 
Chap. II. — Eloquence is not something between Poetry 

and Philosophy 7 

Chap. III. — Eloquence is neither Poetry nor Philosophy. .10 

Chap. IV. — Eloquence is a Virtue 14 

Chap. V.— Ideas 19 

Chap. VI. — The Political and Religious Form of Practi- 
cal Ideas 23 

Chap. VII. — The Different Species of Eloquence 28 

Chap. VIII. — Virtue is also Good Sense 33 

Chap. IX. — The Subordinate Ideas, or Categories 38 

Chap. X.— The Category, Truth 40 

Chap. XI. — The Rhetorical Demonstration of Truth 42 

Chap. XII.— The Categories, Possibility and Actuality 52 

Chap. XIII. — The Plan and Division of an Oration 56 

Chap. XIV. — First Features towards a Sketch of the Orator.69 



VI CONTENTS. 

BOOK XX. 

Page 

Chap. L — Affection and Passion.. 77 

Chap. II. — The Duty of the Orator to speak with Affec- 
tion, and to awaken Affection 85 

Chap. III.— The Different Kinds of Affection 91 

Appendix. — Wit 97 

Chap. IV. — The Means of exciting Affection : or. The 

Rhetorical Presentation of Thought 101 

Chap. V.— The Law of Adaptation 106 

Appendix. — Taste 131 

Chap. VI.— The Law of Constant Progress 134 

Chap. VII.— The Law of Vivacity 146 

Chap. VIII— Prose 155 

Chap. IX. — Conclusion 162 



PREFACE, 
by the translator- 



It is believed that this little treatise upon Rhetoric 
possesses some characteristics which render it worthy 
of a place among the current English treatises on this 
subject. Perhaps no one will be ready to assent to 
all the positions laid down in it, and many may think 
that in its method and spirit it is altogether too for- 
eign to our own modes of thought and expression, to be 
of any worth to the English student. Still, if used in 
the right way, it is thought that it may be made to 
contribute to a broad and thorough discipline in this 
department of culture. For no production, especially 
of a foreign mind, should be servilely received by the 
student, or allowed to exert an arbitrary and violent 
influence upon him. He should retain his own indi- 
viduality and nationality in their most independent 
and determined forms, while, at the same time, he 
opens his mind and heart to all that is true and genial 



PREFACE. 



in a foreign literature. Non-intercourse is as impoli- 
tic and injurious in the world of contemplation, as it is 
in the world of action. 

Moreover, the present state of Rhetoric, considered 
as one of the co-ordinate branches of discipline, to 
which the mind of the student is subjected in the 
course of liberal education, seems to call for the infu- 
sion of an element which may be found in this trea- 
tise of Theremin. Rhetoric, in its best estate, is but 
the science of Form, or, to use Milton's phrase, an " or- 
ganic" — i. e., instrumental — Art. It does not propose 
to furnish the material of knowledge, but only to put 
the material, when furnished, into as fine and perfect 
forms as possible. Owing partly to this intrinsic na- 
ture of Rhetoric as an Art, and partly perhaps to the 
excessively popular character which science and scien- 
tific statements have assumed in the present age, Rhe- 
toric has become extremely superficial in its character 
an I influence, so that the term " rhetorical" has become 
the synonyme of shallow and showy. Dissevered from 
Lo-dc, or the necessary laws of Thought, it has become 
dissevered from the seat of life, and has degenerated 
int \ a mere collection of rules respecting the structure 
of mtences and the garnish of expression. 



PRErACE. IX 

Any treatise, therefore, of which the tendency is to 
restore the connection between Thought and its expres- 
sion, cannot but be beneficial in its influence upon both 
the theory and practice of Eloquence. Even if it were 
constructed upon a false fundamental principle, and, 
as a systematic whole, were incorrect, still the mere 
effort to systematize the subject — the striving to ground 
it in something deeper and more solid than its own 
hollow forms, would not be without its salutary influ- 
ence upon the art itself and the student. It would, 
at least, direct attention to the fact, that an art like Rhe~ 
toric should be based upon some science, and that its 
rules and maxims, in order to be efficient and influen- 
tial, must be the off-shoots of principles lying deeper 
than themselves. It would point to the adaptation 
that really exists in the nature of things, and that ought 
actually to exist in practice, between an instrument 
employed by the human mind, and addressing itself 
to it, and the human mind itself. 

The work of Theremin, whether it be true or false 
in substance, is, what it purports to be, a systematic 
Rhetoric. It does not begin with rules, and it does 
not, in starting, deal in minute observations upon mi- 
nutiae ; but it begins with the Ideas which are con- 

B 



PREFACE 



ceived to underlie the whole subject, and to constitute 
the ground and soil from which the whole after-de- 
velopement and detail will naturally spring. It begins 
at the beginning, goes through the middle, and so ar- 
rives at the end. 

Now there is power in such a method, apart from its 
contents. The course and movement of the system is 

according to Nature. Commencing with the Matter, 

s 
it proceeds to the Form, which is to take shape and 

character, and all its qualities, from that primitive ma- 
terial for whose sake alone it has any existence at all. 

" Wei may men knowen. but it be a fool, 
That every part deriveth from his hool. 
For Nature hath not taken his beginning 
Of no partie ne cantel of a thing, 
But of a thing that parfit is and stable 
Descending so, til it be corrumpable." 

Chaucer. 

The Avhole tendency of such a theory of Rhetoric is 
to produce, in practice, masculine and thoughtful dis- 
course. The student, if we may use the term, is head- 
ed right, by it, and is taught to apply his best power 
to the evolution of truth and the production of thought 
in his own mind, not surely to the neglect of the Form 
in which it is to be expressed, but in order to the high- 



PREFACE. XI 



est and most perfect elaboration of the Form. He is 
taught to be severe with himself, to forget himself in 
the theme, that he may exhibit it with that boldness 
and freedom of manner, that daring strength and gran- 
deur of treatment, which is absolutely beyond the reach 
of him who is anxious respecting the impression he 
may make — who, in short, is tormented by too much 
consciousness of self, at a time when he should be 
absorbingly conscious of the theme. 

According to the theory here presented, the oration, 
— meaning by this, every rounded and complete dis- 
course, — is the evolution of an Idea, which is the germ 
and principle of the whole composition. Hence it is 
simple in its structure, and homogeneous in its char- 
acter — fitted to enlist the whole attention of the hearer, 
and to produce one distinct total impression. 

Nothing can be of greater benefit to the student, than, 
in the very beginning of his intellectual life, to be hab- 
ituated to compose in the light, and by the guidance, 
and under the impulse, of Ideas — than to be enabled to 
discover those germinal truths which are pregnant with 
life, and which, when embodied with freedom and 
power in a discourse, constitute the ground-work of the 
finest creations of the human mind. And apart from 



Xli PREFACE. 

the benefit which is to be derived from this habit and 
ability, for the practical purposes of Rhetoric, what a 
benefit is derived from it in respect to the private con- 
templations and enjoyment of the scholar ! Supposing 
he does not need this ability, because he is never called 
upon to speak or write to his fellow-men, (a supposi- 
tion that is hardly to the credit of an educated man in 
this peculiar age,) does he not need it, in order that 
his own mind may reach essential truth, and may, in 
its own reflections, follow the method and order of Rea- 
son. In what a serene and constant illumination does 
that mind dwell, which is able in its meditations to 
find the fontal truth as it were by instinct, and to un- 
fold it by its own light, and in accordance with its 
own structure ! 

By such a theory the student is introduced into the 
world of Ideas, Laws and Principles, and is taught to 
begin with these, and from them to work out towards 
detail, elaboration and ornament. It is a mysterious 
world, it is true, and it must be, from the very fact that 
it is the source and origin. But it is the very office- 
work of thinking, to convert these Ideas into clear con- 
ceptions ; to put these vast unlimited truths into defi- 



PREFACE. Xlll 



nite and intelligible discourse ; in fine, in the strict 
meaning of the term, to develope truth. 

He is the mystical and obscure discourser who leaves 
truth as he finds it ; who does not, by the aid of close 
thinking and a rigorous, remorseless logic, compel the 
dark truthful Idea to yield up its secret ; who does not 
force the contents out of the all-comprehending Law or 
Principle. And he is the clear and intelligible discour- 
ser, in the only high sense of the term, — clear while 
solid, intelligible while weighty, — who, not starting in 
light to make things light, starts in darkness and works 
his way out into high noon. In both the Pagan and 
Christian cosmogonies, Creation emerged from Old 
Night. 

But if we are not mistaken, the theory presented in 
this work is true in its substance. It teaches that El- 
oquence is moral in essence ; that it has a moral ori- 
gin, moral means and movement, and a moral end. It 
teaches, with what may seem pertinacity to some, that 
in its substance and its accidents, its primary laws and 
secondary rules, Eloquence is ethical. 

This is not a new theory. As the Author remarks, 
it was distinctly announced by the elder Cato, and 



XIV PREFACE. 



mentioned with approbation by Quintilian, a critic 
whose exquisite taste often brought him to an indistinct 
intimation of truths, which a more profound genius 
would have brought out into distinct intuition. It has, 
moreover, been the tacitly-received theory of all the 
great minds — the really eloquent — of the race. We 
have it on the authority of Cicero,* that u Socrates di- 
cere solebat, omnes, in eo, quod scirent, satis esse elo- 
quentes." By this he could only mean, that the moral 
feeling and interest generated by clear knowledge of 
truth, is the ground of that methodical, earnest, and 
animating mental action which we denominate Elo- 
quence — a truth which may be found substantially, if 
not formally, falling from the lips of Socrates in the 
Gorgias. Add to this the decisive statement of Buffon, 
"Le style — e'est Phomme," which meets with an equal- 
ly decisive response within us, together with the views 
of Eloquence left us in the remarkable fragments of 
Pascal, and we find that the theory in question is no 
newly broached one, but one that is unconsciously 
formed by the thoughtful and eloquent mind every- 
where. 

* De Oratore. L, 14. 



PREFACE. XV 



Most certainly the tendency and influence of such a 
theory of Eloquence must be good and elevating. Set- 
ting aside the fact, that if it be the true theory, it is the 
only one by the aid of which Eloquence can come into 
existence, it is the only working theory — it is most cer- 
tainly a great point gained, if an Art, so often supposed 
to be at farthest remove from earnestness and serious- 
ness, which is regarded too commonly as the Art by 
which the ornaments are furnished when the solid and 
real work has been done, is shown to have its native 
seat and source in Ethics. The expression of thought 
by this theory becomes a sincere process, and the mind, 
while giving utterance to its reflections, is really con- 
tributing to the moral culture and developement of the 
man. The productions of such a Rhetoric are marked 
by that grave and conscientious character which is the 
natural fruit of simplicity and sincerity in the mental 
processes. The influence of the theory is felt even in 
the language employed. It is no longer stiff, stilted, 
and aloof from the thought, but pliant, vital, and con- 
substantial with it. 

Finally, it is believed that the theory of Eloquence 
here set forth, harmonizes with the true theory of Art. 
Perhaps the greatest defect in many of the current 



XVI PREFACE. 

treatises upon Rhetoric is the absence of correct views 
of the principles of Art. Oratory is confessedly one of 
the Fine Arts ; and how, then, can a clue to its mystery 
and power be obtained without a philosophic knowl- 
edge of those laws and principles by which Embodi- 
ment, whether in Nature or Art, is regulated and im- 
pelled ? 

We say Embodiment whether in Nature or Art, be- 
cause the method of each is essentially the same. In 
both, a creative Idea is the starting point and the guid- 
ing principle, and the movement in both is free and 
original. A genuine work of Art is no more a copy or 
a mechanical production, than a work in Nature is. It 
is not the product of ingenuity improved by practice 
and experience, but of impulsive genius, and the same 
characteristics are found in it, according to the degree 
of its perfection as a work of Art, that are found in Na- 
ture. Indeed, we demand that a work of Art have Na- 
ture in it, i. e., be original, fresh, living, glowing, breath- 
ing ; a demand that would be unreasonable if there 
were no likeness at bottom between Art and Nature. 
As Nature, according to Sir Thomas Brown, is the Art 
of God, so Art is man's Nature, and sustains the same 



PREFACE. XV11 

relation to the Finite mind that Creation does to the 
Infinite. 

By this is not meant, of course, that it sustains the 
same relation materially, but only formally. The 
work of Art is the creation of the Finite Imagination, in 
the sense that it is the embodiment and result of an 
Idea, a productive thought, which sprang from the in- 
nermost recesses of this human faculty. As Nature 
is the result and embodiment of divine Ideas, so Art 
is the result and embodiment of human Ideas. The 
two differ from each other as the Infinite differs from 
the Finite, but they are alike, as reason in man is the 
same in kind with reason in God. We say, then, that 
the work of Art is formally — i. e., in respect to its origin 
from a productive Idea, and in respect to the plastic 
method of its construction, — like the work of Nature ; 
that man, the Artist, works creatively, not in the abso- 
lute and highest sense of creating something out of no- 
thing, in which sense God is the only creator, but in the 
secondary yet significant sense of embodying Ideas, of 
producing works to which the terms applied to the 
works of Nature, find a natural and spontaneous appli- 
cation, the world over. 



PREFACE. 



Now, it is evident that Rhetoric, whose office it is to 
guide the student into the right method of embodying 
his thought, and which is the very science of Form, 
should itself be formative, constructive, plastic. But 
how is such a Rhetoric possible, if the theory that is 
formed is not only not conformed to, but positively 
contradicts, the laws and principles of what, after the 
remarks above made upon Nature and Art, may be de- 
nominated Universal Art ? Plainly, then, it is only by 
a deep and true insight into the nature of Art, in its 
widest sense, that a system of Rhetoric can arise that 
will lead to the production of works appealing with 
power to the imagination as well as the intellect. 

This treatise of Theremin, while it strictly distin- 
guishes Eloquence by virtue of its moral character and 
its external aim and end, from a merely artistic process, 
at the same time sufficiently recognizes the aesthetic 
element in it, and while, by some, the Author might 
be thought to have carried out his theory too rigorously, 
and have shown too much fear lest the high ethical 
character of Eloquence should be suffered to lose it- 
self in the lower sphere of mere Art, he has by this 
very thing imparted to Eloquence a still higher char- 
acter and a still more energetic power. For by thus 



PREFACE, XIX 



insisting that, while the means employed by Eloquence 
may be aesthetic, and the form in which it appears ar- 
tistic, the great end constantly aimed at must be mor- 
al, and only moral, the Author has furnished a Rhe- 
toric that is not only formative and plastic, but organ- 
ific, and has thus superinduced life upon the lifeless. 
Art in this case passes over into the production of liv- 
ing realities ; the old fable of Pygmalion becomes ac- 
tuality ; the oration is not only a beautiful and fault- 
less Form, it is also a living Soul. 

The work has been translated mainly for the pur- 
pose of furnishing a text-book,. to be used in a free re- 
productive manner in giving instruction in the depart- 
ment of Rhetoric. It is believed, however, that any 
one who shall make use of it, by entering into its spirit 
and method in a free and independent manner, will 
find more or less in it promotive of a sound way of 
thought, and a serious deep-toned Eloquence. 

THE TRANSLATOR. 

University of Vermont, Nov. 2Uh, 1849. 



ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE; 



OR, 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 



BOOK I. 



CHAPTER I. 

DESIGN AND USE OF THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATION. 

It has often surprised me, that while in modern times the 
theory of the Fine Arts, and especially of Poetry, has reached 
so high a degree of clearness and completeness, Rhetoric still 
consists of unconnected principles, and is not competent either 
to guide the practice of Eloquence by sure rules, or to give sat- 
isfactory information with respect to the nature and qualities 
of the subject of which it treats — of Eloquence itself. Hence 
it has seemed to me not to be superfluous to make the attempt, 
whether the gift of Eloquence cannot be represented as one of 
the fundamental powers of man, and whether its laws cannot 
2 



2 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

be derived from one of the higher philosophical sciences, so 
that everything uncertain and mutable may disappear from the 
Theory as well as the Practice of it. 

I must, indeed, fear that such an undertaking will appear 
useless to many, and that I shall be asked " What is gained 
by Theories generally ? Has all the philosophizing upon Art, 
in modern times, produced a more beautiful bloom of Poetry ? 
Did not Eloquence attain its highest perfection among the an- 
cients, although probably among them, as among us, its high- 
est principle either remained unknown, or at least, never dis- 
tinctly presented itself to the orator ? Only by means of rules 
which were drawn from experience, and which had respect to 
individual particulars in the formation of the oration, only by 
means of a constant practice which began in earliest youth and 
never ceased, and not by means of general theories, did De- 
mosthenes and Cicero form themselves ; only by means of a 
similar discipline, and not by means of text-books, can Elo- 
quence, which has sunk so very low among us, be raised up, 
if indeed it is to be raised up at all." 

These objections would be perfectly well grounded, if Elo- 
quence, since the establishment of the Christian Church, had 
not appeared in a form entirely unknown to the ancients, and 
one to which we are obliged to have special reference. The 
political and civil relations amidst which, exclusively and alone, 
Eloquence appeared among the ancients, were sufficient of 
themselves to secure it from deviations from the true course, 
and to render more precise theories unnecessary. For him, who 
spoke before the court or in the popular assembly upon a mat- 
ter which would be decided immediately upon the close of his 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 6 

oration, the effect was the surest proof whether he had spoken 
well or not ; and when the highest personal interests were at 
stake, it was very natural that the orator should call forth all 
his powers in order to succeed, and that he would learn to un- 
derstand and avoid those faults which might draw after them 
the loss of wealth, influence, life, and freedom. The sacred 
orator, on the contrary, stands in a relation to his hearer, and 
treats of a subject, which do not allow of such decisive proof. 
Whether he has instructed, edified, improved, or has merely 
superficially pleased and moved his hearer, the effect of his ser- 
mons can very seldom inform him, since this, from its very na- 
ture, remains concealed in the mind, and almost never comes 
into sight. Since therefore he is not, like the orator before the 
court and in the popular assembly, impelled towards the pre- 
scribed end by a pressing danger ; since he is not shut up with- 
in such narrow limits, which render deviation to the right or 
left almost impossible, he runs the greatest risk of error, if 
without settled theory and principles. He must be able to give 
the most accurate account, to his own mind, of all that he does ; 
and that deeper insight into the principles of Eloquence, which 
the ancient orator did not need, is indispensable to him. 

Moreover, many are of opinion that Eloquence, which in 
Greece and Rome reached so high a degree of perfection, dis- 
appeared from the earth with the destruction of ancient freedom, 
and never again found its home upon it. According to this 
opinion, Eloquence is therefore less an original impulse in man, 
than Poetry ; it is a creature of circumstances, by which it is 
not only more or less favored, but is produced and destroyed ; 
the republican constitutions of antiquity were necessarv to its 



4 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

developement ; and now, when social life, the spirit of the age, 
and the form of government, are so entirely different, that 
which we call Eloquence is either utterly unworthy of this 
name, or is only the mere shadow of that ancient powerful 
faculty/* Whether this opinion is well grounded or not, can 
be known only after such an investigation as we are intend- 
ing to institute. If we do not succeed in showing that Elo- 
quence is one of the fundamental powers in man, this opinion 
will stand unassailed, and whoever in modern times thinks 
himself to be an orator must simply give up his pretensions. 
But if we do succeed, and do actually point out a particular 
original power, whose developement in a certain direction ne- 
cessarily produces Eloquence, then Eloquence is no longer the 
ephemeral bloom of a particular age ; and although it may 
conceal itself, and sometimes may appear under another 
name, it nevertheless lives a life just as real and forceful, in 
modern, as in ancient times. 

Finally, there are men — and men, too, highly distinguished 
for learning and science, — who set a very low estimate upon 
Eloquence, and would have nothing to do with it. For, in 
their opinion, it is perfectly clear that its purpose is to excite 
the feelings, which is always useless, and sometimes even in- 
jurious ; nay, Eloquence commonly carries its pretensions 
still further, and, in the best orators, it is the design plainly 
prominent, and even acknowledged by themselves, to master 
the heart, to rule the will, and turn it whithersoever they 



* Magna ista et notabilis eloquentia .... quae in bene consti- 
tutis civitatibus non oritur.— De Cans. Corr. Elog., c. 40. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. D 

wish. But this, from its very nature, whatever be the manner 
in which it is done, is not at all compatible with the relations 
in which man stands to his fellow-man, and is therefore, strict- 
ly considered, contrary to morality ; and the more so, from 
the fact, that commonly the orator makes use of cunning and 
deceptive tricks of art, rather than honorable weapons. In 
their opinion, we should address the understanding alone, and 
satisfy it by means of stringent arguments ; all excitement of 
the Feelings, and influencing of the Will, were better omit- 
ted. This class of opponents, as has been remarked, is a very 
important one ; at its head stand names of distinction — Aris- 
totle^' among the ancients, Kantf among the moderns ; their 
objections have the very strongest appearance of truth, and 
as yet have not been answered in a satisfactory manner by 
any of the modern advocates of Eloquence, who have made 
far too little of them. But this question also, whether there 

" 'AAA' o\tjs ovaris irpds 66%av rrjs rpayfxareiag rrjg ire pi rrjv prjropiKriv, ov% 
v$ opdios k'xovros, 'aW tog dvayKaiov rrjv eiripii\eiav iroirjriov. 

Rhetor., Lib. Ill, c. 1. 

t I must confess, that while a beautiful poem always gives me pure 
pleasure, the perusal of the best orations of the popular orators of 
Rome, or the parliamentary or pulpit orators of the present time, is al- 
ways accompanied with the disagreeable feeling of disapprobation to- 
wards a cunning art which understands how to move men like machines, 
to a judgment which, upon calm after- thought, must lose all its worth 
with them. Oratory, considered as the art of making use of the weak- 
nesses of men, for its own purposes, (be these never so well meant, or 
be they actually good, as they are always intended to be,) is worthy of 
no esteem at all. — Critik der Urtheilskraft. p. 215. 

It is also said of Eloquence, in the Dialogue de Caus. Corr. Eloq., c. 
40, that it is " alumna licentias, quam stulti libertatem vocabant, comes 
seditionum, effrenati populi incitamentum, sine obsequio, sine servitute, 
contumax, temeraria, adrogans." 

1* 



6 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

is anything contrary to morality in the attempt to acquire 
mastery over the minds of others, can be decided only by 
means of such an investigation as we contemplate. For, if it 
should actually turn out to be impossible to derive each and 
all of the rules of Eloquence from one and the same funda- 
mental principle ; if the theory of Eloquence should be found 
to consist only of some maxims derived from experience and 
observation, which can be brought together under no unity, 
this would certainly be a very strong presumption against it. 
The impossibility of constructing its fundamental principles 
philosophically, would greatly lower it, and would throw it 
into the same class with other abilities of an ambiguous na- 
ture, in relation to which this same thing occurs — with Pru- 
dence, Worldly Wisdom, Hypocrisy, or, in the phrase of Pla- 
to, 2 ^ with the art of Cookery. If, however, we succeed in lay- 
ing down an all-comprehending principle as the ground of 
Eloquence, it will then appear of itself, whether this is good 
or bad ; although Eloquence would be acquitted of all charges 
on the score of being contrary to morality, from the mere phi- 
losophical form of its theory, since that which depends upon a 
fundamental power of man, cannot possibly contradict his 
moral sense. 



* Platonis Georgias ed. Heindorf, p. 53. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 



CHAPTER II. 

ELOQUENCE IS NOT SOMETHING BETWEEN POETRY AND 4 
PHILOSOPHY. 

Three different characteristics of Eloquence attract notice 
immediately upon the first examination. First, it is evident 
that Eloquence seeks to separate the true from the false, and 
to satisfy the understanding by argument. The powerful 
enthymemes of Demosthenes, the assertion of Aristotle that 
Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, and Cicero's affirmation that 
he had made himself an orator, not in the schools of the Rhe- 
toricians, but in the walks of the Academy,^ testify plainly 
enough to the affinity of Eloquence with Philosophy. Se- 
condly, Eloquence approximates to Poetry also, through the 
liveliness of its representations, and the use of turns and fi- 
gures which are similar to those of Poetry. But, thirdly, 
Eloquence is distinguished from Philosophy as well as Poetry 
by the outward end after which it strives, by that mastery 
over minds, which it does not quietly wait for, but obtains by 
a struggle, and by the innumerable references which must be 
regarded in such a striving, and which are entirely foreign to 
Philosophy as well as to Poetry. 

Characteristic marks of three kinds, therefore, are to be 

* Fateor me oratorem, non ex rhetorum officinis, sed ex academic 
spatiis extitisse. — Orator, c 3. 



ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR 



found in Eloquence : 1. An affinity with philosophy ; 2. An 
affinity with Poetry ; 3. A striving after an outward end. 
In order to find a fundamental principle of Eloquence, one of 
these three characteristics must be made predominant; for 
they cannot exist beside each other in equal dignity. Should 
it be affirmed that the Beautiful and the True, which in Poetry 
and Philosophy are principal, in Eloquence appear as adjuncts 
and subservient to outward ends, the difficulty is not yet re- 
moved ; for the question ever returns — What is the law ac- 
cording to which the True and the Beautiful may be used for 
the attainment of outward ends ? So long as this is not given, 
Eloquence*- has not found its highest fundamental principle. 

If we take our stand upon this point of view, where Elo- 
quence appears as something fluctuating between Philosophy, 
Poetry, and mere Worldly Wisdom, the theory projected in ac* 
cordance with this view, cannot satisfy the philosopher ; and 
just as little will it be a sure guide for the pupil in oratory. 

First, the teacher says to him, " You must select a subject, 
and must endeavor to treat it fundamentally," This he does 
in all faithfulness, and thus, imperceptibly, there arises under 
his hands a philosophic essay. " This is good for nothing," 
says the teacher, * where is the rising sweep, the life, the poetic 
ornament, by which these truths are to make an entrance ?" 
This censure seems just to him, and he now throws himself 
into the other extreme, and that which he produces is the 
most disagreeable of all caricatures — poetic prose. Having 
once more failed, it is now said to him, " You discourse as if you 
were alone by yourself, with no hearers before you, into whose 
circumstances, into whose way of thinking, you must enter !" 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 9 

Who will find fault with the pupil, if at this point he falls into 
a sort of desperation, and addresses his instructor somewhat 
after this manner : " In Heaven's name ! what is that you re- 
quire of me ? Am I to unite, in one, three things entirely- 
different from each other : philosophic profundity, poetic or- 
nament, and reference to an outward end ? Tell me first, if 
this union is possible ; and if it is, then give me the higher 
principle under which three so different requisitions can be 
brought into one ; show me the rule which determines how 
much I may concede to the subject-matter, how much to beauty 
of form, how much to the hearer, in order that each may co- 
exist with all, and that an unlucky preponderance may not 
oscillate from one side to another. For I can now no longer 
cast my work in an old form, without troubling myself about 
the wherefore, without asking myself why that which I pro- 
duce must look precisely thus, and whether it might not look 
entirely differently ; I wish in my oration, from beginning to 
end, to see the necessity of every single part. So then show 
me the principle which groups all others under itself, and from 
which all rules readily derive themselves/' 



10 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 



CHAPTER III. 

ELOQUENCE IS NEITHER POETRY NOR PHILOSOPHY. 

If, therefore, one of the three characteristic marks of Elo- 
quence is to be made the fundamental one, it might be supposed 
that its affinity with Poetry is the one, and that the same fun- 
damental principle which reigns in the representations of 
Poetry must also guide in the practice of Oratory. But this 
would pre-suppose that Eloquence give up its striving after 
an outward end, as something incompatible with Poetry, which 
it cannot do without renouncing its own nature and peculiarity 
— or else that Poetry adapt itself to this striving, and to all 
the references connected with it, which is equally impossible. 

When Poetry clothes its ideas in forms, it can demand 
nothing more than the perception and recognition, that the 
idea is perfectly suited to the form, and the form to the idea ; 
its design can never be to implant the ideas, which it has 
wrought out with such pleasure to itself, in another mind ; the 
one process would injure the other ; in the two-fold effort to 
exhibit his own mind and to work upon the mind of another, 
the Poet would succeed in neither. Indeed, nothing is so 
very much suited to produce the feeling of displeasure and 
disgust as an oration overloaded with poetical ornament ; we 
pity the ignorance which selects means so unsuitable for its 
ends ; we are indignant at the profanation which would force 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 11 

Poetry to subserve outward ends. Eloquence, therefore, can- 
not be regarded as a part of Poetry. 

But, secondly, is it not possible to make the Philosophic 
element in it the fundamental principle of Eloquence? 
Since in Eloquence, as in Philosophy, Ideas are presented in 
a certain sequence and in a certain connection, its coincidence 
with the art of Philosophizing might be so great as that it 
should fall into this and constitute only a part of it. But 
here the very obstacle which rendered the union of Elo- 
quence with Poetry impossible, shows itself again — that 
striving, namely, after an outward end, which is just as es- 
sential to Eloquence as it is foreign to Philosophy. Philoso- 
phy can recognize no other law by which its representations 
are to be guided, than that which lies in the Ideas themselves ; 
these Ideas themselves are simply to come forth in their 
greatest possible clearness, and in their greatest possible com- 
pass. The problem of Eloquence, on the contrary, is to gain 
over to its Ideas a mind thus or thus disposed. The laws 
which Philosophy follows in its representations cannot there- 
fore be the highest and sole rules of Eloquence, since, besides 
these, it has still others to obey which are imposed upon it 
by the outward end after which it strives. 

This truth is of the greatest importance for the success of 
our investigation, and I must call attention to it the more, 
since from the great tendency of the Germans to Philoso- 
phizing, it is certainly to be feared that it will meet with op- 
position from many of my readers. " Is not,' 2 it may be ob- 
jected, " this profound and powerful developement of Ideas, 
which is the essential element in the Philosophic representa- 



12 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

tion, itself also the most infallible means of making an 
entrance for these Ideas into the minds of others,"~and thus of 
fulfilling all the requisitions of Eloquence ?" Let one make 
this attempt, but let him make it with thoroughness, without 
suffering himself to be diverted by circumstances from the 
purpose once fixed upon. Let one lose himself entirely in 
the Idea ; let him develope it in its whole compass ; let him not 
omit even the least of all that can serve to exhibit it still more 
clearly ; let him forget, as is fitting, the place where he stands ; 
let him confine himself to no definite time, but speak until 
his subject is exhausted ; let him not trouble himself about 
his hearers, about the degree of their culture, about their ca- 
pacities, qualities, prejudices, and inclinations ; in a word, let 
him seek only to express his own mind ; — will such a discourse 
be adapted to gain over an opposing mind and to transfer the 
sentiments of the orator into his hearers ? I think not. 
Hence no one who refers the Rhetorical manner and method 
to the Philosophical, is able in his practice to remain true to 
his theory. Imperceptibly he concedes something to time, to 
place, to the occasion, to the hearers ; and thus there arises a 
product which is neither Philosophical nor Rhetorical, and 
which can satisfy no one who is accustomed to judge of things 
with strictness. 

If I understand him rightly, Aristotle makes this attempt, 
which must ever be a failure, to connect Eloquence with the 
art of Philosophizing, in order to obtain a simple, firm, con- 
stituent principle for it. In the very beginning of his work 
he lays down the position that Eloquence is akin to Dialectics, 
and it seems as if all is to be derived from this, and that Rheto- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 13 

ric is in this way to acquire a scientific unity. But this first 
assertion compels him to a second, by which Eloquence be- 
comes strangely limited in its sphere. " In Eloquence," he 
says, " which depends upon Dialectics, the arguments are the 
only thing pertaining to the art, and it should, properly, con- 
fine itself simply to showing whether a thing has or has not 
happened. It is owing to the imperfection of governments 
alone, that Eloquence has introduced the Ideas of Justice and 
Injustice into its sphere, and assumes to excite the Feelings." 
Now, it would be interesting to see what sort of a Rhetoric 
would have arisen, if Aristotle had strictly maintained and 
carried out this principle ; but whether it was because an 
Eloquence so narrrowly limited did not satisfy him, or be- 
cause he felt himself obliged to take Eloquence as he found 
it in actual existence, he lets the principle drop again imme- 
diately. Hence we are not a little surprised to see how soon 
he is no longer content with the purely dialectic arguments, 
but, besides these, calls in those means of persuasion also 
which lie in the moral state of the orator and in the inward 
condition into which the hearer has been put. But, in order 
to the apprehension of these, Dialectics no longer suffices ; 
the knowledge of the virtues and the affections is requisite 
for this, and Aristotle finds himself compelled to the acknow- 
ledgment that Eloquence is no longer akin to Dialectics 
alone, but also to the Ethical science called Politics. Thus 
he gets a fundamental principle having a two-fold nature, and 
destructive of all scientific unity — a quality, moreover, that 
is not to be met with again in the whole work. 
2 



14 ELOCIUENCE A VIRTUE ; GR 5 



CHAPTER IV, 



ELOQUENCE IS A VIRTUE. 



Since, therefore, Rhetoric cannot acquire a scientific form* if 
Eloquence is to be regarded as something fluctuating between 
Poetry and Philosophy ; since, furthermore, it can be subor- 
dinated neither to Poetry nor Philosophy, there is only one 
way left to find its highest fundamental principle — if it has one, 
— namely, to examine the third of the characteristic qualities 
noticed in it, the striving after an outward end, and to see if 
it will not lead to a firm fundamental principle. 

Production in Poetry and Philosophy is a species of ac- 
tivity which may be denominated the isolated, or that which 
retreats into itself again. For it simply unfolds an Idea, and 
in the process has no other end but this Idea and its unfold- 
ing. That which has been formed in this way can, indeed, 
like all that exists, exert an outward influence ; yet it never 
owes its origin to the design of exerting such an influence. 

There is another species of Activity, which always aims at 
an outward change, either in the sentiments and conduct of 
men, or in the social and family relations, or in the civil and 
ecclesiastical. Now, to this species of Activity — the sum-total 
of which constitutes Social Life — Eloquence also belongs, and 
it is so entirely implicated in the circumstances existing at the 
particular time, that even in thought it cannot be separated 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 15 

from, them. For although it is easy enough in the case of a 
tragedy of Sophocles, to contemplate it as something existing 
for itself, and to think of it as separated from all the civil re- 
lations of the poet, such a separation in the case of an oration 
by Demosthenes cannot be so effected in the least degree. 
Nothing in it is an isolated piece of art ; nothing can be torn 
out from the web of circumstances in which it was spoken ; 
only in connection with these does it constitute a unity, 
which again was nothing but an act, — a point in the political 
career of the orator. When the ancient orators appeared, 
their discourse was an action in the strictest and most com- 
mon signification of the word ; an action that was none the 
less worthy of the name, and none the less powerful, because 
they made use of speech instead of limbs, weapons, or other 
instruments. Nay, even in our unrhetorical times, if one were 
to regard the discourses of a sacred orator as a series of little 
separate pieces of art, delivered every Sunday, everybody cer- 
tainly would protest against such a view, and demand that his 
orations be regarded as individual attempts to influence his 
hearers, — as individual acts in the discharge of his calling ; 
whereby they would also become lost in the sum- total of his 
social influence. But since all the influence of man in his 
various relations is, or should be, under the guidance of the 
moral law, the practice of Eloquence — inasmuch as it is, in 
reality, influence of this sort — can be subjected to no other than 
Ethical laws. Eloquence strives to produce a change in the 
sentiments and conduct of other men ; the question, after its 
fundamental principles, therefore, becomes changed quite na- 
turally into this ; What are the laws according to which a free 



16 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OK, 

being may exert influence upon other free beings ? And the 
answer to this question can be derived only from Ethics. 

We will attempt to answer it. And if it shall turn out that 
all the rules of Eloquence, which have been truly and cor- 
rectly acknowledged as such, but which have been placed be- 
side each other in no inward connection, can be derived from 
the laws, according to which a free being may exert influence 
upon other free beings, there will be no doubt that Rhetoric, 
considered as the theory of Eloquence, is a part of Ethics, 
and that Eloquence itself is an ability to exert influence ac- 
cording to ethical laws — that is, is a Virtue. 

In this way, moreover, the perplexity will be removed in 
which Theorizers find themselves when they would deter- 
mine whether Eloquence is an art or not, and generally, what 
it is in reality. They cannot declare it to be an art, since it 
is plain that it aims at the attainment of an outward end, and 
not at a free and uninterested representation of the Beautiful. 
To the level of a trade, however, it cannot be degraded ; hence 
a distinction is made between fine and non-fine, aesthetic and 
non-sesthetic, arts ; strange expressions and difficult to be un* 
derstood ! # Into this latter class Eloquence is thrown, with 
the additional remark, that it merits the name of an art, in 
so far as we connect with this term the conception of a prac- 
tised and cultivated capacity and ability to produce works 
w r hose individual parts in their closest connection unite for 

* Schott's Theory of Eloquence, 1807, p. 17. Fundamental Princi- 
ples of Rhetoric and Homiletics, by the same, 1815, p. 420. — A con- 
densed summary of the first mentioned work of Schott, by Prof. Parl$. 
may be found in the Bibliotheca Sacra. — T?\ 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 17 

one and the same end. Under this conception, however, be- 
longs also every ability of a mechanical kind, and hence no- 
thing is added to the dignity of Eloquence by such a dis- 
tinction. But if the view of Eloquence brought forward by 
us can be maintained, not only a much more settled and defi- 
nite place would be secured to it, but also a place in the high- 
est degree honorable. It would belong to that which is high- 
est among men, to Virtue ; and could be called an Art only in 
so far as the name of Art could be given to Virtue itself. 

But in saying that Eloquence is a virtue, it is by no means 
meant that a certain degree of moral excellence is enough in 
order to Eloquence, and that all that is usually derived from 
Art, Learning, and Science, can be dispensed with. It is only 
meant that the arrangement and definition of that which Elo- 
quence derives to itself from these different departments, be- 
longs peculiarly to Ethical laws ; but this is the very thing that 
is demanded of a highest fundamental principle. Who, for ex- 
ample, would deny that the imagination is the highest law- 
giver for the painter ? And yet no painting can be completed 
by the imagination alone. There is needed, besides, mechan- 
ical skill, knowledge of colors, of perspective, of anatomy, of 
history ; the imagination as the highest fundamental principle, 
merely determines how each of these knowledges and abilities 
shall be applied. In like manner, means of various kinds are 
necessary to the orator, according to the different relations 
which he sustains, and according to the different ends which 
he proposes to himself, which are to be obtained only by study 
and practice ; but that which determines where, how, and in 
what degree, each of the existing means shall be applied, is 
2* 



18 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

the Ethical law, to which belongs every judgment regarding 
our relations, our ends, and our social influence. So that here 
the moral law does not merely point out the time for the 
action, leaving the guidance of the action to another principle, 
as would be the case in the practice of any particular art ; but 
Eloquence, in all its various forms, is nothing but the develope- 
ment of the Ethical impulse itself. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 19 



CHAPTER V. 



IDEAS. 



But what is the tenor of this highest law of Eloquence, 
which, according to what has been said, must necessarily be an 
Ethical one? It does not seem to us to be necessary here to 
unfold from the bottom a new and peculiar system of morals ; 
it will be sufficient to consider closely the relation which the 
orator sustains to the hearer. The few positions which we 
shall lay down, will, it is hoped, meet with a confirmatory re- 
sponse in the moral feeling of every cultivated man. 

The orator has plans and designs which he would realize, 
and to this end he must first overcome the sluggishness of in- 
different minds, and give them an impulse to action ; and 
secondly, he must overcome those who openly oppose, and 
carry them along with him. But he has no compulsory 
authority at all over the minds of others ; he is not a law- 
giver, who ordains the relations of men, and thus gives them 
direction in a mediate, yet sure and irresistible manner ; he 
is not a ruler, who leads a whole people hither and thither, 
because he has control over the possessions, life, and standing 
of every individual. He stands upon a perfect equality with 
those upon whom he would exert an influence ; and since his 
relation to them ensures him no open authority over their 
freedom, he may not surreptitiously obtain it in any secret 
manner ; he must respect their freedom, and neither by exciting 



20 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR. 

their emotions, nor deluding their understandings, deprive 
them of this prerogative. The hearer who is carried away, 
must, at the same time, act independently also ; and while he 
follows the will of the orator, he must not merely believe that 
he is following his own will, but must actually follow it. But 
how is the solution of such a difficult, and, as it would seem, 
insoluble problem, rendered possible ? From the fact that 
there is something altogether universal and necessary which 
all men will — something which they must will, from their 
moral nature ; from the fact that the true freedom of man is 
constantly striving after the realization of certain ideas, 
which can be enumerated and distinctly pointed out. The 
orator, therefore, has satisfied all the requisitions of morality, 
as soon as he has carried back his present design to one of 
those ideas which every individual of his hearers wishes to 
realize. For, in this way, the freedom of one man is not de- 
stroyed by the influence of another upon him ; he only fulfils 
from an impulse from without, what he is constantly seeking 
to fulfil from an inward impulse. The highest law of Elo- 
quence, therefore, is this : — the idea which the orator wishes 
to realize, is to be carried back to the necessary ideas of the 
hearer. 

Of these necessary ideas we must now obtain a more dis- 
tinct apprehension. Ideas, generally, are productive thoughts, 
which impel to production and action, and are themselves the 
germ of that which is to be produced, as well as the rule by 
which its form is to be constructed. As there are plastic,* 

* Plastic is here used in its strict signification, to denote that which 
pertains to sculpture, including works both in stone and bronze.— Tr. 



OCTLIXES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 21 

musical, poetic ideas, from which the creations in each of these 
spheres of art originate ; so there are also ethical ideas, 
which are destined to be embodied in life, which lie in the 
reason, must be pre-supposed to be in every man considered 
as a being endowed with reason, and are, moreover, actually 
in-dwelling in every one, though not in equal clearness and 
liveliness. For the mind in action, these ideas flow together 
into one, and form a whole, which flames before it as the one 
highest, after which it strives, and which is capable of an out- 
ward realization in its action. But in reflection, and in verbal 
statement, this one highest divides into three different ideas, 
according as it is referred to the circumstances under which 
action occurs, or to the character of the subject who acts, or 
to the necessary inward and outward consequences of the ac- 
tion. Every man wills the highest, in so far as it is closely 
determined and conditioned by his peculiar relations ; this is 
the Idea of Duty, Every man wills to be inclined and able to 
produce the highest at all times, and everywhere ; this is the 
Idea of Virtue. Every man wills that each and every one of 
his actions produce a series of internal and external conse- 
quences that will render the production of the highest easier 
for him in future ; this is the Idea of Happiness. In a word, 
every man wills to fulfil his duty, wills to form himself to vir- 
tue, wills to promote his own happiness.^ These are the ne- 

* The author here means to say that man wills to fulfil his duty, to 
form himself to virtue, and to promote his own real happiness, ideally — 
not actually. By virtue of his moral constitution, he wills and must 
will this, though by reason of sin he actually does not. But the orator 
must address man as he came from his Creator, and not as he has made 
himself; he must appeal to that which is highest in him, even although 



22 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; Oft, 

cessary practical ideas which are to be met with in every man, 
and freedom consists only in following these ideas uncondi- 
tionally. 

It is plain now, in what consists the first duty of the ora- 
tor. The hearer, while he is borne along, is, nevertheless, to 
remain free, and through the whole of his oration the orator is 
to carry back the idea everywhere present in it, to the neces- 
sary ideas of the hearer. He, in this way, shows them how, 
in order to fulfil their duty — in order to elevate themselves to 
virtue — in order to promote their happiness, they must also 
realize his propositions ; how the ideas of Duty, of Virtue, of 
Happiness, of themselves necessarily produce this very dispo- 
sition, necessarily impel them to the very conduct to which he 
would urge them. In this way, the orator not only respects 
the freedom of the hearer, but while he seems to overpower 
and utterly subject him, raises him, through the enlivenment 
of his ideas, to the very highest grade of an independent self- 
consciousness. It is for this reason, also, that men who abhor 
all compulsion, and are ready to resist all compulsory violence, 
love the orator and follow him gladly, because he gives them 
a direction, by means of ideas, the most powerful and certain, 
yet, at the same time, most innocent force by which men are 
controlled. "Whoever feels himself to be compelled, says 
Xenophon, "hates, as if he were deprived of some good; who- 
ever is persuaded, loves as if he had received a benefit."^ 

it does not find a realization in his actual life.. Only in this way can 
he profoundly move or elevate his hearer.^— ^V» 

* Memor. 1.2, 10. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 23 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FORM OF PRACTICAL IDEAS. 

But only in the most general relations — relations in which 
men meet each other as free beings merely, and before any 
relation of a more limited sort has developed itself from this 
original relation, do the regulating ideas of the will appear as 
Duty, Virtue, and Happiness. Through every closer connection 
among men, by which that original relation is further devel- 
oped and unfolded, these ideas also obtain a stricter determin- 
ation, a wider unfolding, and, consequently, another name. 
There are, however, two relations among men which have the 
common aim to render easy the realization of practical ideas, 
and which have both been established by God, the one in a 
supernatural manner, the other by a necessity of nature. The 
first is the Church ; the second is the State. 

We will, in the first place, consider what form the ethical 
ideas assume in this latter relation. Since in the State the 
universal ethical law, in its application to particular cases, 
becomes more closely determined by positive laws and ordi- 
nances, Civil Law here comes in, in the place of Duty. Since, 
furthermore, in the State, the happiness of every individual 
consists in his activity as a citizen being unrestricted, and 
since this cannot be unless there is a flourishing condition of 
the commonwealth, the ethical idea of Happiness becomes 
changed mto the striving after the well-being of the State. 



24 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

Lastly, Virtue here comes into notice only in so far as the 
highest — to the production of which it is disposed and suited— 
also promotes the well-being of the commonwealth, and in 
this reference Virtue is called Merit. Civil Law, the Common 
Weal, and Merit, are, consequently, the necessary ideas, by 
which every member of State, as such, is guided in his con- 
duct ; and the first duty of the orator, if he is dealing with his 
hearers as members of a State, consists in showing them how, 
through the execution of that which he proposes, Civil Law 
will be obeyed, the Common Weal will be promoted, and 
Civic Merit will be acquired* 

But these ideas attain a perfect unfolding, neither in the 
general ethical relations, nor in the particular political, since 
in these they remain shut up within the sphere of the earthly, 
which can never satisfy man, from his very nature. They 
acquire their highest dignity only through religion, and through 
their reference to the Deity, who imparts this reference to 
them. Hence they appear in the Church, where the Christian, 
as such, exercises an influence upon the Christian, regards 
his own activity as an efflux from the Deity, or as a striving 
to return back into Him, and thereby imparts to these ideas an 
actuating power, both for himself and others, of which they 
are always destitute when man does not rise above and be- 
yond his own individuality. 

In the Church, however, a divine institution, and under di- 
vine guidance, the human reason cannot be regarded as the 
highest law-giver ; God alone is the supreme law-giver who 
speaks to us through his natural word in the Conscience, and 
his revealed word in the Gospel, and gives us a rule of con- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 25 

duct ; what, therefore, this commands in a particular instance, 
is not merely Duty, (an idea that carries man back no further 
than to himself merely,) but the Will of God. Furthermore, 
when the Christian contemplates that disposition of the soul 
which is constantly applying itself to good works, and is able 
to perform them, he cannot possibly stop at mere Virtue ; for 
this denotes that degree of moral perfection to which man can 
raise himself — which he can attain by a constant struggle with 
sin. But the Christian knows of something higher ; he be- 
holds moral perfection as it reigns, without struggle, and 
without conflict, in the divine Being ; and hence this perfect 
condition of the soul can, for him, consist only in resemblance 
to God, or, since the invisible God has become man, and has 
lived and acted in human relationships, in resemblance to 
Christ. Happiness, again, he cannot possibly seek in a series 
of states and conditions, each one of w T hich renders the pro- 
duction of the highest good, easier in the next following ; in- 
stead of this, his eye, pressing forward into eternity, beholds 
the final goal to which this series conducts — namely, intimate 
union with God, or Blessedness ; he, therefore, as his guiding 
idea, chooses this alone, which is the goal, and not Happiness, 
which conceived of in its highest ethical purity, can yet con- 
stitute only the way to this goal. 

Hence, when an orator contemplates himself and his hearers 
as members of the Church, his first duty consists in bringing 
the Idea which he would impart to them, into connection 
with the Ideas which he must necessarily presuppose in 
them ; and these, according to the foregoing, are the W r ill of 
God, Resemblance to God, Blessedness. If no one of these is 
3 



26 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

prominent in a sermon, as the point from which everything 
is viewed, so much is certain at least — the sermon does 
not belong to the sphere of Eloquence. It is not conceivable, 
however, why the sacred orator should deem it unworthy of 
his office to be at home in this sphere of Eloquence, since ac- 
cording to what has been said before, Eloquence is not only 
the most innocent of all influences, but is Virtue itself. It 
has shown itself to be such thus far, and, it is hoped, will 
prove itself to be such, still more, in what is to follow. 

I must here beg my readers to carefully note a result which 
flows with the greatest certainty from the investigation thus 
far, the truth of which, however, has never been strictly 
proved, nay, has been doubted by most — namely, that eccle- 
siastical Eloquence is entirely one and the same with politi- 
cal, as to its Ideas, 2. e., as to its nature. 

In saying this, however, we do not deny that they differ 
from one another in their outward form, in an important de- 
gree ; for Church and State are very different relationships, 
and relationships always exert a material influence upon 
every species of moral activity .^ 

■ It is apparent furthermore, that even if it be granted that 
the political and judicial Eloquence of the Ancients has per- 
ished, still only one form of the thing, and not the very thing 

* Herder says in his letters upon the study of Theology, (letter 40,) 
" Whoever takes the judicial orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, as 
an absolute model for his sermons, has no true conception either of a 
sermon or of a judicial oration; he does not understand the true end of 
either." True, if he makes them an absolute model. But as I have pre- 
sented the matter, this objection would not, it is hoped, apply to my 
view. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 27 

itself, has perished ; for this has risen again in Ecclesiastical 
Eloquence with a still higher splendor ; the Ideas upon which 
Eloquence is based have been made more splendid by passing 
through the medium of Religion, and whatever deficiency 
modern Eloquence may have in perfection of form, when com^ 
pared with ancient, it is compensated for by the superiority 
of its subject-matter, while, at the same time, it is to be re-f 
membered that perfection in the outward form is far more 
easily attained when the subject is of a less elevated nature, 
than when it is of the absolutely highest. Finally, it is ap- 
parent, that even if it be granted that Ecclesiastical Eloquence 
itself has disappeared, as is actually asserted by some, still 
Eloquence itself is not destroyed, but must be sought for in 
the intercourse of men, in their daily society. In a word, 
Eloquence is eternal, for it rests upon that which is eternal in 
man — upon his ethical Ideas.^ 



* L' eloquence peut se trouverdans les entretiens et dans tout genre 
d'ecrire. Elle est rarement, ou on la cherche, et elle est quelquefois ou 
on ne la cherche point. — La Bniyere. 



28 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF ELOQUENCE. 

Although all three of these Ideas may be employed very pro- 
perly on one and the same occasion, as motive grounds, yet 
most commonly, the aim of the orator has a more easy refer- 
ence to one of them, which is then predominant, and to which 
the others, when they are employed, are subordinated. This 
circumstance led the Ancients to assume three species of ora- 
tions, of which one has Legality and Illegality, another, Public 
Advantage and Public Detriment, and the third, Civic Merit 
and Civic Demerit, for its subject-matter. The first is the ora- 
tion before the court of justice ; the second, the deliberative 
or political oration ; the third, the panegyrical or demonstra- 
tive oration. Correct as this division is, the Ancients have 
nevertheless, so far as I am aware, given no satisfactory 
ground for it, as indeed they were in general well fitted for 
comprehending and distinguishing the Actual, but were less 
successful in referring it to its higher principles. For that 
which Aristotle, from whom the later Rhetoricians derive this 
division,* offers in its justification,! has in truth more resem- 
blance to a jest, however earnest he may have been in it. 
There are, says he, as many species of orations as there are 

* auintil. Ill, 4. 

t Rhetor. I, 3. Cicero derives this division in the same way. De 
Partitione, c, III. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 29 

species of hearers ; but the hearer is either a spectator or 
a judge, and this latter again, in respect to the Future, and in 
respect to the Past ; hence there arise the demonstrative, the 
deliberative, and the judicial orations. This supposition, of 
a hearer who is merely a spectator, is most remarkable. The 
demonstrative orations of the Sophists, (i. e., discourses 
having no other aim but to strike by the jingle of words,) 
were indeed listened to with applause in the time of Aristotle ; 
but this must be regarded only as a piece of bad taste, and 
not as a natural impulse in man, upon which to build philosor 
phically. Furthermore, although the relations in which the 
hearers usually stood to the orator in the ancient Kepublics, 
are imperfectly indeed denoted by this passing of judgment 
on the Past or the Future, yet it is by no means shown 
thereby, that there were only so many and could be no more 
of such relations/* 

On the contrary, if these three species of orations are placed 
beside the three Ideas above-mentioned, it is apparent that 
these are the only ground upon which the division in question 
rests. For since among the Ancients, only the political rela- 
tion reached any good degree of perfection, these Ideas could 
be actualized among them only under the form of the Legal 
and the Illegal, the Weal and the Detriment of the State, Civic 
Merit and its contrary, and this very relation is also assigned 
as the subject-matter of the three species. 
. If divisions are to be made at all in Eloquence, the different 
species cannot be determined by a reference to the Form 

* That also does not seem to be satisfactoiy which occurs to Q,u;n- 
tjlian, cuncta rimanti, III, 4. 
3* 



30 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

and Matter, and to the manner in which both interpenetrate each 
other ; in Poetry this can be done ; in Eloquence it cannot be,* 
for the reason, that the Form and the Matter vary with the 
relations which the orator and the hearer sustain, and these 
relations are too numerous to be specified. The leading 
Ideas are the permanent in Eloquence, the only thing which 
does not change ; and on this account, they of themselves alone 
furnish a ground of division. 

If , these three species constitute a valid division in political 
Eloquence, they must be found in sacred Eloquence also, 
since the fundamental Ideas are the same in both. To coun- 
sel for the well-being of the State, and to point out the way to 
eternal well-being, is a moral activity of one and the same kind ; 
as also there is no practical difference between accusing a 
criminal and inveighing against a vice, between praising a 
meritorious man and recommending a virtue. It is only to 
be regretted that the names by which the Ancients designated 
these species are suited to political Eloquence alone ; and it 
could be wished, that appellations of an entirely general char- 
acter might be introduced, which could be applied indiscri- 
minately to both political and sacred Eloquence. 

That species of oration which is based upon the Idea of 
Virtue was developed latest ; it first received its complete 
unfolding through the Church, to which the State was 
always unfavorable. For this reason, also, this species 
was never known among the Ancients in its purity. Aris- 
totle apprehends it merely on the side of the praise and 

* Oratorum genera esse dicuntur tamquam poetarum. Id secus est 

Cicero de optimo genere oratorum, c. I. 



I OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 31 

blame which it dispenses, and makes it a demonstrative oration 
without any practical aim. Cicero, who adheres closely to 
this same view, doubts whether it can be regarded as a species 
at all, and whether it is necessary to give rules concerning it.* 
And contemplated from this point of view, it certainly does 
not belong to Eloquence. If a writer praises and censures 
with no other purpose but to praise and to censure, produc- 
tions of two kinds can arise : a Lyrical Poem, if the writer sur- 
renders himself to his feelings ; or an historical representation, 
if he follows the thread of a narrative. It will be an oration 
only in case the purpose to awaken a certain disposition in 
the hearer, — to determine him to a certain course of conduct, 
is connected with the praise and the censure. The Idea of 
Virtue is employed in this way certainly by the Ancients ; yet 
it is seldom predominant, and commonly is subordinate mere- 
ly, as when Demosthenes places before the Athenians the ex- 
ample of their forefathers as an incitement to great deeds, or 
pictures the worthlessness of an opponent in order to give 
greater weight to his defence or accusation. 

A peculiar species of oration, based upon the Idea of Vir- 
tue, was first formed in the Christian Church ; here the moral 
perfection, which is conceived of as being in God, which was 
manifested in Christ, after w T hich whole companies of saints 
strove, was exhibited to believers for imitation. With the 
panegyrical oration in praise of the saints, was soon conjoined 
the funeral oration, which is also constructed upon the Idea 
of Virtue, and which deserves the name of an oration only 
when, through commendation of the deceased, it seeks to 

* De Oratore, II, c. 11. 



32 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR 

impel the hearer to good inclinations and resolutions. E very- 
department of Literature, nevertheless, has its limits, where 
it borders upon some other ; thus this species of oration, 
based upon the Idea of Virtue, forms the transition from 
Eloquence to the Lyrical Poem, on the one hand, and to Histo- 
rical Representation on the other. For this reason, the great- 
est care is requisite in the orator at this point, in order not to 
lose himself in one or the other. It would be forgetfulness of 
the relations in which he stands to his hearers, and, conse- 
quently, contrary to morality, if, without thinking of their 
benefit, he should give himself up entirely to his feelings, or 
should follow out a Historical Representation ; either of which 
may be done only so far as it contributes to the attainment 
of an ethical end. It is difficult, I acknowledge, for the ora- 
tor to describe his hero with some good degree of complete- 
ness, and still bring all under such a practical point of view 
as that he can be sure of exerting an influence upon the 
hearer. Yet the solution of this problem is not impossible s 
as the great models show. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 33 



CHAPTER VIII. 



VIRTUE IS ALSO GOOD SENSE. 



In case the orator satisfies the requisitions of duty, by refer- 
ring the end he has in view to the ethical Ideas of the hearer, 
the question arises, whether this course is also in accordance 
with good sense, and whether there are not other and far 
more effectual means of gaining entrance to men's minds, and 
of giving them a direction. Should this be found to be the 
case — should it be found that the orator in reality has only to 
choose between acting contrary to good sense, by following 
out moral principles, or acting contrary to good morals, by 
following out the rules of good sense, we must then give up 
the design of giving a systematic form to the Theory of Elo- 
quence, since nothing is capable of a systematic form which 
is either essentially incomplete in itself, or stands in open 
contradiction to one of the fundamental impulses in man — 
the moral. But, furthermore, this question itself could not 
even arise, if the science of morals were only a little more 
developed than, alas, it actually is, although man has been 
employed in its unfolding for so many centuries. We should, 
in that case, see that Ethics, since it includes the whole con- 
duct of man, must also furnish the means requisite to attain 
rational ends ; that it cannot exist at all as a science, — that 
there can be, absolutely, no conduct in conformity with prin- 
ciples, if the same laws which prescribe our actions do not, at 



34 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OB, 

the same time, also point out the way and means whereby they 
will best succeed. In accordance, however, with views now 
prevailing, we hear much of good sense, as an attribute which 
often leads aside from the path of morals, and which, in its 
resources, shrewdly derived from experience and personal ob- 
servation, furnishes us the surest means of attaining our 
ends. Whether this is so or not, I leave undecided ; but that 
for the orator the moral action is also good sense — L e., is the 
true way of attaining his ends — is already apparent, from the 
investigation thus far. For we have found this to be a law — 
namely, that the orator must make his design subserve the 
moral Ideas of his hearers, otherwise he must not attempt to 
give them a direction. But so very much is Virtue one 
with good sense, that this very reference to the moral Ideas of 
the hearer is the only infallible means of giving him a direc- 
tion. Will one here say, " No ! the orator must address him- 
self to the passions of men; he must make use of them 
where he finds them excited ; he must arouse them where he 
cannot pre -suppose their existence, for only in this way are 
minds and hearts swayed. Who will deny that they are not 
very often swayed in this way, and that a practised orator, 
who understands how to inflame the passions, is able to get 
the victory over a less practised orator, who aims only to 
awaken moral Ideas ?" The case, however, must not be 
stated in this way, but we must imagine two men of equal 
talents, one of whom takes hold of the hearer in the way pre- 
scribed by us, on the side of his moral Ideas — that is, on his 
stronger side, — and the other of whom endeavors to seize him 
by his weak side, to corrupt, to blind, to deceive him ; the 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 35 

first, I affirm, will always succeed, the second will always 
fail. 

And, indeed, for this reason — because by virtue of his hu- 
man nature, moral Ideas are in-dwelling in every individual 
hearer, while, on the contrary, the possession of a human na- 
ture does not imply that man is controlled at all times by pas- 
sion, or even that he is peculiarly liable to be. Consequently, 
if the orator pre-supposes the presence of passion, it is very- 
possible for him to be mistaken ; and if the orator endeavors 
to excite passion, such an undertaking is always very doubt- 
ful, since a firm point to which he can fasten is wanting. 
This point, on the contrary, is always found, and the orator is 
always sure to awaken interest, so soon as he claims to have 
morality on his side. 

Secondly, even supposing that the passions exist as gene- 
rally in the hearer as the moral Ideas, yet these latter possess 
this advantage over the former, that they are the same in all, 
while the passions, on the contrary, are different in each indi- 
vidual. But the orator cannot address himself to each parti- 
cular individual ; one and the same effect is to be produced 
in the most diverse minds by one and the same oration. Now, 
how wanting in good sense would the orator be, if he should 
neglect the universal interest grounded in human nature, in 
order to speak of the particular interest grounded in a pas- 
sion which could affect only some particular minds, and with 
respect to which the most would be cold and indifferent ! 

In the third place, in addition to this, a very true remark, 
and one that is very much to the honor of man, applies here — 
namely, that taken singly, men may, indeed, be full of little 



36 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

passions ; but so soon as they are collected in great masses, 
each one seems to give up the base portion of his individual- 
ity, in order to preserve the purely human in it, which is al- 
ways good. When man loses himself in a multitude, he is no 
longer the narrow-hearted creature governed by desire and 
self-seeking ; but his interests melt in with those of all the 
others, and, consequently, cannot be other than pure and 
noble. The greater, therefore, the assemblage is, the more 
large-minded must the orator be, or it is all over with him. 

Nay, even the deception which is so often employed by 
popular orators, proves that a direction can be imparted to 
men only by means of moral Ideas ; for how does the orator 
succeed even in this case ? By no means by appealing to 
Avarice or Revenge, directly, and endeavoring to inflame 
these passions ; for no one has ever been able to carry away a 
great multitude by this means. On the contrary, the art of 
the deceiver of the people has ever consisted in clothing the 
desires growing out of their particular passions in the garb of 
requirements, based upon the universal moral Ideas. Thus the 
Demagogues in the French Revolution were able to bring about 
their great results only by concealing their selfish designs un- 
der the Ideas of Justice, the Common Weal — i. e. 9 under moral 
Ideas ; and they could not but succeed, for owing to the mis- 
fortune of the times, there were none who were able to exhi- 
bit these Ideas in their pure form with equal force. But that 
the pure moral Ideas, when they are presented with power, 
gain the victory, (even in the most frivolous and corrupt 
minds,) over that false play with Ideas, the case of Demos- 
thenes proves, who beat down his opponent, not merely by 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 37 

means of his massive Style and his perfect Declamation, but 
mainly by means of the purity of his Will, and the power 
of his moral Ideas. 

Fourthly, it is to be remembered that every hearer is by 
nature suspicious, particularly when he perceives that the 
right to influence his mind is claimed, and when he reflects 
that he should yield himself up only to one who appears to 
him to be an honest man. It is for this reason, also, that 
teachers of Rhetoric attach so much importance to the way in 
which the speaker appears to the hearer, and to the first im- 
pression which the hearer receives from the orator. But 
nothing is so difficult as to play the honest man, and one is 
far more readily taken for an honest man, if he really is one. 
For the consciousness of being in the right imparts a coloring 
to the style, and an emphasis to the tone, which an evil con- 
science can imitate only in part, never perfectly ; and the 
morally bad which peers through, will always induce a sus- 
piciousness in the hearer, which renders him less susceptible 
to influence. Hence, when Rousseau advised a young and 
afterwards very distinguished French advocate, Loiseau de 
Mauleon, to undertake the defence of only such causes as he 
was convinced were just, this was a Rhetorical rule, for 
the very reason that it was an ethical tule, and adapted to 
promote, in the same degree, both Integrity and Eloquence. 



3S ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE SUBORDINATE IDEAS OR CATEGORIES. 

The orator, in this moral striving to connect his particular 
Ideas with the universal and necessary Ideas of his hearers, is 
liable to meet with obstacles of three different kinds. Fij^t, 
there are the obscure and undeveloped conceptions which the 
hearer forms of the nature of things, whereby he may be pre- 
vented from recognizing something which the orator holds 
out (as e. g. t Duty, Virtue, or Happiness,) as really being 
such, and so from taking it up into his own Ideas. Secondly, 
the hearer, from a defective knowledge of existing relations, 
and of the present state of things, may be in doubt whether 
an Idea, from which in other respects he does not dissent, is 
practicable. Lastly, the hearer may form a different opinion 
with respect to the actual reality of a matter to which the 
orator would apply one of the higher Ideas, or, to speak gene- 
rally, may not be convinced of its real historical existence. 
Hence arises the necessity for the orator, first, to instruct the 
hearer in the true ifature and quality of things ; secondly, to 
make clear to him the practicability of the proposed under- 
taking ; thirdly, to show him that the matter in question has 
been actually realized, or to convince him of its historical 
certainty. Hence arise, for the theory of Eloquence, three 
subordinate Ideas, or Categories, as I would rather call them : 
Truth, Possibility, Actuality. And here it is evident that 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 39 

moral attributes alone do not suffice for the management of 
these Categories, but that Philosophic culture, and a great com- 
pass of solid knowledge, is requisite. If it is asked by what 
right, then, we bring these Categories into a theory of Eloquence 
grounded upon ethical principles, I would reply : Because the 
moral maxim, that the orator should refer his particular 
Idea to the universal Ideas of the hearer, can be followed out, 
only in case the doubts, or false views of the hearer, in relation 
to the categories, Truth, Possibility, and Actuality, are re- 
moved ; and this work, since it is under the guidance of a 
moral principle, must also be regarded as moral in its nature. 
And secondly, because the orator, in case he did not possess 
the scientific culture and the substantial knowledge which are 
requisite, would be morally obligated to attain them, since 
they are the necessary means, in order to the execution of a 
moral undertakiog* The orator, even if he acquires Philoso- 
phic culture and Historical knowledge, to the full extent per- 
mitted and required by the highest ethical principles, does not 
thereby become a Philosopher or Historian, but must ever be 
regarded as one whose sphere is action, and who seeks to ex- 
ert an influence externally. 



40 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 



CHAPTER X. 



THE CATEGORY, TRUTH. 



If we should make Truth — i. e., the exhibition of the essen- 
tial nature of things — the ultimate end in Eloquence, Elo- 
quence would thereby become entirely identical with Philo- 
sophy. But we regard it only as a subordinate Category, to 
which the higher moral Ideas lead. In this way Eloquence 
maintains its ethical character, and at the same time its affi- 
nity with Philosophy is explained. 

It is therefore allowable, and oftentimes necessary, for the 
orator to philosophize, whether the need of the Truth, as such, 
becomes apparent only after the conflict between the practical 
Ideas of the orator and the hearer has begun — in which case, 
Truth merely furnishes the intermediate positions by which 
the former are the more easily made to harmonize with the 
latter ; or whether the orator begins with the exhibition of the 
Truth — a thing that may be done if it accords with the aim and 
the circumstances of the orator, and if the moral impulse from 
which it originates and the moral design for which it is done, 
are plainly to be seen. Then this impulse itself and this de- 
sign will set the bounds within which the Rhetorical presenta- 
tion of Truth must be kept, and by which it is distinguished 
from the Philosophical, which aims at the mere developement 
of Ideas without reference to anything farther. 

The exhibition of Truth is an object of prime importance 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 41 

in sacred Eloquence, and is one of the characteristics by 
which it is specially distinguished from secular Eloquence. 
In secular Eloquence, only one deed, one single resolve, is 
sought to be produced by the orator. This determines, and of 
necessity limits very narrowly, all that belongs to the mere de- 
velopement of a subject and the mere informing of the mind, 
The problem of the sacred orator, on the contrary, is — to con- 
duct man to eternal life through the knowledge of God and of 
His Son, and to mould his spirit in such a way that not 
merely one good deed, but a complete change of the inner 
man, and a whole series of good deeds, may be the result. Be- 
flections upon human nature and its relation to God, so far as 
they are referred back to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, are 
therefore perfectly in place in the sacred oration. 

Nevertheless, the Rhetorical presentation of Truth is en- 
tirely-different from the Philosophical; for, in Philosophy, 
Truth is moulded wholly, and on all sides, in a statuesque 
manner, so to speak, so that as in the case of a statue, there is 
no particular point of view, no perspective, for it, but it pre- 
sents a p o the beholder wherever he stands. In 
Eloquence, on the contrary, Truth appears only in a pic- 
turesque manner, and in profile, so to speak, for the orator 
presents only so much of it to the hearer, as is necessary to 
convince him, and as the theme requires. While, therefore, 
Duty commands the orator to strive after scientific culture, 
so bids him to forget and sacrifice all the sensible, pro- 
found, and excellent thought he may have upon a topic, if it 
lispensably necessary to the attainment of his end. 
4# 



42 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR ; 



CHAPTER XL 

THE RHETORICAL DEMONSTRATION OF TRUTH. 

Two points, therefore, have been fixed with respect to Philo- 
sophizing in Eloquence : first, that some exhibition of politi- 
cal, ethical, and religious truths is necessary in Eloquence ; 
second, that this exhibition cannot be made with the complete- 
ness of Philosophy. From this it follows, further, that the 
strict demonstration of a proposition — i. e. f its derivation from 
the one highest principle of all knowledge — is not allowable in 
an oration ; since by a method of this sort, the practical aim 
of the oration would either be destroyed entirely, or at best 
would only faintly glimmer through. Here, therefore, arises 
the difficult question : How is Truth to be established in Elo- 
quence, if it is not allowable to demonstrate it Philosophi- 
cally ? 

In answer, it is to be noted in the first place, that there are 
many truths which do not need such a demonstration, and to 
which the orator can gain the assent of all hearers by a plain 
explication, by a happy illustration, by a fitting application of 
it to a circumstance in plain view. 

If this is not possible, then doubt respecting any particular 
Truth, since it cannot be removed by means of a demonstra- 
tion, must be removed by means of Authority ; that is, the 
Authority of the hearer himself or the Authority of another. 
And this latter, again, is either human or divine. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 43 

The orator cites the Authority of the hearer himself, when 
he shows him that, in rejecting a certain Truth, he stands 
in contradiction to himself, and to convictions to which he 
has given expression upon other occasions. This species of 
argument, which, from its brevity and convincing power, has 
such a great advantage over philosophical demonstrations, is 
to be strongly recommended to the orator, and in order to be 
able to apply it with success, he must have the views and 
opinions of the general mass constantly in view, and as much 
as possible must enter into them. Herein, I believe, partly 
consists the Popularity so highly praised, and always required, 
in the orator. I am not afraid that the orator, in thus con- 
stantly referring to the in ate convict'ons of his hearers, will 
find that which is false and degrading. It would indeed be 
degrading to proceed from an Idea which the orator him- 
self regards as absurd, for the sake of pleasing the hearer ; but 
why are the opinions diffused among the mass of men to be 
regarded as false and absurd, as a matter of course ? On the 
contrary, is it not an essential characterist c of human nature 
that the Truth can never utterly die out of i , but that a por- 
tion of it is ever preserved pure and genuine ? And why 
should not the orator present what he has to say, in this form, 
rather than in a systematic argument ? Since, moreover, the 
freedom of the hearer must be respected, it will be respected 
far more if I mould him, so to speak, from within outward, 
and by means of the developement which I impart to his own 
Ideas, than if I lace him up in a system foreign to him. And 
I shall have less reason for attempting this last, because, by 
joining on upon his own inward conviction, I can with less dif- 



44 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

ticulty gain him over to a salutary truth ; and because, on the 
contrary, the finest philosophical explication would perhaps 
only weary him and render him indifferent to his own true 
well-being and the practical aim of my oration. Hence, if an 
orator in the expression of his Ideas, seeks to please himself 
simply, and for this reason forgets his hearers and the end 
which he has or should have in view, I affirm that this is not 
only contrary to good sense, since he can never in this way 
attain his end, but it is also contrary to morality — it is repre- 
hensible self-seeking. And the evidence that it is contrary to 
morality, is found in the very fact, that it defeats his under- 
taking. For the orator, with all his powers, is now in the 
Ethical domain, and consequently, that which aids these 
powers must be morally good, and that which thwarts them 
must be morally bad. The distinctive character therefore, of 
oratorical discourse, is Popularity, using the term in its high- 
est sense ; and the orator is to join on upon the Truth as it 
exists among the mass of the people, and to esteem the gen- 
eral form in which he finds it here, more highly than that 
particular form which he has given to it in his Philosophical 
system. 

If, however, there should be no one anions: the Ideas of the 
hearer which the orator can employ as the basis of his argu- 
mentation, then, since a scientific investigation is entirely for- 
bidden him, he must betake himself to human or divine Au- 
thority. And, indeed, nothing is more frequent than the em- 
ployment of the former of these in speeches upon legal cases 
and affairs of state. If the orator thinks that the enlivenment 
of the Ethical Ideas of the judge is not sufficient in order to 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 45 

obtain from him the desired decision, he cites the Authority of 
the law : and if an opinion which is being maintained is not 
in accordance with the conceptions of a political assemblage, it 
must then be shown that, in a similar case, a statesman of ac- 
knowledged wisdom thought or spoke in the very same way. 

To sacred Eloquence, in particular, Authority, and indeed 
a divine Authority, is so necessary, that this species of Elo- 
quence would not have arisen, and, even now, cannot exist, 
without it. The highest of all truths — those pertaining to 
the relation of God to man — are here presented to view, in 
order to serve as a guide to man in his striving after Happi- 
ness, and as motives to sanctiiication. Even granting, what, 
however, is not to be granted, that these truths can be reached 
by Philosophic Deduction alone, yet this method is not to be 
followed by the orator ; for, although knowledge, indeed, 
might be imparted in this way, yet all the practical benefits 
of knowledge would be lost, or, at best, would be but scantily 
reaped. Furthermore, neither the Authority of the hearer, 
nor that of any man whatever, is a sufficient foundation upon 
which to base truths of such importance, and which lie en- 
tirely beyond the ordinary field of view. They need, there- 
fore, a divine Authority, when they are employed in public 
discourse, to promote the sanctification and blessedness of men. 
It was for this reason that, among the Ancients, who were des- 
titute of a positive Revelation, not even a purely moral Elo- 
quence could be developed along with political Eloquence, 
notwithstanding the high degree of excellence which charac- 
terises their ethical systems, and that a religio-moral Elo- 
quence did not appear until Christianity appeared. This 



46 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

species of Eloquence rises and sets according as Faith in a 
divine Revelation grows stronger or weaker ; and, from the 
very nature of the case, in proportion as the sacred orator 
loses the conviction of the divine Authority of the Bible, his 
Eloquence, also, must Jose in Power and Dignity. Let one 
imagine to himself a pulpit orator endowed with the finest ta- 
lents, but who places his own individual reason not beneath, but 
above Revelation, and who, consequently, in determining the 
relations which God sustains to man, and which men should 
sustain to each other, can appeal to no higher divine Authori- 
ty. If the predominant bent of his mind is Philosophic, he 
will make it his principal business to exhibit, to explain, and, 
as far as possible, to demonstrate, the principles of his reli- 
gious and ethical systems. Now, passing over the objection 
to such an undertaking, that it is ordinarily not suited to the 
average degree of culture in a promiscuous assembly, I ask 
what, at most, can be the result, even supposing that the 
hearer rightly apprehends all the views of the speaker ? 
Scientific culture, indeed ; but the improvement of the heart 
and life of the hearer, and not scientific culture, was the de- 
sign of the orator, and he must miss of this, since his whole 
time has been taken up in the endeavor to establish certain 
truths, and none is left, to connect them with the higher prac- 
tical Ideas of the hearer. Ke will, perhaps, attempt to do 
this in the conclusion ; but if the whole of the oration, up to 
the conclusion, has not been planned with the design to 
awaken moral interest, the orator will in vain labor after this 
in the application of his discourse. 

Furthermore, it seems to me that one can never have so 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 47 

firm and unshaken confidence in the religious and practical 
views which he derives from a human system, be it his own 
or another's, as in those truths which, having acknowledged a 
revelation, he receives on its Authority. Hence, there will 
always be in the minds of pulpit orators who are skeptical 
respecting a Revelation, a certain embarrassment, scarcely per- 
ceived by themselves, which will betray itself in their pre- 
sentation of Truth, now by a cold, indifferent tone, now by 
unnatural effort and distorted zeal ; and thus the truths pre- 
sented by them, however excellent they may be, will never 
acquire the influence over the feelings and the will which a 
calmer, more powerful emphasis would have imparted. 

But what carries this embarrassment to the highest pitch, 
and must, in the utmost degree, weaken the Rhetorical power 
of a pulpit orator in the exhibition of truth, is the obscure 
feeling which will certainly press upon him, that, considering 
the relation which he sustains to his hearer, there is some- 
thing contrary to uprightness in such a way of thought ; and 
this not merely because he is acting contrary to the designs 
of the State and the Church, who have appointed him to pro- 
claim, not his own individual and human opinions, but divine 
truth — although this seems to me to be a very well-grounded 
scruple — but principally because his office invests him with a 
dignity and respect which must appear as unwarrantable as- 
sumption in the case of every one who does not found his 
teaching on divine Authority. It is true, indeed, that when 
a man appears before other men, in order to prosecute the 
guilty, or defend the innocent, or to propose measures for the 
Common Weal, he needs no impulse from above, and no divine 



48 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

Authority, in order to do this. But it is difficult to under- 
stand how a man, with no basis but his own strength alone, 
and not regarding himself as the ambassador of a higher be- 
ing, can dare to point out to his fellow-men, this, as the road 
to salvation, and that, as the road to perdition, and now, to 
urge them on by the prospect of the punishment and retribu- 
tions of a future world, and now, to hold them back. He can 
acquire the right to do this only through a wisdom and vir- 
tue higher than human ; and who will venture to ascribe 
these perfections to himself? The higher the degree in which 
he does really possess them, the greater, it seems to me, must 
be his dread of being made vain, even in his feelings, by ap- 
pearing in public. Moreover, he sees among his hearers 
persons who are his equals in moral and scientific culture, or, 
it may be, his superiors. Feeling as though, in this case, it 
would be unbecoming to seize with a strong grasp upon their 
minds, he seeks to say to his little public only what is pa- 
thetic, agreeable and entertaining ; and if he describes a 
vice, he gives them to understand that he does not suspect 
any one of his hearers^ but has in his eye certain other per- 
sons who are out of their circle. Emotion is everything for 
him, and the awakening of Feeling that comes to nothing ; 
he seeks to be brilliant by means of external attractions and 
an ornamental style ; # and thus his discourses are deprived 
of power and usefulness by his skepticism. 

Let one, on the contrary, imagine to himself a sacred ora- 
tor of less talent, but who, to a sincere will to do good, joins 

* Un clerc mondain ou irreiigieux, s'il monte en chaire, est declama- 
teur. — hn Bruy&re. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 49 

an unshaken belief in the truths of the Christian religion ; 
and let him see what a higher elevation and sweep his dis- 
courses will receive from this single circumstance. While he 
derives the sublimest truths from the Holy Scriptures, where 
they are given to him in the clearest, most popular form, he 
is, at the same time, through the divine Authority of the Bi- 
ble, raised above all prolix developements and arguments, and 
without troubling himself about them, can apply his whole 
power to directly impressing the minds of his hearers. The 
truths exhibited by him will be the more readily believed, 
since he himself speaks only because he believes, and since 
his firm inward conviction gives an equally calm and moving 
emphasis to his tone, before which all doubt must disappear. 
With all the humility produced by a sense of the weakness of 
the human reason, as well as of his own moral deficiencies, he 
yet feels that, without assumption, he may address instruction, 
rebuke and exhortation to his equals, nay, to those better and 
wiser than himself, since he speaks to them, not in his own, 
but in God's name ; and since as an ambassador of the 
Highest, he is raised above every one, be he who he may. 
Since, therefore, the design of the sacred orator to lead to Vir- 
tue and Happiness through the knowledge of the truth, is to 
be attained only through his belief in Eevelation ; since with- 
out this, the relation which he sustains to his hearers has not 
even a moral validity, it is plain that belief in Eevelation in 
his case, must not only be regarded as a religious characteris- 
tic, but as a moral excellence also, and should be strictly re- 
quired in him. It is in this connection the more mournful to 
notice, that so many, from a groundless fear of giving displea- 
5 



50 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

sure by recognizing a divine Authority, either conceal their 
belief in it altogether, or else give only timid utterance to it, 
and thereby deprive their discourses of power, dignity, use- 
fulness, and consequently in the end, of the approbation of the 
public also. 

To him who is animated by the lofty desire of rivalling 
the political Eloquence of the Greeks, and of speaking from 
the pulpit with Demosthenean power, I would say " Science, 
Learning, Style, Delivery, these all render easier the practice 
of Eloquence, but do not make the orator. Demosthenes be- 
came an orator through the greatness and solidity of his 
character, and these qualities are indispensable to you too, in 
order to the attainment of your aim ; but they are not all you 
need. Though the greatest perfection attainable here, were 
yours, yet you are not free from human weakness, and who 
gives you the right to proclaim salvation or damnation to 
your brethren, who are not worse than yourself? This diffi- 
culty you will feel ; you will not venture to speak to them with 
power; you will be compelled to content yourself with exci- 
ting their emotions, or enriching their stores of information 
with new views ; you will perhaps, for a time, be listened to 
with applause by a mixed assembly ; but the abiding, eternal 
renown — the salutary, ever-onward-rolling influence of your 
efforts, is gone. You are weak and fearful so long as you 
would rest upon yourself ; dare to regard yourself as the or- 
gan of a higher Being, and you are all power and all courage. 
Faith plants you firm and sure ; your teaching is no longer 
that of the Pharisees — unmeaning sound, and useless hair- 
splitting ; you teach with power, like Jesus himself — for he 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 51 

spake the words of His Father, and you speak His. Appro- 
priate each and every one of His words, as well as those 
which His spirit gave to His Apostles ; but take them in the 
very sense in which they spake them. You do not believe it 
now, but your own experience will soon teach you, that in the 
doctrines of our religion lies hidden all the power of sacred 
Eloquence." 

Would that many might understand me, and through 
Eloquence be led to Christianity ! A great honor for 
Eloquence, and a glorious gain for Christianity ! For were it 
not as well and fitting to attain to Christian faith through Elo- 
quence, as by the ordinary way of adversity and suffering ? 



52 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE \ OR. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE CATEGORIES, POSSIBILITY AND ACTUALITY. 

As the higher Rhetorical Ideas lead the orator to the Category 
Truth — i. e. 9 to the exhibition of the nature of things, — they 
also frequently demand the proof of the possibility and actual 
existence of a thing. And hence, in addition to Truth, Possi- 
bility and Actuality come into view as subordinate Rhetorical 
Ideas, or Categories. 

The Idea of Possibility is employed in a special manner in 
the oration before deliberative bodies. In this case, however 
apparent the benefits are that accrue from the execution of 
the proposed undertaking, yet the courage of the hearer often 
falls on reflecting how difficult the undertaking is, and his in- 
dolence intrenches itself, so to speak, behind the objection 
that it is impossible. This objection must be removed, and 
the orator must show clearly the practicability of his proposi- 
tion. As the hindrances which seem to stand in his way 
disappear, one after another, the Ethical Idea in the hearer 
acquires Vitality and Force, and begins to impel him to ac- 
tion. Demosthenes would have employed all ethical motives 
in vain, in order to incite the Athenians to resist Philip, if he 
had not also, at the same time, made clear to them the practi- 
cability of his proposition, and the Possibility of success. We 
see what an amount of solid knowledge is requisite in the 
orator, how he must have thoroughly examined all the rela- 



OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 53 

tions of the State, and have calculated all its resources, in or- 
der to acquit himself well in respect to this point. It does not 
belong to my plan to mention all the cases which the Idea of 
Possibility includes ; and I content myself with remarking — 
in accordance with my main design — that this Idea, however 
weighty and important it may be, is yet subordinate to the 
Ethical Idea of State-weal. For only through this is the 
orator led to the consideration of the Possibility of a thing ; 
and he can have no finer impelling motive to attain all the 
knowledge requisite for this, than that love of country by 
which he is inspired. 

Moreover, this Idea is found in sacred Eloquence also. 
Those acquainted with the human heart know how often we 
endeavor to quiet our conscience, when it brings to our notice 
our neglected duties, by the excuse that it was impossible for 
us to perform them. Hence, it is not enough for the orator 
to recommend a particular action as belonging to an ethically 
perfect course of conduct ; he must so understand mankind 
generally, and the condition of society around him, as to be 
able to enter into an examination of all their relations, and to 
show that that which he advocates, is, in the highest degree, 
adapted to their relations. In this way, the high religious 
Ideas are taken out of their abstract and universal forms, and 
put into the concrete and definite forms of human life ; and 
nothing imparts a more active life to the Ideas of the hearer, 
than this full unfolding of them, and nothing seizes more 
powerfully upon his mind. But a strong will is needed on 
the part of the orator, in-order to compel the very same spirit 
which has soared up to the highest objects of thought, to de- 
5* 



54 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ', OR, 

scend suddenly to the minutest detail of human life, without 
thereby losing its fire and elasticity. Few are able to do this, 
and hence, since it is easier, the orator often deems it more 
befitting to roam about among abstract and formless Ideas. 

The category of Actuality is of peculiar importance in the 
judicial oration ; for although the sentence of the law, respect- 
ing a particular act — that of murder, e. g. — is not a matter of 
doubt in the least, yet the act itself sometimes is, and its 
Actuality can be affirmed or denied. Here the wide field of 
narrative-proof and statement opens to the orator ; a part of 
Rhetoric upon which the issue of a cause depends, and which 
the Ancients consequently cultivated with great care. Yet, 
however important it may be, the ethical Idea of Civil Law 
presides over it ; without this Idea, the question respecting 
the Actuality of a thing, would not arise in Eloquence, and it 
must ever be kept in view as the last goal to which the narra- 
tive-statement tends. Hence no objection against the ethical 
principle laid down by us as the foundation of Eloquence, 
can be brought from the fact that the Historical element 
predominates in this species of oration ; for the oration, 
before the court, still remains a moral procedure, in accord- 
ance with the Idea of positive Law, although this latter leads 
directly to the notion and exhibition of the Actuality of a 
thing. 

This subordinate Idea is also found in sacred as well as in 
political Eloquence. In this department, it exists in very 
close connection with the category Truth, the latter category 
very commonly leading to the former. For it is a peculiarity 
of Christianity that it establishes the Truth, not by means of 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 55 

Demonstration, but by means of Facts — as, e. g\, the Love of 
God, by the sacrifice of His Son ; immortality, by the Resur- 
rection of Christ. If these Facts are doubted, they must be 
shown to be actual by means of a historical examination of 
witnesses. Such investigations are of the greatest interest, 
because the Truth established thereby stands in such close 
connection with the highest practical Ideas — with Duty, 
Happiness, and Virtue. Furthermore, to this category belong 
those passages, whether in political or sacred oratory, in 
which the quality of a person, or a thing, is described, in or- 
der to apply to it one of the higher Ideas. 



o 



56 ELOQ.UENCE A VIRTUE J OR 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE PLAN AND DIVISION OF AN ORATION. 

By laying down the Rhetorical Ideas and Categories, we have, 
as it were, measured off the domain of Eloquence, and found 
the materiel on which it labors. By contemplating, there- 
fore, these Ideas in their first movement, we also become ac- 
quainted with the Form, in its first and most general features, 
which the Rhetorical materiel assumes. This is the doctrine 
of the Plan and Division of an oration, respecting which, or- 
dinarily very good and correct, but, for the most part, merely 
logical, rules are given, which, consequently, relate only to the 
Form ; teaching, it is true, how to distinguish the Good from 
the Bad in the Form, but not pointing out the way to find 
the former, and avoid the latter. We wish here to unite 
both, and to investigate this materiel, not only in a formal, 
but also in a real manner. We must needs succeed, since we 
conceive of Eloquence as a procedure according to Ideas, in 
which Ideas the Matter as well as the Form of that which is 
to be produced, is contained ; since, consequently, we never 
separate the Form from the Matter, and are, therefore, enabled 
to determine on this theory, not only how the division is to 
be made, but also what is to be divided. 

Let us, therefore, imagine to ourselves a man who possesses 
the ability to bring out ethical Ideas into his consciousness in 
great Power and Vitality, and who is animated with the de- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 57 

sire to represent these Ideas in the Actual, or rather to mould 
the Actual into conformity with these Ideas. Such an one 
can employ, for this purpose, no other means than the Ideas 
themselves, and their expression in language ; and he knows 
that his undertaking will succeed only in case he is not sub- 
servient to the passions of his hearer, but rather subjects him- 
self to the Ideas of the hearer — to that which is Highest and 
Best in him. He, therefore, brings his hearer before his mind, 
at first with merely the main features of his ethical nature, 
and with those requisitions which every man imposes upon 
himself — viz., to fulfil his Duty, to form himself to Virtue, to 
lay a foundation for Happiness. When he addresses members 
of the State or Church, he conceives these Ideas in the parti- 
cular form given to them by each of these relations. Every 
citizen, the political orator pre-supposes, desires to have Law 
and Justice administered, the Common Weal promoted, and 
to acquire personal Merit ; every Christian, the sacred orator 
pre-supposes, desires to fulfil the Law of God, to raise himself 
to Likeness with Him, and to become capable of Eternal 
Blessedness. That these Ideas are leading Ideas in each and 
every hearer, the orator pre-supposes ; but even if he is mis- 
taken—even if no one of them, in any one of the above 
specified forms, exists in the hearers — a thing which we affirm 
to be impossible — still this confident pre -supposition would be 
the best means by which to generate them ; for in proportion 
as men are assumed to be better than they are, and are so 
treated, do they become better than they are. 

When the orator has thus brought the hearer before him, 
he will find it better adapted to his purpose, either to refer the 



& 



5S ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

particular Idea of his oration to one only, of the above-men- 
tioned Ideas, be it one of the higher or subordinate, or else to 
connect it with several of them. The orations constructed in 
the former way, I would denominate simple ; those in the 
latter, complex. In the simple oration, Happiness, or Virtue, 
or Duty, is the predominating Idea, or else Truth, or Possibil- 
ity, or Actuality, shaped and moulded by one of these former. 
In the complex oration, Truth, e. g., takes the lead, and Virtue 
and Happiness follow ; or whatever may be the order found 
best adapted to the particular Idea of the oration, and to the 
relations peculiar to it. 

And now the orator makes a perfectly simple and natural 
beginning, by specifying his general design, and designating 
the Ideas or Categories, whether one or more, to which he in- 
tends to refer. This, and nothing more than this, is the Ex- 
ordium. Its distinguishing characteristics are clearness and 
plainness. The orator announces the contest to the hearer, 
and tells him at what point he intends to attack him ; and the 
hearer can well engage in it, because the fight is with honor- 
able weapons, and the advantage is always on the side of the 
vanquished. 

Since, among the Ancients, the subject upon which the ora- 
tor wished to speak was usually known to the hearers, the 
Exordium — so far as it contained an announcement of the 
subject — must naturally be very brief; and it became more 
extended only when the orator wished to present himself in a 
more advantageous light in the existing circumstances, or to 
remove certain prejudices respecting himself personally, which 
might hinder his success. This advantage, arising from the 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 59 

hearers being acquainted with the subject, and from a set oc- 
casion, is afforded to the sacred orator by the Festival days in the 
Christian Church, and also, to some extent, at least, by the Scrip- 
ture text. For this, provided it is rightly selected, already 
contains the particular Idea of the orator, which needs only a 
slight explanation, in order to spring forth from it into plain 
view. Moreover, the text is often interwoven with the circum- 
stances and relations to which it was applied at the time of its 
first utterance, and the orator needs only to realize them to 
himself, in order to discover the same or similar relations in 
the present time, upon which it shall exert its influence. Since, 
therefore, the Text specifies not only the Idea, but also the envi- 
ronment in which it is to unfold itself, this important advantage 
enables the sacred orator to abridge his exordium, especially 
as he does not need, like the political orator, to fill it out with 
assurances that his purposes are pure. For, in the first place, 
the whole drift and connection of his sermon, and still more 
of his life, is the best evidence of this ; and, in the second 
place, since he ever appears as the ambassador of a higher 
Being, and never in his own name, it is not befitting in him 
to be anxiously careful about himself. That which so often 
lengthens out the Exordium is the undue employment of the 
subordinate Categories — the exhibition of the True or the Ac- 
tual, e. g. — the orator, with the design of interesting, address- 
ing himself to man's mere desire for knowledge, without re- 
gard to the demands of his moral nature, I cannot favor 
this method, and believe that it may be followed only in rare 
instances. For, in the first place, time is in this way spent in 
merely paving the way for the Idea, which might be better 



60 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OK, 

employed in the developement of the Idea itself. In the se- 
cond place, the preliminary representations by which the ora- 
tor would prepare the way for the theme, are often as remote 
from the minds of the hearers as the theme itself, so that he 
might just as well employ this as to introduce the former. 
Finally, in the third place, since the mere desire for know- 
ledge is, or should be, subordinate to the moral Interest, the 
orator can hardly fail to interest the hearer in his main Idea, 
if he connects it immediately with one of the higher moral 
Ideas — a thing that can be done without a long circumlocu- 
tion. 

At the end of the Introduction, the orator may announce 
the two or three parts which contain the developement pro- 
per ; for why should he not carefully employ this, as well as 
every other opportunity, to aid the hearer's attention, and to 
facilitate his comprehension of the whole ? If the hearer is 
compelled to stretch his power of attention too much, he 
either slackens it altogether, or else the effect of the oration is 
exerted on the cognitive powers alone, and not on the Will, 
which, for the orator's purposes, is tantamount to no effect 
at all. 

If we do not find this practice observed in the orations of 
the Ancients, or any announcement of the Plan and Division, 
this may proceed from two reasons. First, the method to 
which they were obliged to accommodate themselves, was 
prescribed to them by the occasion on which they spoke, far 
more than is the case with the sacred orator, and since this 
method, especially in the instance of the orator before a court, 
was almost always one and the same, it seemed unnecessary 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 61 

to announce it formally. Secondly, — and this appears to me 
to be the chief reason — such a formal statement of the Plan 
would have been evidence of study and previous preparation, 
the appearance of which they avoided as carefully as they 
sought to maintain that of Extemporizing. For they had to 
deal with a suspicious Public, who would have attributed 
such previous preparation only to the design to deceive. But 
the case is different with the sacred orator, who may allow 
the diligence which he has bestowed with an honest intention, 
to continually appear in his oration, since he can excite 
thereby in the hearer nothing but the expectation of a mass 
of information all the more fundamental for this. If, however, 
the sacred orator would, for any reason, omit the formal men- 
tion of the grounds of his oration, of the plan which he has 
sketched for himself, he is free to do so ; for though, indeed, 
it is absolutely necessary that he endeavor to arrange his 
thoughts in the clearest and best manner, it is not absolutely 
necessary that he specify beforehand how he has arranged 
them. 

But what is the principle upon which the Division of an 
oration should proceed ? Beginning with the simple oration, 
this contains as many heads as there are principal positions, by 
which the leading design of the orator is connected with une of 
the higher, or one of the subordinate Ideas, as the case may be. 
In the sermon of Bernhardt — e, g., entitled, " The worthy 
celebration of the Sacrament is a source of the noblest enjoy- 
ment," — the leading design of the orator is referred solely 
to the Idea of Happiness, and is connected with it by the fol 
lowing positions ; The worthy celebration of the Holy Sacra- 
6 



62 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

ment affords us a view of our Redeemer in the most affecting 
greatness of his character ; it wakens us to the consciousness of 
the highest of vocations ; it fills us with the feeling of the highest 
of fellowships ; it makes us alive to the most blessed of all hopes. 
If Duty is the single predominant Idea, the oration divides into 
as many heads as there are principal positions employed by 
the orator, to make it apparent that the state of mind, or 
course of conduct, recommended by him, is a Duty. If Vir- 
tue is the predominant Idea, the oration may be divided ac- 
cording to the different motives existing for the practice of a 
particular Virtue, or according to the different characteristic 
marks by which the particular Virtue is made to melt in, and 
become one with the universal Idea of Virtue. 

But the simple oration may also be constructed according to 
one of the subordinate Ideas — Truth, Possibility, Actuality — 
provided only its connection witfy the higher Ideas is, from the 
very beginning, clearly and definitely established. To illus- 
trate : the false notions which Christians form of Divine Pro- 
vidence, or of the efficacy of Prayer, stand in the way of their 
religious and moral developement ; from this point of view, in- 
struction respecting Providence and the efficacy of Prayer, 
according to the Idea or Category of Truth, may be the only 
object of the oration. Yet, such instruction should not de- 
generate into a complete treatise on these subjects, but the 
orator should bring forward, in his refutation or indoctrina- 
tion, that only which is specially important in practical 
respects. 

In a political oration, the whole may be referred to the Idea 
of Possibility, in order to show that the proposition in ques- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 63 

tion, which confessedly promotes the Common- Weal is also 
practicable. The same may be done in sacred oratory, in order 
to weaken the force of excuses for committing a fault, derived 
from the impossibility of avoiding it, and for neglecting a 
virtue, from the impossibility of practising it. It is evident, 
moreover, that in this case the orator should combat those 
objections only, which the hearer actually makes, or, at least, 
may easily make. The positive reasons, on the other hand, 
for the practice of the Virtue then divide oft into main masses 
by themselves which form the Parts of the oration. 

In like manner, also, the Idea of Actuality, referred to one 
of the higher Ideas, may be the predominant Idea in an or- 
ation, as is most commonly the case before a court of justice. 
Here, the different proofs that a thing has or has not happened, 
fall into several classes, and these are the Parts of the oration. 
The old Rhetoricians, however, give us information on this, 
w r ith a minuteness of detail which leaves nothing to be desired. 
In the sacred oration, also, Actuality may be the sole predo- 
minant Idea — first, when the orator wishes to prove a disput- 
ed fact belonging to sacred history ; and, secondly, when he 
would sketch a picture of an important personage or fact, that 
shall be fruitful in practical application. In the first instance, 
he will maintain such a particular fact, not against skepticism 
in general, but against the doubts of his contemporaries only ; 
he will not therefore take into view the objections of former 
times, but those only that are peculiar to their time ; he will 
make a selection accordingly, from the mass of proofs which 
are at his command, and these are easily divided, according to 
their intrinsic character, into certain classes and divisions. In 



64 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

the second instance, the orator brings into notice those qualities 
and characteristics of a person or a thing which are most con- 
gruous with the practical Idea which guides the whole oration. 
Thus, Actuality is the single predominant Idea in the sermon 
of Reinhard upon " The characteristics of the Church of Christ 
as seen in its origin ;" and he describes this origin as pure in 
its sources, miraculous in its circumstances, noble in its aim, 
beneficent in its consequences. 

A peculiarity, not so much in the manner of the division it- 
self, as in the way of announcing it, is found in the French 
orators, especially in Massillon. When, namely, it is their 
principal business to combat the erroneous notions of their 
hearers — and any one of the above-mentioned predominant 
Ideas may lead to this, although the three higher less often 
than the three subordinate ; in such cases, I say, they are wont 
to announce, not those correct views which they wish to un- 
fold, but the erroneous ones which they wish to combat. It is 
apparent that it amounts to the same thing in the end ; for the 
employment of this mode presupposes that the orator has di- 
vided th3 errors and their contrary truths into equal and cor- 
relative masses, and hence it makes no difference which of the 
two he announces specifically. There is always, however, some- 
thing hazardous in this mode of proceeding, since it is easier 
to bring truths of which the speaker is himself thoroughly 
convinced, into a sure and certain connection, than the errors 
and doubts current among the multitude ; and if the orator has 
not so arranged these as that the threads of a full developement 
of the truth can be wound upon them, he will not combat 
them with success. The want of connection, and the breaks, so 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC, 65 

frequently to be noticed in Massillon's sermons, are perhaps 
to be attributed to this manner of arranging the parts of an 
oration, which became an almost uniform habit with him ; 
hence only the practised and skilful orator — and he only rare- 
ly — should make use of this manner. It is alwa) 7 s safest for the 
orator to present in the very outset his own conviction, having 
some reference however to prevalent errors, and to combat 
these only when they come up of themselves in the develope- 
ment of his own thoughts. 

But the complex oration, in which several Ideas arc placed 
beside each other in equal importance, is of more frequent 
occurrence than the simple oration^ of the division of which 
we have been speaking. It is apparent, at the first glance, 
that this species of oration conducts, with much more force 
and certainty, to the end in view, than the other. For, if the 
orator brings his leading Idea into connection with those of 
the hearer, only on one side, it is very possible for him to fail 
in the attempt to show its identity with them. In order to 
win over the hearer completely, the orator must lead him con- 
tinually to one and the same goal from several points ; the 
orator's Idea, if I may be allowed the expression, must con- 
tinue to wind around the Idea of the hearer until it has be- 
come completely incorporated with it. 

It is evident, now, that the complex oration has as many 
parts as there are predominant Ideas in it ; and each one of 
these parts, again, may be regarded as a simple oration, and be 
divided according to the same rules, so that that which forms a 
main division in the simple oration, becomes a subdivision in 
6* 



66 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

the complex. A common method, here, is to begin with the 
Category of Truth or Actuality, in order to throw due light 
over the subject of which the orator would treat, and then, in 
order to waken a higher interest, to follow up with the Idea 
of Virtue, Happiness, or Duty. This is the almost too uni- 
form mode of division, when the orator speaks, first, of the 
nature, and, secondly, of the effects. But unless the Catego- 
ries Truth and Actuality are handled by a very skilful master, 
discourse based upon them often becomes somewhat cold and 
tedious, and the hearer remains indifferent towards a subject 
of which the orator indeed gives right conceptions, but the 
relation of which to the higher demands of his moral nature, he 
does not make plain to him. Or else the orator, conscious him- 
self of this coldness and dryness, allows himself to be led into 
the error of interweaving into this part of his oration those 
higher means of moving his hearers which should not be em- 
ployed until later ; and in this way he oversteps the limits 
which he has prescribed for himself, and anticipates the con- 
tents of the divisions which are to follow, which he is now 
unable to fill out. Instead, therefore, of placing Truth and 
Actuality in an equal rank with the higher ethical Ideas, it 
may often be more suitable to subordinate them to these ; to 
make Happiness, Duty, or Virtue principal parts, and to in- 
sert the representation of Truth and Actuality only when the 
need of it becomes plainly apparent in the course of the de- 
velopement of those higher Ideas. But, again, there are some 
subjects in which the Idea of Truth or Actuality has such a 
decided preponderance, that the orator must make it predomi- 
nant throughout his oration, and must interweave what he haa 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 67 

to say respecting Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, in the indi- 
vidual developements of the True or the Actual. 

In this way, the six Rhetorical Ideas are associated with 
each other in an order and interchange the most manifold. 
The counter-action which the orator expects from the hearer, 
determines him to begin, now with this and now with that 
Idea, and to follow up with the others, thus or so ; and hence 
no universal rule can be laid down regarding a Plan of this 
sort, since existing circumstances and relations have so great 
influence upon it : the Plan is, in fact, a resolution which 
the moral powers form, and which is shaped by the peculiar 
occasions and inducements which lead to it. 

The course and movement of Ideas in a great orator can an- 
imate to a similarly pregnant and powerful movement in no 
other way than as the example of the hero animates to Virtue . 
Demosthenes, e. g\, in the first oration against Philip, begins 
with the Idea of Possibility ; he shows how a more fortunate 
issue may be expected in the case of further expeditions ; and 
as he proceeds, the doubts of his hearers vanish, their breasts 
swell, and fill with heart and hope. But the orator does not 
stop with considerations of a general nature ; he goes into de- 
tail, and lays before the people a circumstantial plan of all that 
is to be done. In this way he satisfies the understandings of 
his hearers, elevates their minds, and renders them open to the 
higher Ideas of State-weal, of Civic Merit, by which they are 
now carried captive at the will of the orator. But there is no 
course and movement of Ideas of such irresistible power as the 
one in the oration for Ctesiphon, in which, in accordance with 
the Idea of Possibility, it is first shown that the speaker could 



63 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR 

not by any possibility have foreseen the issue of the battle at 
Chseronea, and then the Idea of Virtue follows with a startling 
rapidity — the orator affirming that, even if he had foreseen all, 
he should nevertheless have given no different counsel. The 
well-known division of Cicero's oration for Milo, according to 
the Ideas of Actuality and Legality, has some resemblance 
to the wonderful method of this oration of Demosthenes. 

In the oration of Demosthenes upon the affairs of the Cher- 
sonesus, the Idea of Public Advantage is not connected, but 
entangled with that of Civil Law, in a highly singular man- 
ner. For, while according to the former he shows that the ar- 
my which Diopeithes commanded in # that country, should not 
be disbanded, he, at the same time, according to the latter, ex- 
culpates their general with respect to the acts of violence with 
which he was charged : a procedure to which he was proba- 
bly compelled by the circumstances of the case, and which he 
carries through with extraordinary self-confidence, but which 
I would recommend no one to imitate, since, of Ideas thus en- 
tangled, the one commonly would be prejudicial to the other. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 69 



CHAPTER XIV. 

FIRST FEATURES TOWARDS A SKETCH OF THE ORATOR. 

It has been remarked, respecting the Science of Morals, 
that there are three points from which it may be contemplat- 
ed, and that a complete Philosophic presentation of it is 
rendered possible only by connecting these different views. 
Morals, in the first place, may be regarded as the enumera- 
tion of all those commandments derived from the one highest 
law, by which the will ought to be directed, and of the du- 
ties imposed by them. Secondly, the question may arise 
with respect to that character in the Subject, or agent, which 
is inclined and able to fulfil all these duties ; and developed 
in this direction, the Science of Morals becomes a presenta- 
tion of Ideal Virtue, or of Ideal Virtues. In the third place, 
again, the Product may be contemplated, which perfect Virtue 
produces by the fulfilment of all its duties, and this becomes 
the chief object in view, under the names of Prosperity, Hap- 
piness, the Highest Good. But, instead of connecting in one, 
these three different views, writers upon Morals commonly 
make but one of them prominent in their theories, which, con- 
sequently, must be one-sided and unsatisfactory. For does 
not the sum-total of all the different and scattered Virtues 
pre-suppose an acting Subject, in which they can concentrate 
and come into actual practice ; and when this Subject is seen 



70 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

acting, what is more natural than the inquiry after the Pro- 
duct of its activity ? 

We make these well-known statements, in the first place, 
in order, by placing the three different forms of .the system of 
Morals beside the three highest Ehetorical Ideas mentioned 
by us, to justify our having assumed these latter as funda- 
mental Ideas ; and in the second place, still more, for the rea- 
son that these fundamental Ideas furnish rules for the treat- 
ment of Rhetoric as a system. If Rhstoric, as we affirm, is 
only a more general unfolding of Morals, the selection of one 
particular point of view, alone, would be a fault in Rhetoric, 
as well as in Morals, and the combination of all the points of 
view becomes as necessary in the former as it is in the latter. 
We have thus far developed the part of Morals which is called 
Rhetoric, from the Idea of Duty, as a point of view. For we 
began with laying down a law, of which we have pointed out 
the application, and from which we have derived several indi- 
vidual rules ; and we have believed it necessary to take this 
method, for the sake of greater intelligibleness. Cicero and 
Quintilian — to compare those Philosophers who have devel- 
oped Morals from the Idea of Virtue, as a point of departure — 
it seems to us, have in view particularly the representation 
of the Perfect Orator, whom Quintilian describes even from the 
time of his first instruction in school. But their representa- 
tions are somewhat ambiguous, since, although in this way of 
treating the subject, we are, indeed, made sufficiently ac- 
quainted with the character and qualities of the orator, we 
can yet form no definite conception of his activity, because 
the rule by which it is to be judged of, remains unknown. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 71 

If now, as we have said above, we have sought to avoid 
this fault by laying down firm fundamental principles, 
we must also guard against falling into the opposite error of 
forgetting the character and qualities of the orator. The re- 
presentation of these is the more important, since it might 
seem as if the mere knowledge and skilful application 
of the rules laid down by us were sufficient for the orator, 
and as if his moral character and qualities were to receive 
no farther notice ; which, if it were actually the case, would 
frustrate our endeavor to construct Rhetoric as a part of 
Morals. But such is not the case, and furthermore, it is im- 
possible to follow all these rules, unless there be moral strength 
of Character, unless there be Virtue, and, in the case of the 
sacred orator, unless there be the inner life of Faith. 

For the distinctive agency of the orator consists in giving a 
powerful impulse and direction to the minds of others, and he is 
not equal to this unless the goal to which he would direct them 
is plainly in his eye, and unless he earnestly desires to reach it 
himself. In a word, he must possess, so to speak, the Faculty 
of Moral Ideas, and these belong to Character. The Imagina- 
tion, it is true, generates those Ideas from which the creations 
in the sphere of Art proceed ; although, even in the case of 
Art, as it seems to me, the products are always somewhat 
lacking in body and firmness, unless they are set up by Char- 
acter. But, inasmuch, as the Will is the object which Elo- 
quence seeks to influence, Eloquence must originate in the Will, 
in the moral state of the orator. Take the sacred orator for 
instance : where will he find matter for his discourses, if his 
own sanctification, if the moral and religious condition of men, 



72 ELOO.UENCE A VIRTUE \ OR. 

does not lie near his heart — if he does not earnestly desire to 
improve human character ? In him alone who is animated by 
these motives — who labors upon himself, and contemplates 
men around him with the design of elevating them to a high- 
er degree of perfection — only in such an one will Ideas that 
may be referred and applied easily to the highest aim and 
end of the human Will, be generated in their constant an4 
abounding fulness ; and such Ideas are, beyond question, 
motive-powers, moral and Christian in their nature. Nay, 
they presuppose a higher grade of morality — one that is 
raised far above that which is commonly called Virtue, the 
mere abstaining namely from Vice, and an irreproachable life. 
For if it is morally beautiful to will, at all times, that which 
is Best and Worthiest, for its own sake, it is still more beauti- 
ful by far, to desire at the same time, in connection with this, 
that which is Best and Worthiest for all mankind. This de- 
sire may be wanting in a man, and he not be morally bad in 
his life ; but a far higher degree of moral perfection must be 
ascribed to him of whom it is the sole and actuating princi- 
ple. Hence it is certainly no envious complaint, when a sa- 
cred oration is charged with being wanting in such moral 
Ideas as alone can beget a disposition of soul that is constant- 
ly employed in promoting the well-being of humanity. To 
give expression to one ? s self merely, to depict certain favorite 
views with self-complacency, cannot be represented as a vice 
exactly ; but it is certainly proof of an imperfect nature, 
which is not able to forget itself, and to live only in the well- 
being of others ; it indicates a want of that higher Character 
by which the orator produces the stuff and material employed 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 73 

by him, and which, since the creative power in man is desig- 
nated generally by the term Genius, we would style Moral Ge- 
nius. In vain, therefore, is the command, " Refer your Ideas 
to the highest human Ideas," addressed to him who, absorbed 
in his own emotions, fancies and notions, does not feel the he- 
roic impulse to seize upon the hearts of men, and to mould them 
into a nobler state ; for he is lacking in the first and most ne- 
cessary things — in Ideas, — and instead of these, he will play 
with figures, dissolve in soft emotion, or bring forward informa- 
tion, which is quite entertaining, it may be, but which produces 
no effect upon the Will. 

That which is true of the sacred orator, is true also of the 
civil orator. If he does not cling with disinterested love to 
his father-land, and is not impelled by this love to study close* 
ly the internal relations of his country, and to mark attentive- 
ly the changes in its foreign relations, how is he, in important 
and difficult emergencies, to acquire correct views and to form 
salutary plans, without delay ? He will be dumb, as was the 
case with the Athenian orators on hearing that Philip had ta- 
ken Elatsea. " For," as Demosthenes said, " that day and that 
occasion demanded a man who had traced events from the be- 
ginning, and had formed a correct conclusion for what reason 
and for what end Philip had done that." And how had De- 
mosthenes, the only one who spoke on this day, obtained this 
keener insight, except through his love of country, in which res- 
pect he was in advance of all his fellow-citizens ? It may in- 
deed be said, that in the absence of love of country, self-interest, 
hatred and friendship, preconceived opinions, political systems, 
7 



74 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ) OR, 

will not leave the orator destitute of Ideas and Plans. Perhaps 
not ; but here the great difficulty presents itself, that these ve- 
ry designs are to be subjected to the highest ends of the State, 
and not of the individual Will, and this must be uncommonly 
difficult to accomplish, if they did not spring up in dependence 
upon and subjection to, the Common Weal, but were suggested 
by other and less noble motives. In order that his selfish Plans 
may succeed, the orator, as has been remarked, must bring them 
into connection with the highest moral Ideas ; and if this con- 
nection is not a natural, but a forced one, talent of the first or- 
der will often fail in the endeavor to carry through the decep- 
tion,*' and the web of its argument will be torn into shreds by 
another orator, who perhaps speaks with less power, but whose 
Ideas have grown up out of the ground and soil of Patriotism. 
A fine instance of this is afforded in the two orations, which, 
according to Sallust, were delivered by Caesar and Catointhe 
Roman Senate, respecting the punishment of the fellow-con- 
spirators of Cataline. What can be finer than the arrangement 
of Caesar's oration ; how cunningly does he understand how to 
render the Ideas of magnanimity, positive law, and public ad- 
vantage, available in a case in which it was his sole aim to sup- 
port the mere instruments of his own ambitious plans ! With 
less art, but with greater power, the honest Cato forces his 
way through, and the whole Senate sides with him. And 
thus, finally, by our own examination and by the example of 

* A wrong design is betrayed by the contradictions in the course 
and connection of thought. 

'E7T£t<5ttv tis, oHfiai, KCLKOvpy&v &rc fif) 7rpo$fiKOVTa Trpdyfiara tov$ \6yovs pera- 
<p£py, dverxfipci'fai'aj'** tyai&oQai.— Demwtk. adv&rms lAptinem, p. 190, ed.Wtifr 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 75 

the younger Cato, that definition of the orator is justified, 
which, according to Quintilian,* originated with the elder 
Cato, and which is indisputably the best that has come down 
to us from antiquity, viz : The orator is an upright man who 
understands speaking. 



* Instit. XII, 1. 



BOOS XI. 



CHAPTER I. 



AFFECTION AND PASSION. 



Before we proceed further, let us cast a glance over the path 
which we have opened. 

It was our design to seek for a highest fundamental princi- 
ple, that should bring unity and connection into the fragmen- 
tary and disconnected Theory of Eloquence. In order to 
this, we made one of the characteristics of Eloquence — the 
striving to produce an influence outwardly — its essential 
characteristic, and in this way found that it stands upon an 
ethical basis and ground, and is an active process ; that, as it 
proceeds only from Ideas, it can address itself only to Ideas. 
The developement of this single thought has already led us 
to important results, and has combined into a systematic 
unity, many assertions which in the common Theories of Elo- 
quence are laid down without proof; and we have also been 
enabled by it to correct many errors in the prevailing views 
on this subject. We have seen that there is but one Elo- 
quence, and that civil Eloquence is connected with sacred by 
the unity of its constituent principle, although each is diffe- 
rently modiiied by the particular relation in which it moves ; 
7# 



78 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

that the Ancients, in conformity with a feeling in the highest 
degree correct, have assumed three species of Eloquence, 
corresponding to the three highest Ideas ; by laying down 
Truth as a subordinate Rhetorical Idea, we have found again 
one of the characteristics of Eloquence — its inclination to 
Philosophy, but, at the same time, as we flatter ourselves, 
have thrown some light upon the difficult question respect- 
ing the dividing line between Philosophy and Eloquence ; 
we have given rules respecting the plan and division of an 
oration which proceed according to Ideas, and, therefore, are 
preferable to the common method of division, which proceeds 
merely according to Conceptions ; and, finally, in order to 
justify our ethical view, we have in different places made it 
apparent that the orator is capacitated for the performance of 
his proper business only by means of a truly moral state of 
heart. 

And thus, as we believe, has our ethical principle main- 
tained itself, so far as that part of Rhetoric is concerned 
which embraces the doctrine of invention and arrangement ; 
for all the rules which can properly be given respecting these 
subjects flow directly from the fundamental law laid down by 
us, which, in its developement, has shown not only how each 
and everything in this part of Eloquence should be, but also 
why it should be so, and not otherwise. To maintain this 
principle with respect to that part of Rhetoric which is now 
to follow — with respect to Elocution, so called — seems a work 
of greater difficulty. For since the excitement of the Affec- 
tions, or at least of the Passions, is that with which we have to 
do here, how, it may be asked, is this to take its origin from an 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 79 

ethical principle — nay, even to be justified before it ? Further- 
more, we are here, and rightly tco, to expect the outlines at 
least, of a Theory of Prose ; and it would seem that an ethi- 
cal principle could in no way lead to it. It does indeed seem 
so ; but it is seeming merely ; for, in fact, this part of Rheto- 
ric constitutes the very triumph of the ethical view, since 
problems are solved by it which can be solved by no other 
view. 

But we must, in the first place, express our regret at the 
errors by which this part of the subject has been disfigured, 
and for which the Ancients, properly, are responsible, who, 
since they are now universally lauded, must here, at least, 
take home a merited blame. This blame falls, first, upon the 
Rhetoricians, who again can throw the accusation back upon 
the orators themselves, or, rather, upon the circumstances 
amidst which they spoke. Ancient Ebquence owed its power 
and definiteness principally to the rapidity with which the 
effect followed immediately after the oration was ended ; but 
in this very circumstance lay also a source of degeneration. 
For, since the orator contended for honor, property and life, 
and since the possession or loss of these depended upon the 
effect of the oration, he would, in this his strait, find every 
means good, of whatever sort, provided it only led to the end 
in view ; and he who could get hold of no noble means, must 
often content himself with bad ones, satisfied if he only at- 
tained his end, and not considering that he would have at- 
tained it with much more certainty had he employed worthier 
means. Hence the orators allowed themselves in artifices of 
many sorts, in order to deceive the judges and the people — 



80 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE } OR, 

to dazzle them and excite their passions. This Practice, 
which, of necessity, must often succeed, passed over into the 
Theory of Eloquence, which, in this instance, as generally, 
was not able to rise above the existing Practice. The arti- 
fices for stimulating the minds of the hearers were collected 
together and arranged in a connected series ; and Rhetoricians, 
who held the excitement of the passions to be necessary in 
their art, taught for this end, not the training of the mind, 
to use Plato's phrase,^ but the actual deceiving of the mind. 
Aristotle does this in the section of his Ehetoric where he 
treats of the Passions ; and Cicero speaks of the means which 
he employs for exciting them with a frankness at which we 
cannot but be surprised.! 

But it is, perhaps, equally surprising that these writers, 
and those who have harmonized with them in sentiment, 
should have been implicitly believed, and that these artifices 
should have been held necessary and indispensable in secular 
Eloquence at least. The example of Demosthenes alone, it 
seems to me, could not but have led to the thought that they 
might be dispensed with, and that other means might be em- 
ployed in their stead, which are not only much nobler, but 
also much more reliable. If this orator had written a Ehe- 
toric, it would certainly have been different from Cicero's 
Rhetorical writings, and have been not unworthy of his instruc- 
tor Plato, who, in the Gorgias, lays down such a strict view 

* ¥vx<iYi>iyia..—PhcbdruSi p. 331, ed. Heindorf. 

t Qua (miseratione) nos ita dolentet- usi sumus, ut puerum infantem 
in manibus perorarues tenuerimus; ut alia in causa, excitato reo nobili, 
sublato etiam filioparvo, plangoreet lamentatione complerimus forum. 

Orator, c. 38. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 81 

of Eloquence. But the Eloquence of Demosthenes, like his 
character, possesses an elevation, which, of necessity, must 
fail of being apprehended ; and owing to their inability to 
rightly estimate the Rhetorical means which he employs, the 
Ancients, and we after them, have believed to have detected 
the very same artifices in him, which are plainly apparent in 
other orators. • 

In order to prepare the way for this part of Rhetoric, it is 
necessary to enter upon a psychological investigation, and to 
establish a distinction between two things, which, though very 
different from each other, are yet commonly confounded with 
each other — namely, between Affection and Passion. The 
movements in our minds differ very much in their nature, 
their duration, and their importance, according as they are 
produced by external objects, or are generated from within 
outwards. An external object, or the representation of it, ex- 
cites, if we desire or loathe it, a movement within us which 
is rightly called Passion, since we are passive in the matter, 
and yield ourselves up to an influence which operates upon 
us from without. This condition of the soul cannot, in strict- 
ness, be justified, since it supposes the inactivity of the Rea- 
son, a power which, indeed, cannot always prevent the recep- 
tion of impressions from without, but which should, neverthe- 
less, limit, elevate, and, if they are injurious, suppress them. 
Moreover, this inward condition is, in its nature, unquiet, 
perplexed, and painful to the mind, which is always troubled 
by the feeling of dependence upon external objects, and in its 
duration it is transient, since it is produced by a transitory 
object. Entirely different from this, is that excitement of the 



82 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

mind which owes its origin to an Idea ; I call it Affection, 
(Affekt,) and not Passion, since the spirit in this case affects 
itself through its own activity, instead of passively receiving 
an impression from without, as in the other case. Yet this 
term Affection, which renders me liable to misapprehension, 
and is not, by any means, adequate, I employ only because I 
know of no better one. What, however, I mean by it, will bo 
clear from what follows. A mind in which an Idea has be- 
come living consciousness, cannot possibly retain that cold- 
ness which accompanies mere abstract representations or con- 
ceptions ; for since the Idea contains within itself the notion 
of an activity of some sort, and the impulse to it, it must ne- 
cessarily appropriate to itself all the powers of the soul, and 
set them in motion in one definite direction ; and from this 
united working of all the faculties — from the exertion accom- 
panying it, an inward state must arise, distinguished by a 
higher degree of warmth and life. In case a creation in the 
domain of Art results from the Idea, this inward state is de- 
nominated Poetic or Artistic inspiration, and is universally 
recognized and esteemed as Good and Beautiful in its nature. 
But the same warmth and glow attends upon all ethical Ideas 
which strive to break forth into activity; nothing but the 
mere refraining from Evil can have coldness of soul as its at- 
tendant ; he who strives to produce something Great and 
Good, will never be # without ardor, without affection. Yet 
we should never apply the name Passion to this fine mental 
manifestation ; this term indicates the inactivity of the higher 
spiritual powers, while, on the contrary, Affection, as distin- 
guished from Passion, supposes the highest activity of the 



OTTTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 83 

Reason, which is the parent of Ideas. Furthermore, the 
warmth of Feeling and of Passion is obscure and vague — to 
use a comparison, is like a dimly burning fire ; Affection, on 
the contrary, constantly conscious, constantly attentive to the 
slightest hint of Reason, capable of checking itself in the midst 
of the most rapid course, is to be compared to the sun-light, 
which brings even more clearness than warmth with it. For this 
reason, and also because Affection does not, like Passion, di- 
vide the mind into two contending parties, but unites all the 
powers of the soul, and all the emotions of the heart, in finest 
harmony with the Reason, it is the happiest state by far to 
which man can raise himself. That it is also a perfectly 
moral state, it seems unnecessary to add. It is, especially 
when generated by ethical Ideas, man's moral nature itself, 
and that, too, in its finest splendor, its highest dignity, and 
elevated far above that coldness of soul which is sometimes 
denominated rational, although with great injustice, since a 
powerful activity of the Reason must necessarily banish all 
coldness. Finally, Affection is distinguished from Passion, 
by the fact that the former is as permanent as the latter is 
transient. For since the Idea which generates it can never 
be exhausted by a single exhibition, but only by a continued 
series of exhibitions, and, therefore, has a long-continued ex- 
istence — nay, if it is a moral Idea, an eternal existence, for 
the contemplating mind, it imparts this attribute and duration 
to the menial affection which accompanies it. 

Instead, however, of duly distinguishing between two men- 
tal manifestations so diverse as those above described, it is too 
common to denominate everything as Passionate, that is at- 



S4 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

tended with any degree of fire and life ; and it often happens 
that that which is Beautiful and Excellent in the highest de- 
gree, is degraded by the debasing conception which is con- 
nected with this word. We should, therefore, never ascribe 
to one who is given up to an Art, or a Science, as soon as he is 
capable of producing something within its sphere, by his own 
independent power, a Passion for this Art or Science ; his 
love is an Affection which is generated by Ideas ; and he, 
alone, has a Passion for an Art who merely desires to con- 
template its creations for the sake of the pleasure they pro- 
duce, without being excited to any activity of spirit by them. 
In the social relations of men also, not all Love is Passion. 
Love is Passion only when it strives after the possession of 
the loved object, as after the possession of a piece of property 
which it wishes to obtain and hold ; it is something far high- 
er, it is Affection, so soon as the Idea of a perpetual connec- 
tion comes to lie at the bottom of it ; an Idea which is neither 
disturbed by separating circumstances, nor grows cold from 
the earthly possession of the object. Speaking generally, the 
action of man should never be Passionate, but always Affec- 
tionate ; it should never betray the fire which an external ob- 
ject has kindled, but should be constantly animated by that 
mild and clear warmth which accompanies all that springs 
from the inward depths of the spirit. And thus let us, in 
Eloquence also, distinguish the discourse of a man who is 
filled with an Idea, which he would impart to others in an 
equal degree of clearness and warmth, from the effort, ever 
to be condemned, to awaken their Passions. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 83 



CHAPTER II. 

THE DUTY OF THE ORATOR TO SPEAK WITH AFFECTION AND 
TO AWAKEN AFFECTION. 

Having, in the foregoing, shown that true Affection as distin- 
guished from Passion, is never morally wrong, but is always to 
be regarded as intrinsically Beautiful and Excellent, we now 
go still farther, and affirm, that it is absolutely necessary that 
the orator speak with Affection. For he goes before an as- 
sembly only in order to impart to it the Idea by which he 
is himself pervaded ; and this Idea, if it actually be an Idea, 
must be accompanied with Affection. If we find the orator 
wanting in this, we are justified in assuming that he is not 
animated by an Idea ; that he seems to purpose and undertake 
something, but in reality has no definite purpose, and, there- 
fore, is in contradiction with himself ; that he pursues his 
business from necessity merely, like a day-laborer, or from 
by-ends like a demagogue, or from cold and chilling van- 
ity, like a mere fine speaker ; and any one of these as- 
sumptions, if just and warranted, will prevent the hearer 
from respecting the man, or opening his heart to him. What 
we have said, moreover, respecting the difference between Af- 
fection and Passion, will, it is hoped, protect us from the 
charge of demanding in the orator, feverish heat, sickly 
emotion, or strained animation; we demand warmth with 
thoughtfulness, feeling with reason, emphasis without dis- 
tortion, light and fire without vapor ; fine qualities, which 
8 



86 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

even the common hearer knows how to estimate, and readi- 
ly distinguishes from the Extravagant and Artificial. 

Every one who has ever come before the people, filled with 
a great Idea, has spoken with Affection ; but with the great- 
est Affection by far, He who gave utterance to the greatest 
Ideas ; namely, Christ. This Light of the World reveals 
eternal Truth with an abiding Inspiration, which is at one 
time mild and gentle, at another, with thunder and crash ; 
a great example for every sacred orator, and one that warrants 
him in dispensing with all, so called, philosophical calmness, 
and obligates him to speak with similar Affection. 

Supposing, now, that there are means whereby Affection 
can be imparted to others, it is plain that the use of these 
means can never be injurious, but always and only beneficial. 
For they never rouse up mere blind feeling to a life and en- 
ergy that renders Reason inactive ; on the contrary, mere 
blind feeling is held in subordination, since the orator compels 
it to co-operate towards his ends, and, in this way, there arises 
inward harmony, which is man's most perfect condition. The 
fear, also, that the orator may go too far in exciting Affection, 
seems to me to be entirely unfounded, for Affection is gen- 
erated by a stronger activity of the Reason, in which there 
can be no excess, and the calm Thought must at every mo- 
ment lead back within its proper limits the discursive Feeling. 
Passion most certainly may become too strong, or rather, it 
should never become so, but how the Ideas of the moral 
Reason can be accompanied with too lively Affection, or how 
it is possible for these same Ideas, sanctified by Religion, to 
seize upon the mind with too great power, I, at least, cannot 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 87 

imagine. The orator, therfore, if he is able to excite Affection, 
need prescribe no limits to himself while making the attempt ; 
owing to human weakness, instead of going too far, he will or- 
dinarily have to blame himself for having done too little. And 
if it is objected that Affection, like every lively frame of the 
soul, is transitory, I ask whether it isTor this reason merely, to 
be deemed worthless, and whether every single hour which is 
spent in the feeling of enthusiasm for the Highest and Best is 
not a positive gain and a beautiful reward for the soul that is 
the subject of it ? But this objection is without foundation ; for 
Affection owes its existence to the heightened activity of Reason 
alone ; and Reason, by means of the fuller developement it 
has received in the process, is always of itself independently 
able to reproduce Affection. 

Invariably excluding everything Passionate, and assuming 
that Affection can be imparted to the hearer, we can now, 
without any opposition whatever, we hope, lay down the as- 
sertion, that it is the duty of the orator to awaken Affection. 
In case, either from principle or from inability, he disclaims 
this obligation, his activity must be limited to that of which 
we have treated in the First Book ; namely, to proving that 
the particular Idea of his oration is contained in the general 
Idea of the hearer, and that the hearer, if he wills Duty, or 
Virtue, or Happiness, must also will this or that procedure 
to which these Ideas lead. But what is accomplished by this ? 
As good as nothing. This might indeed do, if in man, Know- 
ing, Willing, and Doing, were one and the same act. In this 
case, he would only need to know that he ought to will, in or- 
der to will, and would only need to will, in order to do. But 



S8 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

such is not the case. There is a cold abstract Knowing which 
generates no Willing ; there is a feeble Willing which never 
passes over into Doing. But to what does this cold Know- 
ing and this feeble Willing lead, and how can the orator be 
satisfied with producing it ? For the very reason, that some- 
thing is to be accomplished which is not yet accomplished ; 
for the very reason, that he finds the State and the Church 
in a corrupt, or at least an imperfect condition, and would have 
it changed for the better ; for this, and no other reason, does 
he come forward as an orator ; this is the end towards which 
he must labor, if he would not be in contradiction with him- 
self; and if he does not attain it, he has spoken in vain. But 
in order to attain it, it is necessary, that the Idea of the hear- 
er be raised to such a grade of vitality as that it can immedi- 
ately pass over into act ; for that blazing up of all the inward 
powers which we denominate Affection, indicates the moment 
when the Idea is breaking through and coming forth into 
Actuality. If the capacity of being conscious of Ethical Ideas 
must be predicated of every man, and yet very few act in ac- 
cordance with Ideas, this is only because Affection is wanting 
in them, the very link itself, which, in the chain of human ac- 
tivity, connects Willing with Doing. The sentiment which 
the orator labors to produce in his hearers, and the resolution 
which he seeks to have them take, are to be brought about 
immediately, not only when he speaks before the judge or be- 
fore his fellow-citizens, but also when he speaks before a Chris- 
tian assembly. For if it is not brought about immediately, 
when will it be? At another time? But why defer that 
which is in itself good ? Or would the orator merely enlight- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 89 

en and cultivate the Reason, under the conviction that well- 
regulated action will then be developed of itself, from it ? But 
experience proves the contrary ; it shows us men of very- 
cultivated Reason, who either do not act at all, or act wrongly. 
And, moreover, how is this gradual cultivation possible in the 
case of the orator, to whom, at this one particular moment, a 
mind is surrendering itself, which perhaps will never again 
fall within the sphere of his influence ? Is nothing at all to 
be done for such an one, and how long is the orator to wait 
for something to be developed of itself, from the audience be- 
fore him ? Their ethical Ideas they bring with them ; they 
are therefore, at this moment, just as susceptible to every good 
influence, as they will be years hence ; for it is the individual 
who changes — the mass, on the whole, is ever the same. The 
objection in question proceeds from the false supposition, 
that it is necessary for the orator to laboriously impart to men 
that intelligence which lies at the bottom of action ; but he is 
spared this labor, since every man by nature possesses the 
ethical Ideas. Perhaps there is sometimes in the orator, as in 
the hearer, an aversion towards the exhibition of Affection, 
which conceals itself behind these objections, but which, after 
what has been said, can hardly pass as praiseworthy. 

If now it be asked, in what does the business of the 
orator properly consist — in conviction or persuasion — I con- 
fess that I can declare decidedly neither for the one nor for 
the other, and that it seems to me the question ought not to 
be asked, since it is based upon a false Eloquence. 

So far as conviction is concerned, this is by no neans suffi- 
cient to constitute the substance of Eloquence, if by ii ier- 
8* 



90 "eloquence a virtue ; or, 

stood the proof that the particular Idea of the orator is con- 
tained in the general Idea of the hearer. But this is hardly 
the meaning given to the word ; it is generally taken to de- 
note a demonstration, by means of which the whole Philoso- 
phic connection of the thoughts of the orator is impressed 
upon the hearer, in order that he may be excited to one par- 
ticular act. Conviction of this sort seems to me to be an im- 
possibility, and I believe that the best Dialectician has not 
yet succeeded in entirely bringing over his opponent to his 
own standing point. But even if it were a possibility, I 
should deem it useless for the orator to start from the highest 
principles of all knowledge and action, when he might di- 
rectly, and with entire certainty of success, fasten on upon 
the ethical Ideas. It were also sad, in the highest degree, to 
be compelled to go through with a course in Philosophy with 
a man in order to move him to the performance of a good ac- 
tion. But this part of the subject, as I believe, has been suf- 
ficiently explained in the First Book. I can as little approve 
of persuasion, if by it is understood the distortion or darken- 
ing of representations, in order to excite the Passions ; no 
able orator will betake himself to this means, and we have 
shown that he has no need to do so. If, however, conviction 
may be taken to denote the production of the Idea in consci- 
ousness, and persuasion its elevation and transformation into 
Affection — which, however, as I believe, the common use of 
language does not permit — I would answer the question above 
by saying, that the business of the orator consists neither in 
conviction nor persuasion alone ; but that his conviction should 
be persuasive, and his persuasion convincing. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 91 



CHAPTER III. # 

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF AFFECTION. 

Before we proceed to treat of the means of exciting the Af- 
fections, we must first become acquainted with the different 
kinds of Affections. Affection is not always one and the 
same ; for, in the first place, the Ideas upon which it attends, 
although all of them of an ethical nature, may be very diffe- 
rent from each other. In the second place, the character and 
qualities, as well of the Subject in whom the Idea is generated 
as of the Object to which it is referred, vary. For example, 
the Idea of Duty may be generated in a guilty or in an innocent 
mind — may be applied to a guilty or an innocent man ; and 
in relations so dissimilar, the Affection arising from the en- 
livenment of this Idea must assume different hues. Finally, 
in the third place, several Affections, in themselves different, 
may flow together, and, by their union, form a third. The 
knowledge of these different kinds of Affections seems to us 
to be necessary, since, without it, it will be impossible to deter- 
mine whether the means of exciting the Affections which we 
shall present, are sufficient or not. This knowledge will also 
enable us the better to distinguish the Affections from the 
Passions — a distinction upon which I lay the greatest stress, 
since only through its observance can Eloquence be restored 
again to its proper rank. Indeed, it does not escape me, that 
I am here entering upon the dangerous ground of Psychology, 



92 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR 

so called, from which perhaps the fragments of so many un- 
successful undertakings in this department of Khetoric ought 
to deter me ; yet the safe clue with which I venture into this 
domain, will perhaps preserve me from a similar failure. It 
is true, that nothing can be done in Psychology, if that obser- 
vation of self and of others, from which it draws its truths, is 
pursued at hap-hazard, and without leading principles. 
But here we have something firm, universal, and sure, in 
the ethical Ideas, which we bring down into the lower region 
(so to speak) of the mind, only in order to observe what will 
result from their contact with the natural feelings and the dif- 
ferent inward states of men. In this, or in a similar way, 
it may perhaps not be impossible to distinguish and to de- 
signate satisfactorily all the different movements in the mind 
which so interpenetrate and run through each other, and 
which no so-called empirical Psychology has as yet syste- 
matized. Yet, what we shall be able to do here, can be re- 
garded as only a slight contribution towards such an under- 
taking. 

Without regard now to the Idea of Duty, it is apparent 
that the inward state of a man who is warmed and enlivened 
by it, and who strives with all his powers to realize it in con- 
duct, must be remarked as a peculiar Affection. It is deno- 
minated Zeal, and it is naturally the strongest in him who 
regards the law which he obeys from love, as a truly divine 
law ; it is weaker in degree, yet not essentially different, in 
the mind of him who receives the law by which he regulates 
his conduct, from the State solely, or who believes that he im- 
poses it upon himself. If, however, man does not strive after 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 93 

the realization of an Idea, but after the possession of an out- 
ward good, his Zeal, which at first was an Affection, dege- 
nerates into Passion. If the Idea of Duty has been sup- 
pressed for a long time in a man's mind, and again acquires 
dominion within it, it begets, with reference to his past faulty 
state, Shame and Repentance, the liveliness of which, like 
that of Zeal, is in proportion to the seriousness of the sphere 
in which the Duty is conceived to be obligatory, and which, 
like the Affection of Zeal, would cease to be pure Affections, 
if the individual, instead of charging himself with the posi- 
tive neglect of duty, should charge upon himself merely the 
neglect to make use of a favorable opportunity to promote 
some earthly advantage. The perception, in the case of 
another, of the difference between what he actually does and 
what he ought to do, excites in different degrees the Affection 
of Anger, which, in order to remain a pure Affection, must 
never go farther than to the bad action itself, and which be- 
comes a Passion so soon as it is directed against the person 
of the agent. 

The Idea of Virtue, whether its perfection in God, in 
Christ, or the approximation to its perfection in a good man, 
be considered, through the Affection accompanying it, be- 
comes Love, Friendship, Esteem, Benevolence, Emulation, 
Admiration. These are pure expressions, from which the 
common use of language has already banished every notion of 
passionateness, with the exception only, that by Love is not 
always meant an Affection, generated by the Idea of Virtue, 
for an object in which this Idea is perfectly, or in part real- 
ized, but often, also, a passionate desire for that which stimu- 



94 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

lates unnaturally. Love, as an Affection, has the Godhead for 
its highest object, with which it strives to unite and become 
one, and can pass over to a human being only in case the 
human being manifests something divine. Accordingly, it is 
more perfect in its nature than Friendship, since it reveringly 
recognizes the whole Individuality of the loved object, while 
Friendship, on the contrary, is generated by esteem for only 
certain particular, mainly moral, qualities. Yet, as Love 
strives after an abiding union with its object, so there is also 
in Friendship the desire for community of feeling and action ; 
if this fails, Esteem remains, which is denominated Benevo- 
lence, when it is accompanied with the impulse to manifest it- 
self in procuring some earthly advantage for the object of 
its regard. Emulation is inseparable from Love and Friend- 
ship, and, in general, arises in a mind that is pervaded by the 
Idea of Virtue, on seeing its Ideal of Excellence more perfect- 
ly realized in another being than itself. Admiration is the 
loving recognition of another's Excellence, when it is unattaina- 
ble by us, or, at least, when it seems so far removed from our own 
Ideal, that we cannot strive after it, without renouncing our 
own Ideal, and ourselves, as it were. Thus the Hero admires 
the Poet, and the Poet the Hero, while each follows after a 
restricted Ideal, and one that is and must be foreign to the 
other. But no one admires either the invisible Godhead, or 
the Godhead as revealed in Christ, for the very reason that 
its perfection is without limits or restrictions, and, conse- 
quently, may be taken as an Ideal by every man. The Idea 
of Virtue produces the Affection of Contempt and JDisesteem 
towards those who seem to be destitute of the Idea of Virtue ; 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 95 

though Disesteem more properly has reference to the absence 
of civic merit, or desert in relation to the State. Contempt is 
a very harsh, and, therefore, an imperfect Affection ; he alone 
feels it who stands upon a low point of view, and who believes 
himself to be the creator of the virtue he possesses. He who 
is convinced that he has received it from God, without any 
merit of his own, will be more inclined to Pity than Contempt, 
in relation to the sinner. 

Finally, in the third place, the following Affections are as- 
sociated with the Idea of Happiness : — Longing after the 
highest Good, Hope to obtain it, Gratitude towards him who 
has rendered aid in obtaining it, Pity for the erring who 
does not strive after it at all, or in a false way, Fear of all 
that might deprive us of it, and Abhorrence of evil within 
ourselves, as the worst enemy of our true happiness. Yet, in 
order to preserve these affections pure, the Idea of Happiness 
must be conceived in its greatest purity ; and it is for the 
very reason that this is seldom done, that the Affections at 
this point border so closely upon the Passions. He who 
stands upon the position of the mere moralist, and seeks his 
happiness in an unhindered activity, will detect in himself 
a displeasure, not altogether pure and unselfish, towards all who 
oppose him in any way. But these Affections most easily 
degenerate into Passions, when the Idea of Happiness is ap- 
plied to political relations, and the individual animated by it 
is striving after the welfare of the State. So long as Enthu- 
siasm only, is felt in relation to those who promote the wel- 
fare of the State, and Displeasure only, in relation to those 
who disturb it, these are beautiful Affections, and worthy of 



96 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

esteem ; but, instead of Enthusiasm, there very easily arises 
blind Adoration, and instead of Displeasure, raging Hatred ; 
and these political Passions, which pre-suppose a great obscu- 
ration of the rational Idea of Happiness, are the more frightful, 
because it is easy for every man to justify to himself, and to 
others, his own selfish efforts, under the appearance of a patri- 
otic disposition. In like manner, Enmity against him who 
has done us some injury, is never an Affection, but always a 
Passion. The same is true of Envy, in which the Begrudg- 
ing another of his Happiness is connected with Hatred to- 
wards him for having it. Even Pity has something of Passion 
in it, if we deplore the case of an unhappy person, not for his 
own sake, but from a lurking, unconscious intimation, that 
possibly we may soon find ourselves in his condition. It is a 
true Affection only when, as has been said before, it springs 
from the pure Idea of Happiness dwelling in us, and in some 
degree realized in our own case, but which we miss in the 
striving of another, or when our feeling for the miserable is 
elevated and ennobled by the additional influence of the 
Ideas of Justice and of Virtue, as is the case on seeing an in- 
nocent man stricken with disease, or a man who, considering 
his high qualities, merited a better fate. As the sight of an 
innocent man, stricken with disease, calls forth an elevated 
Pity that is full of Affection, so the sight of prosperous Vice 
begets Moral Indignation,* which, like Compassion, is a 
mixed Affection, and springs from the connection of the Idea 
of Justice with the Idea of Happiness. 

Aristotle, who, in the beginning of his Rhetoric, condemns 

* Nemesis, 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 97 

the excitement of the Passions, but who afterwards, unable to 
carry out his theory independently, adapts himself to the ne- 
cessities of the case, treats of the subject-matter of this chap- 
ter with evident interest, and with the precision in the speci- 
fication of particulars peculiar to him. He assumes eleven 
Passions : — Anger, Placability, Love, Hatred, Fear, Sha?ne, 
Benevolence, Moral Indignation, Pity, Envy, Emulation. It 
is easy to see how, in this enumeration, things the most di- 
verse are brought together — e. g., the mean vice of Envy* 
with the noble striving of Emulation, and, consequently, how 
necessary it is to distinguish between Affection and Passion. 
Let it also be noticed that this list of Aristotle is not more 
copious than our own, and, consequently, that we have not 
been compelled, in order to systematically arrange the actual 
phenomena of consciousness, to mutilate them in the least* 



APPENDIX. 

WIT. 

If we, of right, require in the orator the ability to awaken 
Affection, we should also, perhaps, require that he have Wit. 
Wit is the destruction of Affection ; it is the bent of a mind, 
which, instead of being carried away by the Holy and the 
Great, makes it an object of its scrutiny, and entertains itself 
with the apparent contradictions and contrasts which are con- 
tained in it. The play of such a mind is much more sure 
9 



98 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

and safe when it is directed against a Passion, which continu- 
ally presents a great number of weak points, and which is 
always checked and abated whenever Wit gets the upper 
hand. It might, therefore, seem as if the weapon of Wit 
were necessary to the orator, not indeed for attack, but 
for defence against a Passion or an Affection awakened by his 
opponent, that is working against him. This is the only 
one, among the many shallow reasons mentioned by Cicero, 
for the employment of Wit in Eloquence, that is not utterly 
to be rejected.^ And, indeed, it cannot be denied that a 
well-applied sally of wit is of great effect when the orator needs 
merely to free himself from some entanglement, to help himself 
quickly out of a momentary embarrassment, and by a brief 
word to get rid of a matter, especially if it does not pertain 
to the higher relations of human existence, and is of no special 
importance to any one. Yet, when the orator has in view the 
excitement of a great and powerfully moving Affection, Wit, 
however skilfully applied, can produce only an injurious effect. 
It may indeed deprive the reasoning of an opponent of its 
force, and extinguish the fire which he has kindled ; but the 
hearer is thereby put into an indifferent mental state that is 
destitute of Affection, and one in which he is more inclined to 
reflection than to action. But the orator should never let it 
come to this, for while in this way he destroys the Affection 
or Passion which his opponent has called forth, he at the 
same time destroys that which has been produced by himself, 
and must, after an interruption so disturbing in its effects, be- 

* Q,uod frangit adversarium, quod impedit, quod elevat, quod deterret, 
quod refutat.— De Oratore, II. 58. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 99 

gin his whole work over again. The intermingling of Wit in 
an oration, is therefore unworthy of a true orator, and it seems 
to me the orator is upon true and high ground only when, 
without utterly annihilating the particular Affection which has 
been called forth in opposition, he throws it back with re- 
doubled force upon his opponent. In this way, without any 
cold and indifferent state intervening, Affection follows upon 
Affection, and that awakened last is strengthened by the con- 
trast with the preceding. It will not be more difficult, it will 
rather be more easy for him who speaks with the conscious- 
ness of the goodness of his cause, and can apply the whole 
power of the moral Ideas to his own purposes, to suddenly re- 
verse a false feeling in the mind of the hearer, which is un- 
favorable to himself, than first to kill all feeling in him, and 
then re-animate him for his own purposes. 

In order to clearly perceive how foreign Wit is from Elo- 
quence, let one consider the nature of sacred Eloquence, and 
ask himself, What would be the effect of a witty sally — against 
an oppose r of religion, for example — in the midst of a serious 
discourse ? Would it not, of necessity, so destroy the whole 
impression of the discourse as that it would be impossible to 
think even, of renewing it again ? Of similar effect, also, is 
Wit in political Eloquence, although less hazardous, because 
the contrast with the main character of the discourse is not so 
sharp and striking. Upbuilding, to speak generally, is the 
proper function of the orator ; he can therefore have to do 
with destroying, only in passing and briefly. 

The tendency to Wit and the capability of employing it, 
were very slight, in the serious mind of Demosthenes, in which 



100 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

great affections were constantly dominant, while they were 
prominent qualities in Cicero. The latter took great pleasure 
in practising this talent, which flattered his vanity, while in 
the orations of Demosthenes no traces of it are to be met with, 
although he was often the subject of the witty sallies of his 
contemporaries. Quintilian, who in general is more prejudiced 
in favor of his countryman than he should be, in reference to 
this quality places him above Demosthenes ; a totally false 
judgment, since he praises him on account of a quality which 
rather merits condemnation. Cicero is very entertaining 
perhaps, to the modern reader, in those passages in which he 
covers his opponent with wit and ridicule, but let one only 
observe how Demosthenes refutes his adversary with earnest 
vehemence, with what masterly ability he converts defence into 
an attack, and hurls back as an accusation the annihilated 
charge of his opponent, and then ask himself which method is 
most conformed to the end of the orator, most elevated and 
noble, most virtuous ? 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 101 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE MEANS OF EXCITING AFFECTION ; OR ; THE RHETORICAL 
PRESENTATION OF THOUGHT. 

The way for the investigation of the important inquiry, 
by what means Affection can be excited, seems to have been 
sufficiently prepared, by what has been said in proof of the 
moral dignity and worth of this mental state, and of the duty 
of the orator to call it into existence. We do not treat of the 
excitement of the Passions, because it is a subject which can 
find a place only in a Rhetoric constructed according to en- 
tirely false, or, at least, imperfect principles. Aristotle, upon 
this subject, imparts an amount of instruction which, in com- 
pleteness and fulness of rich and fine remark, can hardly be 
surpassed. Yet it all amounts simply to this, that each Pas- 
sion has its particular object by which it can be excited, if it 
be depicted in lively colors, and placed vividly before the 
view. A little imagination and so-called knowledge of hu- 
man nature, accompanied with a versatile character, or an evil 
will, is often sufficient in order to succeed in this. It is not 
even necessary that the orator himself feel the Passion which 
he would enkindle ; nay, this might rather be a hindrance to 
him, since it would destroy his coolness and self-possession. 
We acknowledge, moreover, that in many circumstances, and 
having to do with certain characters, it may be much easier 
to allow a Passion to blaze forth, than to produce an Affection ; 
9* 



102 • ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

nay, that the former, in comparison with the latter, is mere 
child's-play. But besides that such a procedure is not moral 
in its nature, it is also a highly uncertain and deceptive 
means in order to attain a Rhetorical end, as we have already 
shown ; so that Good Sense, which goes hand-in-hand with 
Duty, limits the activity of the orator to the production of 
Ideas, and their enlivenment into Affections. 

While now a Passion may be made to blaze forth, by one 
who is destitute of Passion himself, he alone, on the other 
hand, is able to awaken an Affection, who is himself enliven- 
ed and pervaded by it. For the aim, in this case, is not to ren- 
der the mind of the hearer susceptible to the stimulus of an 
external object, in order to which, it is not indispensably 
necessary that the orator himself be strongly affected by it ; 
but to transfer something that has been generated in the 
depths of the soul, into another person, which can be done 
only in proportion as the orator himself possesses that which 
is to be produced. Furthermore, it has been shown, that in 
the mind of the orator the Affection is most intimately con- 
nected with the Idea, and that it arises only as an effect of the 
Idea, and in proportion to the degree in which the Idea is un- 
folded and developed. In like manner, it can never be pro- 
duced in the mind of the hearer by means which lie without 
the Idea, but only by means of the Idea itself, and its pre- 
sentation. Only when the orator succeeds in imparting the 
Idea which is living, and creative in his own mind, to the 
hearer, in an equal degree of force and clearness, will the Idea 
break forth into activity in both speaker and hearer with 
equal power, i. e., be accompanied with the same Affec- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 103 

tion in each. If, therefore, we can discover a particular 
and peculiar manner of presentation, by which an ethical Idea 
may be gradually carried up to its highest completeness in 
the mind of another, we shall have discovered the true means 
of awakening Affection. I say a particular and peculiar 
manner of presentation, for at this point especially, it must 
be evident, that it can be neither a Philosophical nor a Poeti- 
cal manner. For although Philosophy exhibits Ideas in them- 
selves, and Poetry, an Idea in a sensuous dress, yet neither 
strives to excite an Affection from which a sudden revolution, 
either in the inward state of a man, or in the outward condition 
of human society, may proceed ; and even if anything similar 
to this results from the Philosophical or Poetical manner of 
presenting Ideas, yet the design to attain it, forms no part of 
this manner of presentation, and exerts no influence upon it, 
when it is pure and perfect in its character and execution. 
But the Rhetorical manner of presenting Ideas has the ex- 
citement of Affection, for its peculiar aim and end ; and I 
affirm that this is the only point of view from which we can 
proceed, if we would consecutively and systematically derive 
its rules and laws. After having treated, in the First Book, 
of the Plan and Division, we shall therefore now endeavor to 
penetrate more deeply into the secret of Rhetorical Compo- 
sition. 

The success of our attempt to refer the Theory of Elo- 
quence to ethical principles, would be very doubtful, if we 
should now find ourselves compelled to leave the path which 
we have hitherto trodden, and to deduce the laws of the 
Rhetorical presentation of thought, which have for their aim 



104 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR 

the awakening of Affection, from some other domain than 
that of Ethics ; perhaps from a newly-invented Theory of the 
Beautiful and Sublime, which we had connected as a little 
addendum with the main system, or perhaps from the Theory 
of the Emotions, and some shrewd empirical rules for exerting 
an influence upon the human mind. But we find ourselves 
in no such desperate position, but take up our investigation 
again, precisely at the point where we dropped it in order to 
explain some subjects which presented themselves, by the aid 
of the principles which had been established, and proceed in 
the deduction of the laws, according to which a free being 
may exert influence upon other free beings. The first was : 
the orator must subordinate his particular Idea to the univer- 
sal and necessary Ideas of hearers ; and upon this was based 
all that we have thus far developed. It is now incumbent 
upon us to lay down the remaining laws which are to be ob- 
served in this case, and to show how they, and they only, are 
the best, sole means of attaining the end which the orator 
must of necessity prescribe to himself, viz. the production of 
Affection. 

He, therefore, who, as a free being, would work upon other 
free beings, and has already brought his particular Idea into 
harmony with their innate and necessary Ideas, must, in the 
first place, closely adapt his method of treating the subject to 
existing circumstances and relations. He must, in the second 
place, with all this reference to the position in which he finds 
himself, with all the resistance or avoidance of the obstacles 
which he meets in his path, at the same time be shut up and 
continue, in one constant, unceasing, progressive process. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 105 

But since, in the third place, through this advancing move- 
ment, the entire relation of the orator is every moment chang- 
ing, and assuming another form and shape, every element of 
his activity must likewise be distinguished by a particular 
form and shape ; and as his method, as a whole, was adapted 
to the relations which he found already existing, so each of 
the steps in it must be in harmony with these changes brought 
about by himself. 

These three laws — the first of which we denominate the 
Law of Adaptation, the second the Law of Constant Pro- 
gress, the third the Law of Vivacity — we shall now examine, 
and endeavor to apply to Eloquence, as the means of excit- 
ing Aifection P 



106 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE '> OR r 



CHAPTER V. 



THE LAW OF ADAPTATION. 



It is not merely a maxim of good sense, it is an ethical law, 
that our influence upon others should be adapted to the cir- 
cumstances under which it is attempted to be exercised. These 
circumstances are no other than our relations to otir fellow- 
men, which again are determined by their particular Individu- 
ality, and by all that is connected with this. But every man 
demands that his Individuality be respected, and although he 
acknowledges that it can and must undergo modifications, he 
nevertheless demands that these consist not in the suppression, 
but in the cultivation and elevation of what is already existing 
within him. Since this is a demand which every man makes, 
and since it is a moral law, that we so harmonize our claims 
with those of others, that they can co-exist with each other, 
this same law imposes upon us the obligation to respect their 
Individuality — L e., in our method of procedure to adapt our- 
selves to existing relations and circumstances. For in endea- 
voring to realize an Idea, we assert and maintain our own In- 
dividuality ; but in order that this may not be done at the ex- 
pense, or by the suppression, of the Individuality of others, the 
preponderance which we are endeavoring to acquire must be 
made easy and compensated for, by the closest possible insin- 
uation of our own Individuality into that of our hearers. 
Hence arose the first duty to fuse our Ideas with theirs ; hence 



OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 107 

arises, now, the second duty of recognizing their Individuality 
while asserting our own, and of employing the greatest care- 
fulness while penetrating into anything that can possibly be 
regarded as belonging to it. But since, according to what we 
have before affirmed, the highest virtue is also the highest 
good sense, the employment of this moral adaptation, while 
we are endeavoring to exert an influence upon others, will be 
the surest means, and the necessary condition, of securing a 
successful result. It is this by which the practical man, in 
the higher and better sense of the word, is distinguished ; and 
if his method is uniformly characterised by this quality, and 
for this reason is never fruitless, we should, while ascribing 
good sense to him, at the same time not overlook the moral 
ground and source of this quality. There are men who at 
first sight inspire confidence, because they assert a distinctive 
and superior Individuality with dignity, and set it forth with 
modesty, while at the same time they concede ii§ full rights to 
the Individuality of every other man. Hardly have they com- 
menced the management of a difficult case, when all obstacles 
and opposition vanish, because every hearer, on seeing them 
proceed, is soon convinced that their influence upon him can 
result only in his own benefit. These are the men who con- 
trol and give direction to social life, and to such examples must 
we look if we would obtain a true and lively notion of the 
distinctive peculiarity of the orator. On the contrary, there 
are persons who are ever ready and desirous to exert a good 
influence upon others, but who, because they always bring for- 
ward their propositions at the wrong time, and are not able to 
adapt them to the individual peculiarities of those with whom 



10S ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

they have to do, invariably fail in their plans and enterprises J 
good men, perhaps, and yet, without doubt, men who need a 
higher moral cultivation. They are the genuinely unrhetori- 
cal natures, exactly adapted to place clearly and plainly before 
the eye, what the orator should not be. 

Now the Law of Adaptation is as valid in relation to a rhe- 
torical, as it is in relation to a moral procedure, and imparts 
to it, if it is formed after it, certain qualities which are of an 
ethical origin, and which, at the same time, may be regarded 
as the best means of exciting Affection. 

In the first place, an oration adapted to existing relations, 
will be so suited to the hearer's power of comprehension, as 
that it will neither strain it to over-exertion, nor leave it un- 
employed. For the power of comprehension depends upon 
the learning and intellectual cultivation of the hearer, along 
with which it forms a part, and indeed a very essential part, 
of his Individuality, which is to be respected by the orator, 
and which he would offend against in an inexcusable manner, 
if he should fatigue it by too great obscurity, or too great 
plainness, in his discourse. And since, in order to avoid both 
these faults, a very accurate acquaintance with the Public 
whom he addresses is necessary, and one which he cannot ob- 
tain without a diligent study of it, he is obligated to engage 
in this study ; otherwise, he would incur the very same blame 
which he does, who undertakes a particular business, and ne- 
glects to acquire the knowledge necessary to its prosecution. 
It is indeed true, that, even among the same class of hearers, 
the degree of cultivation in each one is different ; yet, it is 
easy to strike a mean, and from this to form the image, if I 






OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 109 

may so say, of a universal or model hearer ; and this image, if 
the orator keep it constantly before him, and address all he 
has to say to it, will keep him from the two extremes above* 
mentioned. 

If an orator is not able to form a correct judgment respect- 
ing the Public which he is to address, or to occupy their at- 
tention in a manner adapted to their power of attention, this 
cannot be regarded as a natural and unavoidable defect, and 
so be merely matter of regret, but must be considered as a 
moral defect; for his inadequateness ought not to have es- 
caped his notice, and he should have given up a profession to 
which he had not become equal, especially since, in the majo- 
rity of cases, he might have made up for what was wanting in 
natural talent, by persevering diligence. Nay, even if the 
orator possesses the greatest natural talents, it will be impos- 
sible for him to form a correct judgment respecting the intel- 
lectual state of cultivated hearers, and to adapt his conceptions 
to theirs, unless he possesses scientific and learned culture ; 
this, therefore, he should acquire ; ignorance in him is to be 
regarded as weakness of moral character, and as such, is to in 
cur moral condemnation. Here, again, we see how, in the 
case of the orator, the activity of all his powers is, or should 
be, under the guidance of a moral principle. 

In the acquisition of learned and scientific culture, he is to 
set no limits to himself; let him go as far as he may and 
can ; let him keep even step with his age, or let him press on 
before it ; only let him never forget that Learning and Science, 
for him as an orator, are only means, and not ends, and that 
he may not put the exhibition of what he has made his own 
10 



110 elogujence a virtue; or, 

in these departments, in the place of the moral Ideas which 
he is to set before the popular mind. This would be a vanity 
intrinsically contrary to morality ; it would cause him to lose 
sight entirely of the hearer's power of comprehension, and 
oftentimes to present things that would weary the attention of 
his audience to no purpose, or only awaken obscure images, 
instead of distinct conceptions ; and this is the second, and 
as it appears from investigation, also culpable error, which the 
Law of Adaptation forbids, in respect to the hearer's power of 
comprehension. 

In this adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power of 
comprehension, which, as we have seen, is of an ethical origin, 
we find the first means of exciting Affection. In order that 
the hearer may be induced to take part in a series of concep- 
tions, it is absolutely necessary that the activity which is re- 
quired of him be not fatiguing in its nature ; in case it were 
fatiguing, it would soon become irksome to him, and he would 
surrender himself to an inactivity that would render all further 
efforts of the orator fruitless. And even if the hearer should 
be willing to exert himself, to attentively follow a discourse 
which taxed his powers to the utmost by its obscurity, yet the 
too great stretch of the power of comprehension would exert 
a deadening influence upon Feeling and Imagination, and 
would render it impossible to excite them. But the power of 
attention is weakened by the too great plainness, as well as 
the too great obscurity, of that which is presented to it, and 
the gentler stirrings of Affection will ever disdain to wake at 
the bidding of an orator who cannot even satisfy the under- 
standing. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. Ill 

Here, I fear, I shall be met with the objection, that he who 
has good sense enough to see the correctness of the remarks 
just made, will need nothing more than this good sense itself, 
in order to direct himself acordingly, and to impart to his ora- 
tion the right relation to the hearer's powers of comprehen- 
sion, so that the moral qualities and character of the orator 
need not come into account at all. This may have actually 
been the case in Athens, and in Eome, with many a dema- 
gogue ; yet, such an example would prove nothing here ; for 
he who in Athens, or Rome, should have set forth something 
utterly unintelligible, would have been immediately driven off 
from the bema by the scorn and laughter of his impatient 
hearers. Under these circumstances, therefore, where the ne- 
cessity of following the rules above-mentioned was so clear 
and pressing, the moral character and qualities requisite in 
other circumstances, might, perhaps, have been dispensed with 
in the orator ; but from the fact, that a bad man may be com- 
pelled, by circumstances of a highly pressing nature, to a cer- 
tain method of procedure, it cannot be inferred that this 
method of procedure is not of an ethical nature, and that, 
other things being equal, the bad man can succeed in it as 
well as the good. For only contemplate, for a moment, the 
sacred orator of our own times, whose relation to his hearers 
is far more unhampered than that of the ancient orator, since 
they cannot react upon him in a manner so totally destruc* 
tive of success, as iu the case above-mentioned, and how diffi- 
cult, nay, how impossible, it often seems, even for men of 
the shrewdest good sense, men whom no one cr.ii deny to be ca- 
pable of forming a correct estimate of the capacity of their 



112 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

audience, to keep themselves in their discourse upon the right 
level, and neither too high nor too low. Carried away by 
complacency in something which they have learned or origin- 
ated, they at one time require impossibilities of the hearer's 
power of comprehension ; at another, from mere habit, stick- 
ing to common-places, they set forth that which is perfectly 
well known to their audience, in a prolix and wearisome man- 
ner. Does not the former testify of too great vanity and 
self-complacency, which are certainly faults of a moral nature ; 
and does not the latter, as does all supine yielding to mere 
habit, pre-suppose a lack of strength and elasticity in the 
character ? 

Thus it is apparent that even this excellence in an oration 
— viz. that it is adapted to the hearer's power of comprehen- 
sion, although it is only a very subordinate excellence, camiot 
be reached without qualities in the orator that are morally 
good. If I have succeeded in demonstrating the truth of this 
assertion, I believe I have thereby done those young men no 
little service, who are devoting themselves to Eloquence. 
Science and Learning prepare them beforehand for an office in 
which Science and Learning can no longer be the principal ob- 
ject of their endeavors, but must be subordinated to the higher 
aim, to the attainment of which they are subservient. That 
this higher aim is actually a higher, it will be very difficult 
for them to understand, especially since the instruction at the 
common and higher schools, as these have hitherto been con- 
stituted, exhibits Learning and Science to them as the high- 
est of all things, to which nothing, Religion and Morality not 
excepted, should be preferred. In vain, therefore, are they 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 113 

now urged to banish everything purely Scientific, both in 
Matter and Form, from their discourses ; they despise this 
rule, which appears to them only as timid concession, and 
which, it cannot be denied, is commonly represented to them 
as such, by their teachers ; in default of the Professor's chair, 
they would employ the Pulpit instead of it, and would make 
the bold attempt to raise the people to the heights where they 
themselves are soaring. If they finally come back from their 
error, yet the loss of heart and inspiration often causes them 
to sink down into superficiality and common-place. If, on 
the contrary, this accommodation of discourse to the hearer's 
power of comprehension is not a mere shrewd and skilful 
concession, but a perfectly moral procedure, if the opposite 
to it is contrary to duty, and if it is exhibited from this 
point of view, a young and noble mind will readily follow 
a rule, the observance of which it believes does not degrade, 
but, on the contrary, elevates and ennobles. 

Yet the Law of Adaptation requires not only that the ora- 
tion be adapted to the capacity of the hearer, but also that the 
orator have reference to his whole Individuality, to his posi- 
tion, his relations, to the occurrences which enter deeply into, 
and determine his fortune and fate. And this kind of adapt- 
ation is far more difficult to attain to, than the first. In or- 
der to this, it is necessary that the orator know, and have 
before his eye the innumerable elements which enter into 
the civil, moral, and religious condition of man ; namely, 
the circle of his ideas and experiences, the thoughts that rre 
common or foreign to him, the images with which his imagina- 
tion is commonly employed, the more or less perfect Ideal of 
10* 



114 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

happiness, of civil, moral, religious perfection, which floats 
before him, his virtues and vices, his wishes and desires, to- 
gether with all the more intimate modifications imparted to his 
Individuality by standing in society, by wealth, by political 
events, by the condition of the Church and State to which he 
belongs. 

This adaptation of the oration to the hearer's power of com- 
prehension, the best teachers of Rhetoric seem to have recog- 
nized as a means of exciting the Affections (in their sense in- 
deed, according to which they were merely Passions) ; at least, 
I know no other reason why Aristotle in his Rhetoric, imme- 
diately after presenting the theory of the Passions, follows with 
a description of the manners of men, according to their age, 
rank, and wealth,^ although he does not explain what use the 
orator is to make of this latter knowledge. 

Cicero also, would have the orator be a shrewd and subtle 
man, who has thoroughly scrutinized the character, and way of 
thought of his hearers, according to their age and standing in 
society ;f and he only errs in expecting of shrewdness and 
subtlety what may be best accomplished by morality. A crafty 
man may indeed succeed in detecting this or that weak side 
of a character, in order to attach to it the threads by which he 
would lead it ; but in order to so enter into, and feel, the views, 
the sentiments, and the position of a man, as to be able to ad- 

* Rhet. Lib. II. c. xii.— xvii. 

t Acuto homine nobis opus est, et natura usuque callido, qui sagaciter 
pervestiget. quid sui cives, iique homines quibus aliquid dicendo persua- 
dere velit, cogitent, sentiant, opinentur, expectent. Teneat oportet 
venas cuj usque generis, eetatis, ordinis, et eorum apud quos aliquid aget 
aut erit acturus, mentes sensusque degustet. — De Oral. I. 51. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 115 

dress his whole Individuality in a manner to benefit and ele- 
vate, something more than craftiness is needed ; shrewd good 
sense is indeed needed, but such as is under the guidance 
of moral feeling, and that disinterested benevolence which 
readily surrenders itself up to sympathy with men, and to the 
contemplation of the objects in which they are interested. 

Furthermore, the knowledge of the hearer's capacity thus 
obtained, should not be used to favor his errors and to flatter 
his passions, but it should be employed to excite the Affec- 
tions in a negative way at first — z. e., to avoid all that might 
displease, and so injure the hearer as such, or that might 
render things, in themselves indifferent to him, matters of 
offence. Without this care beforehand, the excitement of Af- 
fection is not to be thought of. In vain does the orator speak 
with fire and emphasis ; in vain is the hearer inclined to suffer 
himself to be warmed and animated by the Idea which the 
orator imparts to him, if the orator detains or wearies him in 
the way to the goal in view, by a thousand minor matters irk- 
some in their nature. And this is no undue or sickly sensi- 
bility on the part of the hearer, for the claim itself, w T hich I 
as an orator make upon him, to entirely surrender himself in 
one respect to me, imposes the duty upon me to spare him as 
much as possible in all other respects. Hence, the orator also, 
if he is endowed w r ith true moral wisdom, must know how to 
go around all the difficulties which he cannot at the moment 
overcome ; this is at once Duty and Good Sense. Thus, the 
Apostle Paul, in order the better to reach his great aim, spared 
the prejudices of his cotemporaries, and became all things to 
all men, if by any means he might save some. 



116 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; OR, 

The orators of antiquity, Demosthenes perhaps alone ex- 
cepted, because they did not apprehend the true ground of this 
Adaptation in the oration, sometimes practised a species of 
artifice and trickery as unworthy of a high-minded man, as it 
was useless towards the attainment of their aim. When 
Cicero pretended that he could not call to mind the name of 
Polycletus, and it was mentioned to him aloud by one of the 
by-standers,^ he, without doubt, intended by this seeming ig- 
norance of the history of Grecian Art, to fall in with the notion 
of his fellow-citizens, that to employ one's self with such ob- 
jects as those of Art was unworthy of a Statesman. For my 
part, I can see in this, only an excess of Rhetorical Adapta- 
tion, and, consequently, something contrary to Morality. 
Moreover, I do not understand of what use this little piece of 
trickery could be to a man who knew how to set such mighty 
springs in motion. But it is the fate of all one-sided endea- 
vors, to soon degenerate into the production of mere form 
without substance. This was very soon the case with an- 
cient Eloquence, because the Ancients misapprehended the 
moral nature of Eloquence, and regarded it only as an instru- 
ment for the attainment of ambitious designs.! 

* Verrina, IV. 3.— Wolf ad Leptineam, p. 300. 

t An artifice similar to this of Cicero's, only still more shrewd and 
cunning, is attributed to Demosthenes, in order to explain the following 
passage in the oration for Ctesiphon : " For I, (thus he addresses iEschi- 
nes,) and all these with me, call you a hireling, first of Philip and now of 
Alexander! If you doubt, ask these present; but I will rather do it for 
you. Does it seem to you, Athenians, that iEschines is a hireling or 
a guest of Alexander ? Do you hear what they sayT — Von Raumer's 
Translation, p. 12*2. 

Here, say the Scholiasts, Demosthenes purposely pronounced the 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 117 

If such an extreme Adaptation on the part of the orator is 
to be condemned, the opposite fault — namely, striking vio- 
lently against existing and unalterable relations — is likewise 
to be regarded as contrary to morality, and contrary to good 
sense. A shock of this kind annihilates immediately the 
effect of the most powerful oration, and we need only to. ex- 
amine the sort of displeasure which is excited by it, in order 
to see that the orator who has committed the fault in question, 
is chargeable, not with a defect in good sense, or in pro- 
ductive genius, but, what is far worse, in moral feeling. If 

word ni(T$a)Tds, with an incorrect accent, and represented the excla- 
mation of the hearers, who repeated the word in order to correct the 
pronunciation, as an answer to his question, and as a declaration on 
their part that they regarded iEschines as an hireling. This expla- 
nation is given upon the authority of the Scholiasts, and, so far as I 
know, is accepted by many, because the reader is particularly delighted 
with discovering such artifices in orators ; but that it is the correct one, I 
doubt. Certainly such a misplacing of the accent would have offended 
the ears of the Athenians extremely, and might have occasioned an ex- 
clamatory correction on their part ; but could this same excitable public 
have thus coolly entered into the deception, and pretended to pronounce 
a judgment respecting iEschines, when they only corrected Demosthe- 
nes'? It seems to me, that Demosthenes, by this artifice, in reality so im- 
pertinent to the occasion, would not have won over the minds of his hear- 
ers, but would have only exasperated them. But besides this, while ex- 
amining the orations of Demosthenes, we should at least consider what 
is due to his character, the dignity of which, even though but half recog- 
nized, must protect him from the suspicion of having meddled with such 
miserable conceits ; we should consider that in this most tragic hour of 
his life, his strongly exercised soul could only hurl bolt-like Ideas and not 
play with accents. Moreover, what is more natural than to suppose, as 
an explanation of this passage, thai he could from the first reckon upon 
a strong party among the audience, and might anticipate that they 
would answer the question according to his wishes 1 This, much more 
befitting explanation is also found in the Scholiasts, who ascribe this 
answer to a friend of the orator, the comic poet Menander. 



118 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

an audience should be so obtuse as not to be offended by mis- 
takes of this kind — and this is oftener the case than one 
would think — this indeed renders the labor of the orator 
easier on the one side, but it renders it more difficult on 
the other ; for, as the audience does not perceive the want of 
Adaptation, neither will it perceive the presence of Adapta- 
tion in an oration. The orator, therefore, should congratulate 
himself only in an audience that is cultivated enough to be 
displeased with the slightest unbefitting expression ; if he 
does not find his audience to be of such a character, he must 
seek to elevate it to this height, while he shows it a respect 
which it will certainly learn more and more, to estimate and 
understand. 

But with respect to what he may venture upon, and what 
he may not venture upon, let the orator decide, not according 
to the conjectures of worldly shrewdness and sense, but accord- 
ing to moral principles ; the hardest and strongest statements, 
provided only they are adapted and suitable — provided only 
the orator is called upon, by virtue of his office and his call- 
ing, to make them — will never do injury ; they will never 
weaken, but will always strengthen the effect of his oration, 
and the Affection w T hich he would produce. How cultivated 
was the feeling for the Befitting and the Adapted, in the 
Athenians in the time of Demosthenes, and yet this orator 
never feared to charge home upon them, with the greatest 
force and impressiveness, their degeneracy, their failures and 
weaknesses ; and I am not aware that he ever injured the ef- 
fect of his orations by the freedom which was so unmistake- 
ably connected with his love for his country and the existing 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 119 

constitution. Still less should the sacred orator fear to de- 
pict moral and religious corruption, according to its true re- 
ality, and to terrify the impenitent sinner by the retributions 
of the future life. He who omits to do this from fear of es- 
tranging his audience from himself, does not consider that 
the hearer altogether involuntarily judges of the orator ac- 
cording to moral rules, and allows him to venture upon all 
that he may rightfully venture upon ; that the most vehe* 
inent charges do not exasperate him, provided only he sees 
that the orator, by virtue of the relation in which he stands 
to himself, is justified therein ; nay, that there is a propen- 
sity in the moral and religious nature of man, which is close- 
ly akin to the propensity for the Terrible and Sublimt, by 
virtue of which he is better pleased with a merited humilia- 
tion, that may lead to better sentiments, than with that su- 
perficial emotion which is generated by flattering and specious 
discourse* Thus the renowned orators who spoke before 
Louis XIV. and his Court — an auditory who surely would 
never have pardoned the slightest impropriety in them — 
often employed and applied all the terrors of religion, and all 
the censorial power of their office, and always with the great* 
est effect* 

While, on the one hand, Adaptation in the oration pre* 
vents every offence that might suppress Affection in the 
hearer, on the other it contributes directly to the awakening 
of Affection. If, namely, the orator moves in a circle of such 
thoughts, images, and allusions, as recall into memory the 
experiences of the hearer himself, and the scenes of which he 
was himself a witness, the oration must influence with double 



120 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE; OR, 

power. For in this way the Idea is not merely made clear 
and distinct to his mind, but since the orator associates it 
with all that the hearer has himself thought and felt, the 
whole inner being of the hearer is taken possession of, and 
that inward fermentation, which we denominate Affection, 
is awakened. There may be many forms of expression suit- 
able to the thought, and intelligible to the hearer ; but there 
is perhaps still another in particular, by which a region of his 
mind enveloped in darkness may be suddenly filled with light, 
and which at least strikes some of the manifold threads of 
which the web of his feelings consist ; this latter form the 
orator should know how to find, and he will be enabled to 
find* it by means of that study of his hearers which is 
grounded in an interest for their well-being. If he should 
prefer another mode of presentation, to this form of clothing 
his thought, this would be an egotistic procedure that would 
punish itself by the inefficiency of the oration. But the oc- 
casional oration shows how strong the impression is, which 
can be produced by the wise use of feelings already ex- 
isting in the hearers. If the preacher speaks on the occasion 
of the opening of a campaign, or of a festival in commemo- 
ration of a victory or a peace, he may, in this instance, pre- 
suppose the existence in the hearers of certain prevailing 
views and opinions, certain hopes and fears, certain feelings 
of joy and thankfulness, with greater certainty than in the 
case of ordinary discourses, when the relations that exist 
are not so determinate and precise ; and if he understands, 
with only moderate wisdom, how to converge all these diffe- 
rent rays into the focus of his leading Idea, he will be able 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 121 

to raise his Idea to a very high grade of Affection. This is 
the reason why the effect of sermons on Festival occasions is 
always greater than that of ordinary discourses on the Sabbath. 
In the former case, the hearer, however unfavorable his mental 
state may be for the purposes of the orator, nevertheless, al- 
ways brings with him some sentiments of a religious charac- 
ter, upon which the orator can very easily fasten. 

It also belongs to this Adaptation in the oration, that the 
orator never rise into expressions, phrases, and images that are 
above the language of cultivated society, even before an audito- 
ry that would be able to follow a higher style of thought, and to 
understand more exquisite modes of speech. I mention this 
for the sake of those who think they impart a peculiar dignity 
and force to their discourse, by the use of poetic ornament, by 
employing words which they bring forth from the dust of past 
centuries, and by constructions which are foreign to pure prose. 
But this is always only a cold show without power : if power, 
as I affirm, can mean nothing else than the efficiency of the ora- 
tion in exciting Affection. In the throng of active life, amidst 
heart-rending misfortunes, during the silent hours of contem- 
plation, does the hearer make known his thoughts and feelings 
to himself and to others, in a highly flowery style, and in 
strange unusual phraseology ? Certainly not. The style of 
expression which spontaneously associates itself with the silent 
emotions of our heart, when they come forth into conscious- 
ness, is always as noble as it is simple ; if therefore the orator 
would penetrate into our inner life, and renew again the tra- 
ces of forgotten thoughts and feelings, if he would actually ad- 
dress us, he must employ the very same well-known and cus- 
11 



122 ELOQUENCE A VlRTtJE J Olt, 

tomary language in wliich we are wont to commune with our- 
selves. Every strange expression, nay, every unusual phrase, 
tears us away from ourselves, instead of leading us back into 
ourselves ; and the stream of inward harmonies, which per- 
haps was on the point of flowing forth, suddenly breaks upon 
some such unexpected obstacle, and is dissipated. Moreover, 
with the disturbance of this flow is connected displeasure to- 
wards a man who decks himself out in a showy costume of 
sounding phrases, which, after all, are not so very difficult to 
collect together, instead of employing my common, every-day 
language along with me, to his own true advantage, as well as 
mine. Those very rare instances when the speaker selects an 
unusual expression for an unusual thought, are of course ex- 
cepted here ; but to allow one's self in even the slightest de- 
parture from ordinary language^ unless there is some particu- 
lar reason to justify it, seems to me to be unadapted to the ora- 
tion, and contrary to its aim, and is therefore, according to the 
theory of Eloquence here laid down, morally blame-worthy. 

It will of course be understood in this connection, that I do 
not intend to disapprove of the use of Bible language ; on the 
contrary, I would recommend to all sacred orators, the frequent 
employment of the expressions and images of the sacred Scrip- 
tures, as a highly adapted and effectual means of exciting Af- 
fection, provided only they be not brought in merely to fill up 
empty space, but are fused into the discourse, retaining their 
whole dignity and force. They are highly adapted ; for the lan- 
guage of the Bible can never become antiquated, because it 
affords so many highly significant expressions for the manifold 
conditions of human life and states of the human heart, many 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 123 

of which also appear as proverbial phrases in the language of 
common intercourse ; and however much, religious education, 
and the reading of the Bible, may have been neglected, the or- 
ator may yet, in the case of the generality of hearers, reckon 
with certainty upon a thought being understood sooner in a 
Biblical than in a Philosophical dress. But the great power of 
Bible language, in awakening Affection, consists principally in 
this — that, in it, the expression for the Understanding, and the 
expression for the Feelings, are not different, as in merely 
human representations, but are always one and the same. 
The figures, so frequent in the Bible, while they have all the 
precision of an abstract terminology, at the same time trans- 
fer the Idea into the web of human relationships, and clothe it 
with all that can exert influence upon the mind ; they are a 
ray which unites in one, both light and heat, and passes over 
from the mind into the heart, thus kindling the whole man. If 
now, as is often the case, a sentence from the Bible, on our first 
meeting with it, or upon after-occasions, has awakened a whole 
series of pious emotions, the orator, by citing it as he passes 
on, can evoke anew the Affection which has already become con- 
nected with it,, and can apply it to the purposes of his oration. 
On account of this great advantage, I would advise the employ- 
ment of the language of the Bible, even though the orator can- 
not presuppose that the hearer is acquainted with it, or that it 
has ever contributed to awaken his inward life ; for by this 
frequent employment of it, this closer acquaintance, and this 
influence upon the mind, will be brought about by degrees. 

But that which prevents the orator from entering into the 
conceptions of his hearers, speaking to them in their own Ian* 



124 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

guage, and exciting Affection by the Adaptation of his dis- 
course to their Individuality, is, in the last analysis of it, noth- 
ing but a moral defect. In the main, it is that self-complacent 
vanity which only desires the pleasure of expressing itself apt- 
ly and agreeably, and which shrinks from the difficult and of- 
tentimes violent effort which is requisite in order to go out 
from self, and into another Individuality. From this weak- 
ness arise, in sacred Eloquence, the loosely constructed, flow- 
ery orations, which, indeed, since they are adapted to excite 
the fancy of the hearer, often meet with enthusiastic ap- 
plause, (inasmuch as men generally, blinded by their own 
vanity, seldom set such an estimate upon the vanity of 
others, and chastise it, as it deserves,) yet whose idle play 
of thoughts and images can never produce a noble Affection 
urging on to great resolves. Secondly, there is also a certain 
aversion to the process in question, which may be found even 
in noble and tender minds, and which prevents them from en- 
tering into the relations of their hearers, seizing their hearts 
with a strong grasp, and thus giving to their discourse that 
Adaptation which awakens Affection. If an orator absorbs 
himself entirely in the Idea, and developes it with great care- 
fulness, but touches only superficially and generally upon the 
relations in which it is to be realized, in order not to strike 
against any obstacle, or to give offence to any one, we may 
presuppose with certainty the existence of the very aversion 
above-mentioned. Thirdly, too great yielding on the part of 
the orator, in sacrificing his Idea and his Individuality, and in 
employing himself solely with the relations and inclinations 
of his hearers, in order to say something agreeable and pleas- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 129 

ing to them, deserves the very same, if not greater, moral con- 
demnation, as the faults already mentioned, and exerts the 
same debilitating influence upon the discourse ; an orator who 
is thus moved, often lets his hearers melt away hi powerless 
emotion, but he will never kindle in them a true Affi on, 
since the clear ray of his Idea, by which alone this if I a ac- 
complished, never breaks through the veil which surrounds it. 
Thus we have specified three errors : absorption in self, ab- 
sorption in the Idea of the oration, absorption in the relations 
of the hearers. If a Rhetorical presentation of thought has a 
decided preponderance to one of these three sides, it is without 
Adaptation, and powerless. In order, therefore, to speak with 
perfect Adaptation, the orator must so bring together, unite, 
and reconcile these three different claims, which his own Indi- 
viduality, the Idea of his oration, and the Relations of his hear- 
ers, make upon him, as that each one of them be satisfied with- 
out any disparagement to the others ; and in order to do this, 
nothing more is necessary, than is required in order to any truly 
moral action — namely, a constantly clear consciousness of our 
own Individuality, of the Idea according to which, and of the 
Relations in which, we act. But in order to the solution of 
this problem, extremely great strength of character in Rhetori- 
cal as well as in Moral respects, is necessary ; and how very 
much both are one and the same in essence, is seen in the fact, 
that orations, which are excellent both as Rhetorical and Moral 
processes, are not distinguished by any outward brilliancy and 
splendor ; for when the three different elements above-mention- 
ed are fused together, their colors flow into each other, while, 
on the contrary, imperfect orations, for the very reason that 
11* 



130 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

some one of these elements appears separated from the others, 
provided they are elaborated with any tolerable degree of abil- 
ity, readily acquire a brilliancy which astonishes the ignorant 
hearer, but which truly enlivens neither him nor any one else. 

In this respect Demosthenes deserves the very highest 
praise, since no orator has ever united with such a dignified 
presentation of his own Individuality, and such a transparent 
developement of his Idea, such an all-comprehending reference 
to existing Relations ; and from the constant fusion of these 
three constituent elements, originates his forcible simplicity, 
which would have been totally destroyed, if, in his orations, 
the Lyrical and the Philosophical had ever been separated 
from the Real. On the other hand, Cicero is far less deserv- 
ing of being set up as a model of Adaptation in the oration ; 
not that he ever rises above his hearer's power of comprehen- 
sion, or brings forward anything unbefitting and offensive, 
but at one time his own Individuality, at another, his Idea, at 
another, the existing Circumstances, are too prominent ; and 
that one of these three elements which is predominant at 
any time, throws the other two into the shade. But on ac- 
count of this very fault, his coloring is more brilliant than 
that of Demosthenes, and he can, in general, be understood 
with less laborious study into the relations of the age in 
which he appeared. 

Without wishing in the least to compare Massillon with 
Demosthenes, or Bossuet with Cicero, they nevertheless have 
this similarity — that Massillon, like the Grecian orator, with- 
out giving up himself and his Idea, realizes to himself, in the 
most accurate manner, the life of his hearers ; on the contrary, 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 131 

Bossuet, and indeed, as I conjecture, on account of a less pure 
character, almost entirely neglects this latter reference. For 
this reason, Massillon inspires us, and we forget to admire 
him — the highest praise that can be given to the orator ; on 
the contrary, Bossuet excites, even by his most sublime reli- 
gious elevation, nothing but cold admiration, or, at most, an 
inflammation of the Fancy that is morally useless. If, more- 
over, the French themselves almost always place Bossuet be- 
fore Massillon, this only proves, like many other judgments of 
their critics, how little they know how to recognize and esti- 
mate that which is truly excellent in their own literature. 



APPENDIX. 

TAS TE. 

What Taste properly is, is as much a matter of dispute, as 
is the place which it should hold in a Theory of Ait, and the 
influence which should be conceded to it in the production 
and criticism of works of Art. Indeed, the attempt has been 
made in modern times to bring it into utter condemnation^ 
and to strip it of all influence, as a perverted principle which 
we have derived from the French ; yet since the Public, how- 
ever much it may have been enjoined upon it not to exercise 
Taste in its judgments, does not, nevertheless, cease to regard 
its requisitions as valid ; since, likewise, Taste sometimes un- 
consciously influences the judgments of those who despise it, 



132 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OK, 

it would seem that it only needs to be seen in the right light, 
and to be placed in the right position, in order to be univer- 
sally recognized. It can, indeed, find no place in such theo- 
ries as recognize no other rules for Art but those which the 
Imagination imposes upon itself; for Taste will never have 
any connection with the Imagination, so long as the Imagi- 
nation works separate from the other faculties of the soul. 
But in this very separation lies the fault ; for how is it possi- 
ble that Art, which, from its nature, is to seize upon the whole 
man, should excite into action the Imagination alone, and not 
the other powers also ? And even if this should be the case, 
still the ethical power, although it will not indeed predominate 
in Art as it does in Rhetoric, will certainly not be without 
influence upon the impulse of the Imagination predominant 
in it. 

In the ability, then, of working according to ethical Ideas, 
I would seek the source of Taste, and affirm that Taste is 
nothing but the selection of the Befitting and Adapted, guided 
by ethical Ideas. Its proper home, therefore, is within the 
sphere of Eloquence ; or rather, its sphere should be extended 
over the whole practical life of the orator, since regard for the 
individual peculiarities of his fellow-men, and for the rela- 
tions in which he finds himself to them, should accompany 
him at all times. But if Taste has become a moral habit in 
him, I do not understand how he can suddenly drop it, when 
he turns back from the circle of his outward activity into 
himself, in order to unfold the Ideas of his Imagination, and 
how he can here speak with himself in a language, and make 
use of a manner of representation which he would never allow 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 133 

himself in, in his relations to his fellow-men. Taste in the 
above-given sense, should therefore extend itself over all 
Poetry ; the Ideas of the Imagination must be made to pass 
through this medium, and if this is done, they will gain in 
liveliness, and the discourse in power and perfection. For in 
order to make his work a living whole — in order to give it In- 
dividuality — the artist must impart to it characteristics of the 
most precise stamp; and some of them will always be failures, 
unless, besides the other relations in which the work origin- 
ated, the moral relations also, are to be recognized in it by the 
regard paid to them. But Eloquence, in respect to Taste, 
must always differ from Poetry in that, in the case of Elo- 
quence, the selection of the Befitting and Adapted is accom- 
panied with the design of exciting Affection, while Taste in 
the Poet, on the contrary, is a quality that works without any 
design in view, except the mere production of Beauty. More- 
over, the term Taste, so offensive to many, would not be so 
unsuitable to denote such a separating, selecting principle, as 
has been spoken of; while, at the same time, it would occur to 
us, that as the sensuous Taste manifests itself differently in 
different persons, so also the moral Taste does not pass the 
same judgments in Eloquence and Poetry, in different ages 
and relations ; for although the rule remains ever the same, it 
is modified by circumstances in the most manifold way. 



134 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OK T 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE LAW OF CONSTANT PROGRESS. 

After having previously become acquainted with the main 
parts into which the oration divides, we have now also seen 
what should be the nature of the subordinate represen- 
tations by which the Ideas are developed. But the ques- 
tion now arises, as well in respect to those main parts, as to 
these subordinate representations : By what Law are their 
order and succession determined ? We set forth here the 
Law of constant Progress, and have, in the first place, to 
show that this is an ethical Principle. 

Not only should the inward moral developement of man, 
considered as a striving after a perfection never to be abso- 
lutely reached, be a constant progress, but also when in active 
life he attempts the actualization of an ethical Idea, he should 
seek to approach continually, and without intermission, the 
prescribed goal. If the difficulties that stand in the way, de- 
termine him to entirely give up his plan, or if, occupying him- 
self with secondary things, he suffers himself to be turned 
aside from the path upon which he has entered, so that he 
returns back into it late, and with spent energies, we justly 
charge him with being wanting in that heart, that constancy, 
that force of character which is an essential constituent of 
Virtue. He cannot, it is true, approach his goal always in a 
straight line, so to speak, and with even pace ; he will some* 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 135 

times advance slower, because he must remove the obstruc- 
tions which oppose him, out of his way, or because he must 
slowly prepare the way for a work which cannot succeed at 
once. But even while making these elaborate preparations, 
the eye should never lose sight of the goal, and the striving 
to reach it, must be plainly apparent, even in the greatest di- 
gressions* But this progress itself receives its perfection 
from the steady constancy prevailing in it — ?. e., from the 
easy connection and fusion of the parts of the process, so that 
each particular part, as it was occasioned and prepared for, by 
what preceded, so in its turn serves as the occasion and pre- 
paration for what follows. If this essential requisite be want- 
ing, and the movement of the discourse is only by leaps and 
impulses, individual brilliant fragments may, indeed, be the 
result, but no continuous ethical life. 

From Ethics, therefore, we derive the Law of constant Pro- 
gress, (for it is contained necessarily and essentially in Ethics,) 
and not from the art of representation employed in Philosophy 
or Poetry, in which it is to be met with only under many li- 
mitations, nay, is often forced out by the opposite principle. 
For the activity of the Poet, like that of the Thinker, returns 
back into itself, because of the effort to impart roundness and 
finish to its creations, and is accompanied with a rest and sa- 
tisfaction which is grounded in the" consciousness of the pos- 
sibility of perfectly representing its Idea. The ethical striv- 
ing, on the contrary, in the consciousness that it can never 
reach the Ideal of its Perfection, nay, can never exhibit even 
a single Idea perfectly realized in actual existence, is never to 
give itself up to rest and self-satisfastion, but with abiding zeal, 



136 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

though with reflection, is to hasten on immediately from each 
step in the process that has been taken, to a new one. And 
if the law of constant Progress is found in certain species of 
Poetry — as for example, the Drama — it must not be* suppos- 
ed that Rhetoric borrowed it from them ; on the contrary, it 
imparted it to them, since the Drama is the representation of 
the ethical activity of men, and must therefore retain some- 
thing of the ethical element in it. 

As, therefore, the individual actions in a complete moral 
process join on uponone another, so also in the oration should 
the ethical Ideas and the adapted representations which serve 
to develope them, be methodically arranged. *So unceasing 
and vehement is the progress of the genuine orator, that he 
detests every thought, every word that does not bring him 
nearer the goal, as a weakness, a fault, nay, as a sin, and casts 
it from him. If it is necessary to instruct the hearer in things 
of secondary importance, that might have influence upon his 
decision ; to moderate his excited feelings ; to obviate an ob- 
jection ; he checks for a moment the rapidity of his course, yet 
only in order to be able to advance with so much the greater 
speed ; nay, it may sometimes seem as though he were de- 
viating entirely from his path, yet, even in his deviation, the 
movement towards the goal is constantly apparent, and it is 
soon seen that he turned aside into the by-path, only in order 
to reach the goal the sooner. And in this movement, sometimes 
vehement, sometimes gentle, thought without effort joins on 
upon thought, so that, from the first to the last, there is an un- 
broken chain, in which not the least break, either for the Un- 
derstanding or for the Feelings, is discoverable. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 137 

Furthermore, it is plain, that by the application of this 
ethical principle to the Rhetorical presentation of thought, its 
chief aim, the production of Affection, is reached. If men 
find in themselves no enthusiasm for a really great and beauti- 
ful Idea, the reason must be, either that they do not contem- 
plate it in all its relations to Happiness, Virtue, and Duty, or 
that they allow themselves to be too greatly dampened by 
the individual difficulties in the way of its realization. But 
if all the individual elements and relations of the Idea are 
made to pass before their minds, one after another, in rapid 
progression, so that they can take in at a glance, all that is 
great, sublime, and rich in blessing, flowing from it, it is im- 
possible that they should not warm towards it ; every new re- 
presentation on the part of the orator, is a new spur which 
urges them on to the realization of the Idea. At the same 
time, the mind depressed and bowed down by the presenta- 
tion of difficulties and hindrances, is, as it were, freed from 
a burden, by the removal of its doubts, so that it no longer 
anxiously holds itself in reserve, but can freely and readily 
yield itself up to the influence which is exerted upon it. But 
in order that this warmth with which the mind begins to glow, 
may not grow cold, but may increase and constantly diffuse 
itself, it is necessary that this progress of the orator be also 
constant. If the thoughts are not closely linked together, so 
that the understanding perceives a defect in their connection ; 
if it is difficult for the mind to change from one feeling 
already awakened, to another, or to pass from a feeling to 
thoughts not specially connected with it, there arises Reflec- 
12 



138 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE \ OR, 

tion in the hearer's mind, not upon the Idea, but upon the ora- 
tor ; and the effect of this Reflection is so chilling, that all the 
warmth which had already been produced perhaps, at once 
vanishes, and the orator must begin his work over again from 
the beginning. In the case of a constant Progress, on the 
contrary, the effect of what follows is strengthened and favor- 
ed by what precedes, and the effect of what precedes by the 
effect of what folio ws. # 

Thus have we shown, as we flatter ourselves, that through 
this Law of constant Progress, which is ethical in its ori- 
gin, the chief aim of the Ehetorical presentation of thought, 
the excitement of Affection, is also reached. But in order 
to obtain a more thorough insight into the scope and appli- 
cation of the Law, we subjoin in addition the following par- 
ticulars. 

In the first place, so far as respects this necessary progress 
in the oration, it is to be noticed that, though it admits of 
narration, it entirely excludes description. In narration, the 
different constituent parts of a subject follow one upon 
another, and the progress of the oration is not checked by it ; 
but in description, on the contrary, these constituent parts 
stand beside each other, and form a quiet picture, whereby 
the swift, strong movement of the oration is stopped. Hence 
the orator, if called upon, as is very often the case, to des- 
cribe the character of a person, or a particular posture of 
things in actual life, should never in his narration exhibit the 

* Cicero seems to mean the same thing, when he says : Deinde 
inventa, non solum ordine, sed etiam momento quodam atque judicio 
dispensare atque componere. — De Orat., I. 31. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 139 

different qualities of a person, or the different characteristics 
of things, beside each other, but he should find a Historical 
thread, by means of which his representation may run off like 
a gradually developing History. It is exceedingly difficult 
to do this, since, in order to do it, the orator is often obliged 
to do violence to the representation as it exists in his own 
mind, and to take objects which he has apprehended and con- 
templated as a quiet whole, out of this form, and put them 
into another. Yet this is absolutely necessary ; unless it be 
done, the orator falls away from the Rhetorical into the Po- 
etical representation, and allows himself and his hearers a rest 
that is destructive of all Affection. The descriptions in the 
orations of the Ancients, are wrought entirely according to this 
principle ; they are always narrative, never descriptive ; in 
modern Rhetoric, the contrary is almost always the case, and 
hence the heavy dragging movement found in it. 

The Law of Progress also determines the extent of the de- 
velopement of each individual thought that appears in the 
Rhetorical series. For the orator must not allow one thought 
to so expand and become prominent at the expense of another, 
as to produce a pause in the movement of the oration. The 
recondite nature of many thoughts, which require develope- 
ments, explanations, arguments, may often lead to this fault. 
Hence the genuine orator will rather make up his discourse 
out of thoughts that need only to be enounced, not explained 
and proved. Strictly speaking, it is a fault to express the 
same thought in different language — the first time obscurely, 
the second time by explanation and circumlocution ; for the 
Law of Progress, strictly observed, requires that the de- 



140 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ) OR, 

velopement of the thought progress with every new sentence ; 
the orator, therefore, must know how to find immediately, 
the plainest, most forcible expression, and to be satisfied with 
it once for all. 

With respect to the arguments often necessary in Elo- 
quence, it might seem as though they must stop the swift 
current of the oration, and impart to it that slow movement 
— returning into itself — which is peculiar to Philosophy. 
Yet this w r ill not be the case, provided these arguments are 
brought forward according to the general principles laid down 
in the First Book. Would the orator show the Possibility 
of a thing, he does it by proposing a Plan, by citing an Ex- 
ample, showing that in similar circumstances the like has al- 
ready been done ; would he prove the Actuality of a fact, he 
cites Testimony, and establishes its validity. In this way 
every thing is made out by the exhibition of the Real, of the 
plainly Apparent, and there is no need of a slow, tedious 
chain of abstract propositions. This is not necessary even 
when the Truth of a thing is to be demonstrated ; in this 
case, the orator refers to a universally recognized Authority, 
the weight of which immediately decides the question ; or he 
makes use of public opinion, which has already, on another 
occasion, decided according to truth, and shows his hearer, by 
means of a brief and readily-apprehended enthymeme, that 
he cannot possibly judge differently, or decide differently, in 
the present case, from what he did in the former, without fall- 
ing into self-contradiction. In this way Demosthenes con- 
structs his formidable enthymematic trains of Eeasoning, 
which, so far from hindering the progress of the orator, are 



OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 141 

rather to be compared to the lightning, in force and 
rapidity. 

It often happens that a thought, in a position from which 
the logical arrangement would not displace it, exerts a retard- 
ing influence, and interrupts the continuity of the Rhetorical 
series, because it seems neither to have been sufficiently pre- 
pared for by what precedes, nor to sufficiently prepare for what 
follows. To avoid this case, and so to present every single 
thought as that it shall not only not retard, but accelerate 
the sweep of the oration, is one of the most difficult problems 
in Eloquence ; yet it may be solved, as it seems to us, by the 
aid of the principles which we have laid down. In order to 
this, we must recognise a gradation in the relative rank of the 
Rhetorical Ideas. Though Duty, Virtue, and Happiness, are 
all equal in importance, yet the three forms under which they 
present themselves are not. The first of these forms is the 
Religious, then follows the Ethical, and lastly the Political. 
Under these, again, stand Truth, Possibility, and Actuality, 
in the order in which they are here mentioned. Now in 
every separate developement of a subordinate Idea, if all that 
pertains to it is not fused with a higher Idea, and interwoven 
at all points with the developement of it, the steady flow of 
the oration is retarded and checked. Suppose that a sacred 
orator is discoursing with reference to the Ideas of Truth and 
Actuality — e. g., that he wishes to present the events of his 
time from a religious point of view — beginning with the de- 
velopement of Truth, he may, provided he has reached a pro- 
per place for it, cast a passing glance at Actuality ; for des- 
cription based upon this latter subordinate Idea, if he should 
12* 



142 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

begin with it, or should give it a developement independent 
of that of Truth, would be a dead stop, and not progress, and 
could not well be connected either with what followed or 
with what preceded. 

An orator before the Court, or before the people, commits 
the same error, if, when he might make the higher Idea of 
Duty or of Virtue predominant, he neglects it, and allows 
himself in a developement entirely unconnected with it, of 
the Idea of Civil or Positive Law, which he should have em- 
ployed only as a corollary and confirmation of the former. 
With all the modesty that becomes us Moderns in criticising 
the great models of Antiquity, I venture to charge iEschines 
with committing this latter error in his oration against Ctesi- 
phon. Since his attack upon Demosthenes in strictness was 
based upon the Idea of Virtue, since he wished to represent 
his life and character as unworthy and detestable, it was a 
mistake to dwell so long, as he does, in the very beginning, 
upon the positive statutes that might take from his opponent 
the crown which had been decreed to him. We feel, in the 
perusal, how weak this whole first part of his oration is, and 
how little it prepares for the succeeding part, in which he ex- 
amines the life of Demosthenes ; nay, between these two parts 
there is a chasm over which he could not possibly carry his 
hearers without their minds becoming entirely cold and emo- 
tionless. That Demosthenes perceived this mistake, it seems 
to me is evident, from the circumstance that he protests in 
the very beginning of his oration, against the demand of his 
opponent, that he shall in the defence follow the same plan 
which he did in the attack ; far from doing this, he rather sets 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 143 

forth the Idea of Virtue as the Idea upon which he shall found 
his oration, and not until after he has refuted a great portion 
of the objections brought against him, by a history of his 
past life, does he occupy himself with the examination of the 
positive laws which seem to be adverse to the proposition of 
Ctesiphon. Hence, from the beginning of this oration to the 
end, there is no pause to be perceived, but the mind is kept 
continually on the stretch, and borne along unceasingly from 
one important point to another. 

To impart this constant flow to an oration, is perhaps the 
most difficult among the many difficult things in Eloquence. 
A Poem, like the Poet himself, is born ; in some fine moment 
of inspiration it stands out before him, an articulated whole, 
and, so far as the place, at least, is concerned, is completed 
without further effort. But as Virtue is born with no man, 
but is acquired only through a long series of efforts, so like- 
wise the oration, considered as a moral product, is never com- 
plete in its first origin, but becomes so only by means of labor 
and pains perse veringly applied to it. Nay, inasmuch as the 
activity even of the most virtuous man can never be wholly 
perfect — i, e., can never be wholly conformed to the Law, and, 
at the same time, to existing relations — the question may arise, 
whether the oration, which, according to my assertion at least, 
is a moral act and process, can be perfect — a question which I 
should answer in the negative. The Adaptation which has 
been spoken of in a former chapter, can itself be reached only 
approximately ; for in order to be perfect, an absolutely Divine 
knowledge of all characters and relations would be requisite. 
The second law also, laid down by us — that of constant Pro- 



144 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

gress — in its perfection can belong only to the action of 
God in the government of the world, but never to human 
action, which is ever imperfect. But be this as it may, so 
much is certain, and with respect to it every man will agree 
with me, and the more readily the better orator he is, that 
in the plan of the oration as it is first presented to the mind, 
the thoughts are never found already arranged in this con- 
stant progressive flow, but must be afterwards wrought into 
it. As they first present themselves, they are hard, brittle, 
and separate particles ; the mind must seize them, and by 
grinding them incessantly upon each other, crush them, until 
the friction kindles the mass, and it runs like molten ore. 
The higher Ideas, thrown, as it were, into this solution, take 
up the thoughts which belong to them, and which, now that 
they are fluid, obey the mystic power which attracts like to 
like, so that they form themselves into a firm chain. 

Here the truth of our assertion becomes very apparent 
again, that it is the Character which makes the orator. Could 
the most brilliant Imagination, and the most profound and 
penetrating Reason, succeed in so elaborating the thoughts, if 
they were not guided and supported by the power of the mor- 
al Will ? Both Imagination and Reason, taken by themselves 
alone, lead the orator away from the sharply-drawn line along 
which he should move, and seduce him into a useless pause, and 
an idle undue unfolding of his thoughts. They can find no in- 
terest at all, in the elaboration of the unpretending, highly sim- 
ple conceptions borrowed from common life ; at the same time, 
they grow weary, and, finally, try to exchange an irksome 
business for one more agreeable, unless they are actuated and 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC HHETORIC. 1 1 > 

urged on by another power. And this power is not the mere 
empty rage for shining before an assembly ; for vanity is not 
capable of such a tension of mind ; nay, vanity does not even 
feel itself to be called upon to make such an effort, since it is 
satisfied with a loosely constructed oration garnished with some 
showy passages. For the hearer is capable of criticising such 
an oration and of admiring it, but let him be ever so culti- 
vated, he can never do full justice to an excellence lying so 
deep as the steady unceasing sweep of thought. He only feels 
its effects upon him, like the breathing of the living Spirit, with- 
out knowing the cause ; and for the very reason that so much 
that is Beautiful and Excellent arises in his own mind, he forgets 
that the orator has spoken excellently. That Demosthenean 
determination, that iron diligence, which is requisite in order 
to the formation of the rhetorical, constantly progressive train 
of thought, can spring only out of the effort to fill the minds of 
others with great Ideas, in which the orator has lost himself; 
the effort to satisfy his own conscience, and to employ only that 
which can rightfully contribute towards his success: and what 
is such an effort but the moral power of the Character in its 
finest developement and highest dignity ? 



146 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OH, 



CHAPTER VII. 



THE LAW OF VIVACITY. 



In the beginning of this treatise, we attempted to seize 
the active process of the orator in its origin, as it unfolds it- 
self under the guidance of certain definite moral Ideas. In 
this second part of the work, we have sought to become ac- 
quainted with the nature of the representations with which the 
leading Idea of the orator becomes encompassed, as well as 
with the rules in accordance with which these representations 
are linked together. We have now to conceive of the active 
process of the orator, as it comes forth into Language from his 
inward being, and here we find that his progress in the de- 
velopement of his Idea, and the effect produced by it upon the 
hearers, cause his own relation to them, though remaining the 
same in substance, to change every moment in respect to in- 
dividual circumstances ; and we demand that this active pro- 
cess of his, without wavering in its essential character and pur- 
pose, do, nevertheless, through a constant variation in the 
form, keep company with all these different variations in his 
relations. This is the third and last Law of the Rhetorical pre- 
sentation of thought. We denominate it the Law of Vivacity. 
Like the former Laws that have been mentioned, this Law 
also is of ethical origin, and wholly foreign to the Philosophi- 
cal, as well as the Poetical, presentation of thought. In both of 
these latter the mind isolates itself, and since it is not its de- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC, 147 

sign to exert an influence upon the circumstances which sur- 
round it, so neither does it allow circumstances to exert an 
influence upon itself. Hence the unvarying uniformity of 
the state and condition in which it remains from the begin- 
ning to the end of its work, allows the mind, in these latter 
cases, to give to its products a fixed, unchangeable form. Moral 
activity, on the contrary, would entirely preclude such an iso- 
lation ; it is itself a constant reception of outward influences, 
and an equally constant reaction upon them ; and since all 
that is outward is never still, but fluctuates restlessly hither 
and thither, man, when in action, must change his position 
in respect to the outward every moment. This is not bend- 
ing the Will to the force of circumstances, but is in reality 
the only means of obtaining dominion over them ; their con- 
stantly varying pressure would utterly overwhelm, if the 
manner of meeting them did not vary with equal rapidity. 
True Virtue on the side of Law, is indeed unalterably the 
same, but on the side of Life, is constantly changing and new. 
It would betray a want of elasticity in the character, if one 
should continue the same way of action in entirely different 
circumstances. 

This change in the position and movements of the orator, 
peculiar to moral activity of all sorts, can be perceived in the 
case of the activity of the orator, only in the thoughts and the 
words, and in their constantly varying turns, since the orator 
makes use of thoughts and words only, in order to the realiza- 
tion of his Idea. These turns are the so-called rhetorical 
Figures: an expression which must not be taken to denote 
mere ornaments coldly and artificially contrived to set off the 



148 ELOQUENCE A VlfcTUE J OR, 

discourse, (to which the expression might indeed lead,) but 
Turns and lively Movements in thought and language, 
prompted by the Imagination under the guidance of rhetorical 
Affection in conflict with the opposing sentiments of the 
hearers ; for which reason, perhaps, these latter expressions are 
preferable, because they are liable to no such misunderstand- 
ing. Similar turns arise easily and naturally in the social in- 
tercourse of cultivated and lively minds. For since social 
life of the higher order involves the mental cultivation of 
minds through the interchange of views, each man alternately 
playing the part of the orator and the hearer, it is evi- 
dent that, although from the language of such social life, 
nothing indeed is to be learned in relation to the rhetori- 
cal series of representations, because it is, of necessity, frag- 
mentary in its matter, yet much is to be learned from it in 
relation to the turns of thoughts and words, which become 
more lively and forcible on account of the closer action and 
reaction within this sphere. The so-called Figures which are 
employed by orators, and which are specifically enumerated 
by Rhetoricians, are in reality only such turns of thought and 
expression as arise in the active intercourse of men, elevated 
and polished in order to adopt them to a higher connection. 
Hence, if the orator would employ Figures rightly, he should 
not borrow them from manuals of Rhetoric, or even from the 
most perfect works in Eloquence, but should go back to the 
language of common intercourse, and appropriate to his own 
purposes all those living movements and turns in thought and 
expression, the influence of which he has felt upon himself, 
and has also imparted to others. Or rather, the orator must 



OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 149 

realize the hearer to himself with definite features, with all 
his opposing views and inclinations, and represent the whole 
oratorical process to himself, not monologically, but dialogi- 
cally ; then he will know instinctively, the proper time* to 
waken attention, to instruct, to exhort, to show the connection 
or the opposition of several thoughts, to meet an objection, 
to hurl it back again, to place a truth in clear light by an 
unexpected surprising turn, to pass from one truth to another, 
to restrain his feelings, to give them full play, &c. Having 
such a lively sense of his position and relations, and of the 
changes which he is producing in them by the progress which 
he is constantly making, his thoughts, and consequently, 
their expression, will take on a different form at every step. 

But if this alternation of forms in the rhetorical presenta- 
tion of thought, is of ethical origin, as we have endeavored to 
show, it is also the most powerful and effectual means of all, 
in exciting Affection.! For Affection in the hearer is kin- 
dled by Affection in the orator ; and how can the orator show 
more plainly, that he is wholly animated by an Idea, and by 
the striving to impart it to others, than by exhausting all the 
most lively forms of presentation ? Adaptation, in the dis- 
course, taken by itself alone, would not produce such an 
impression ; even the firmest and most labored chain of 
thought, unless each link in it were distinguished by a pecu- 
liar structure, would, in the end, only weary by a fixed uni- 
formity. But by means of the peculiar, and often surprising 

* Cicero. Orator. 39 et 40. 

t Jam vero ad affectus nil magisducit. — Quint. IX. 1. 
13 



150 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

turn, in which each new representation is announced, it is 
made to pierce more deeply into the mind, which, incessantly 
stimulated on so many sides, is compelled, in the end, to yield 
itself up without resistance, to the exercise of Affection. 

This influence upon the Affections is the distinguishing 
mark by which we can recognise Rhetorical figures, and can 
separate them from Poetical. The latter are created by the 
Imagination for the Imagination ; they are a painting, a pic- 
turing, a representing. The Rhetorical figures are produced 
by the Mind — using this term to denote the whole inner 
being of man so far as it is under the guidance of the Will 
— for the Mind ; they should seize, enchain, move, carry away. 
Poetical figures are brilliant and adorned, and Poetic Art 
delights in their splendor ; Rhetorical figures are a naked 
power, which avoids all pomp, because its influence is liable to 
be hindered thereby, or to be directed to the Imagination in- 
stead of the Affections. If the orator would acquire a quick 
feeling and an unerring sense for Rhetorical figures, let him 
read Demosthenes ; for in respect to him, the Ancients boast 
that he never brought forward a thought without expressing 
it in some peculiar figure.^ In reading Demosthenes, we 
shall also perceive most clearly, how great is the differ- 
ence between Rhetorical and Poetical figures ; for no style 
can be freer from all that we denominate Poetry of expres- 
sion, than that of Demosthenes. In saying this, however, we 
would by no means assert, that none of those figures which 
are commonly termed Poetical, are to be permitted in an ora- 

* Cicero Orator, c. 39, — Et vero nullus fere ab eo locus sine quadam 
conformatione sententiae dicitur. 



OUTLINES OP A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 151 

tion. Everything depends upon the application, upon rela- 
tive position and influence, and it is very possible indeed, that 
in a different use and connection the same figure would at one 
time depict to the Imagination, at another awaken Affection. 

There being this difference between Poetical and Rhetori- 
cal figures, the specific enumeration of the former is as pro- 
per, as that of the latter is improper. Since the Imagination 
renders itself independent of the external world, and allows it 
no influence upon its creations, its forms are by no means in- 
numerable in their manifoldness ; for their source is in the Im- 
agination alone, which, notwithstanding all its opulence, is, like 
every human faculty, limited by certain definable laws. Hence, 
in the enumeration of the different species of Poetry, as well 
as in the specification of Poetical figures, completeness is at- 
tainable. But since the moral activity of man, on the con- 
trary, is constantly conditioned by his relations to the exter- 
nal world, all the changes of which can never be computed, it is 
impossible to enumerate with satisfactory completeness, the 
forms under which this activity appears. For this reason, 
we may not in Eloquence, as in Poetry, assume certain species 
distinguished by Form and Matter ; and hence it was an absurd 
undertaking to attempt to bring under certain fixed rubrics, 
the turns which the thoughts of the orator receive, under 
the influence of the constantly varying cir cumstat ces amidst 
which his activity is put forth. This mistake would never 
have been made, if the ethical character of Eloquence had been 
recognised, and if Eloquence had been properly distinguished 
from Poetry. That the undertaking was a failure is perfectly 
evident. There are fine and noble turns of thought in De- 



152 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

mosthenes, which no Rhetorician has yet put on his list ; and 
many have also been invented by orators of the Church, that 
were entirely unknown to the Ancients. 

Owing to this confounding of Poetical and Rhetorical 
figures, there arose among the Ancients an entirely false view 
of the use and influence of the latter. Cicero and Quintilian 
agree in this, that they may, in part at least, be employed as 
adornment merely, of the oration, and to please the hearer.^ But 
this should never be the purpose for which they are employed, 
if, as we affirm, they are not productions of the Imagination 
for the Imagination, but of the Mind for the Mind. Quintilian 
gives another excellent rule, but one that by no means har- 
monizes with his other statement just cited, when he says, 
that all that does not promote the design of the orator, hinders 
it ;f and certainly, nothing so little promotes, and consequent- 
ly so greatly hinders, the awakening of a strong Affection 
that seizes upon the whole mind, and breaks forth into acts, as 
that light play of the Imagination which leaps from figure to 
figure. Hence, we assert that no figure should be allowed 
in an oration, unless each and every word in it, according to 
the expression of QuintiHan,J awaken an Affection of some 
sort. Any other use of figures on the part of the orator 
would betray a departure from his purpose, — L e. 9 a moral 
weakness, — .and instead of contributing to his design, would 

* Ex collocatione verborum quae sumuntur quasi lumina, magnum 
afterunt omatum orationi. — Oicero. Orator, c. 39. — Major pars harum 
figurarum posita est in delectatione. — Quintilian, IX. 3. 
t Obstat enim quidquid non adjuvat. — Quintilian, VIII. 6, 
X Gtuot verba, totidem affectus. — Quintilian, IX. 3. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 1§3 

only stand in its way, — i. e., would leave the mind cold, in- 
stead of warming it. 

Furthermore, figures, which consist in peculiar turns of 
thought, are likewise subject to those Laws of Adaptation 
and constant Progress, which we have laid down for the 
guidance of Rhetorical discourse generally. If the orator 
wastes the most impressive and powerful of these figures 
upon trivial occasions, or employs them imprudently at a 
time when the mind is not prepared for so violent an impres- 
sion, this unsuitable application of them will hinder and des- 
troy their influence. And since, in order to prevent Affec- 
tion from becoming cold, the thoughts themselves must run 
on in a continual series, it is also necessary, in order to the 
same end, that the turn which one thought has taken, easily 
and naturally lose itself in that which the following thought 
will assume. In this connection, it is also to be remarked, 
that the most perfect concatenation of figures loses its effect, 
if it is repeated successively, after short intervals ; for the 
mind once impressed, is immediately rid of the impression, 
by the repetition of that which produced it, and is led 
away to an idle contemplation of the mere Form, irrespective 
of the Matter ; the constant recurrence of which would, in this 
case, produce only a poetico-musical enjoyment. 

And as we have seen that every offence against the Rhe- 
torical Laws is to be regarded as a moral defect, so also the 
wrong use of figures is not to be ascribed to a want of Ge- 
nius, but only to a weakness of Character. It is vanity, if 
the orator is profuse in figures for the sake of show and orna- 
ment ; it is obtuseness of moral feeling, if the orator em* 
13* 



154 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

ploys them unsuitably ; it is sluggishness, incapacity of en- 
thusiasm in respect to lofty Ideas, if the orator does not un- 
derstand how to give to a thought those forcible turns by 
which alone he can produce the designed impression. Hence, 
not by means of the mere knowledge of this or of other rules, 
but only by means of those moral excellences which are op- 
posed to the faults above-mentioned, will the orator be en- 
abled to employ figures rightly and with effect. In order to 
this, a mind is needed which can warm towards moral Ideas ; 
which, along with all its inspiration and enthusiasm, can keep 
up a calm, accurate survey of circumstances, and which is far 
more interested in the true advantage of the hearer — in his 
improvement and elevation — than in his applause. 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 155 



CHAPTER VIIL 

PR08E. 

In the beginning of this Second Book, we promised to sketch 
the main features of a Theory of Prose, and to derive them 
from the ethical principle which we have sought to establish 
as the foundation of Rhetoric, We now attempt to fulfil 
this promise. 

We shall first set forth the distinguishing marks of Prose, 
while at the same time, for the sake of greater distinctness, 
we shall compare them with the peculiar characteristics of 
Poetic discourse. 

The first difference between Poetry and Prose lies in the 
Period. Not that the Period is peculiar to Prose alone, and 
might be dispensed with in finished Poetry. But in Poetry 
it appears only as a necessary form in the connection of 
thoughts upon which no special emphasis is laid. In Prose, 
on the contrary, while it retains this first original characteris- 
tic, it acquires a still higher significance, and seems to serve 
particular purposes. Hence we require in Prose, that each 
Period be marked by something peculiar to itself, and be 
distinguished from what precedes and follows it, by its form, 
while in Poetry, we do not regard it as a fault, and hardly 
notice it, if several sentences exceedingly simple, and entirely 
similar in their structure, follow one another. 

The second difference lies in the words used. In Poetry, 



156 ELOaUENCE A VIRTUE ; OR, 

every word has worth, not only by virtue of its sense, but also 
by virtue of its sound and its mere existence ; the most im- 
portant and the most unimportant words, in respect to sense, 
as integral parts of the same whole, have equal rank, like cit- 
izens of a free State. In Prose, on the contrary, the worth 
of words differs according to their sense ; in every sentence 
there is one or more words which, by their peculiar position, 
are elevated and placed in the light, so that the others are 
subordinate to them, and seem to be designed only to elevate 
and minister to them. 

The third difference lies in the relation between long and 
short syllables, which, in Poetry, is termed Metre, in Prose 
is termed Number. The difference between the two may 
perhaps, be best exhibited under the following general cha- 
racteristics : Metre, though adapted to the Idea, yet appears 
as something independent in itself, and seeks to attract atten- 
tion to itself, aside from the thoughts and feelings expressed 
through it. Hence it not merely determines, with the great- 
est exactness, the number and succession of long and short 
syllables ; it also separates them into individual'metrical mem- 
bers, the frequent repetition of which, impresses their pe- 
culiar form so much the more, upon the ear and the mind. If 
the difference between long and short syllables is not duly 
marked in a sentence, Poetry makes up for what its 
form would lose thereby in peculiarity and independence of 
character, by counting and limiting the number of the syl- 
lables which compose the individual line, and by the regular 
recurrence of the same sound at the end of the verse. Num- 
ber, on the contrary, far from separating itself from the 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 157 

thought, remains constantly subordinate to it, and it would 
be regarded as one of the greatest faults of a Prose Period, 
if one of its parts, by a succession of tones too striking and 
too agreeable to the ear, should attract attention from the 
Matter to the Form. Number, therefore, arranges the suc- 
cession and number of long and short syllables, only so far as 
is necessary in order that the impression of the discourse 
upon the sensuous organs may be adapted to the impression 
which is to be produced upon the mind, so that the mind may 
not feel less, because the ear has either experienced no agree- 
able sensation at all, or has been offended. And that Num- 
ber may not usurp an independence that does not belong to 
it, it is necessary, and is also universally required, that it be 
adjusted most accurately to the Matter, as well as the Form ; 
that it vary with every new thought, nay, every new Period, 
and thus flow forth in constant manifoldness. 

If, as I believe, the peculiar characteristics of Prose have 
been sufficiently exhibited in what has been said, the question 
now arises: From what principles can we deduce such a form 
of discourse, and show that it must be constituted so, and 
not otherwise ? This problem seems never to have been pro- 
posed even, while yet a similar one respecting the forms of 
Poetry, has employed many Theorizers, and has been suc- 
cessfully solved by them. Why, then, is there Prose at all ? 
What right has it to exist by the side of Poetry ? Should 
men generally, speak only in verse, and is it owing merely to 
convenience or inability, that they do not ? We feel that 
this cannot possibly be, for there are modes of presenting 
thought in which Poetical forms cannot be employed at all. 



158 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE J OR 

And this does not arise from their intrinsic difficulty, for 
finished Prose has its peculiar excellences, and, conseque ntly, 
its difficulties also, which are not easier to master than those 
of Versification. If, now, Prose is to maintain itself as a pe- 
culiar form of presenting thought, the rightfulness of its 
claims must be demonstrable from rational grounds. Or shall 
we, after having deduced the necessity of the forms of Poetry, 
represent Prose as a thorough and complete opposite to them, 
and consider the matter as settled in this way, because there 
can be nothing which has not its opposite ? But, not to 
mention that this principle is not justifiable in itself, it could 
not, even if it were correct, find its application here, because 
although Prose and Verse indeed differ from each other, they 
by no means constitute a proper antithesis, the members of 
which run parallel to each other, and have purely opposite 
and mutually correspondent marks. 

The right of Prose to assert its place beside Poetry, and 
the necessity of the characteristic marks perceived in it, can 
be satisfactorily shown, only in case it is construed from ethi- 
cal principles. In deriving the rules to which the moral acti- 
vity of man, so far as it makes use of discourse for its pur- 
poses, is subjected, we had arrived at the Law of Vivacity ; 
while we further develope it, we shall see Prose with all that 
is peculiar and distinctive in it, originating from it. 

For, in the first place, since according to the Law of Viva- 
city, each thought should appear with a peculiar turn and 
movement, it must naturally impart a peculiar form and 
structure to the Period also, in which it is presented. On 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 159 

this ethical ground* therefore, the carefulness with which the 
Period is formed in Prose, is explained and justified, while, 
on the contrary, a similar carefulness in Poetry, would not 
only be unnecessary, but a fault also. For the change in the 
form of the Period is expressive of a change in the mental 
state — a change which is required in the orator, but not al- 
lowable in the Poet, since he purposes to exhibit only one 
and the same tone of mind. With the same right that fig- 
ures in the Thought are assumed in Rhetoric, we believe we 
may assume figures in the Period, which are to be distin- 
guished still further, from figures in the Language. More- 
over, much that is cited by Rhetoricians under this latter 
name, is a peculiarity in the structure of the Period, rather 
than in the position of the words — e. g., the Climax, the 
Antithesis, the Isocolon, the Prosapodosis, and the Coinotes, 
arising from the connection of the Epibole and Epiphora. 

But not only does the Law of Vivacity exert its influence 
upon the structure of the Period, it also exerts it secondly, 
upon the position of the words. For since the greatest care 
must be taken that the thoughts do not flow into each other, 
so as to form one uniform mass, it is evident that those parti- 
cular words which express each particular thought most 
plainly, should be made prominent, and be distinguished from 
the others. From this ethical view of Prose, not only is the 
peculiar Emphasis laid upon the most important words — as the 
Substantive, Adjective, Verb — explained, but also the origin of 
the more exquisite figures of Speech — as Paranomasia, Para- 
diastole, Antanaclasis, Epanode, Diaphora, Homceoptoton, &c. 



160 ELOdUENCE A VIRTUE J OR, 

The use of these figures in Poetry, is condemned of right, 
because in Poetry the essential thing is not the distinguish- 
ing of one thing above another, but the connecting of 
one thing with another. And if Poetry has appropriated 
one or another of these figures — as, e. g. 9 the Homceoptoton, 
from which Rhyme seems to have arisen — it has yet entirely 
altered it ; for in Prose, a proposition is individualized by the 
Homceoptoton ; in Poetry, the metrical lines are linked and 
united together by Rhyme. 

Finally, in the third place, the Law of Vivacity permits 
neither Metre, nor Rhyme, nor the numeration of syllables ; 
for through these, the outward form of presentation acquires 
a repose, and an evenness of proportion — it expresses a compla- 
cency — which, indeed, belongs necessarily to the finished un- 
folding of Poetical Ideas, but which must ever be foreign to 
the active process of the orator, which is full of Affection in 
itself, and seeks to awaken Affection in the hearer. Never- 
theless, since that which is peculiar in the Rhetorical thought 
seeks to express itself, not only in the structure of the Period, 
and the position of the words, but also in the relation of the 
long and short syllables ; since, in order to the more distinct 
separation of the thoughts, there must be the slower pace of 
some, ana 1 the more rapid flight of others, and this difference 
must be made perceptible to the mind through the ear, the 
Law of Vivacity requires a mingling of syllables, in respect to 
their quantity, suited to the existing thought, but going no 
further than to vary with each Period, and never occupying 
the mind at the expense of the thought* For if this were 
the case, the orator would betray a complacency which is pro- 



OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC. 161 

per in the Poet, but which is forbidden to him by the Law of 
Vivacity ; and, moreover, he would fail to reach the end at 
which he aims — the production of Affection in the hearer — 
if the hearer should come to be as much delighted by the 
musical enjoyment of the melody, as impressed by the force of 
the thought. 



14 



162 ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE. 



CHAPTER IX. 

CONCLUSION. 

We have thus far endeavored to unfold and perfect our 
theory of the ethical nature of Eloquence, in three different 
ways ; by showing, first, that all of its essential Laws are of 
moral origin ; secondly, that a morally good Character, alone, 
imparts the inclination and the ability to follow these Laws ; 
thirdly, that the orator is sure of success, only in proportion as 
he strictly obeys these moral Laws, and puts away all refer- 
ences of a less pure nature. 

And as in running out these laws, we have arrived at the 
construction of Prose as a necessary form of presenting 
thought, we believe we may here lay down our pen, inasmuch 
as what has been said will be sufficient to enable him who has 
followed us thus far, to form a judgment respecting the cor- 
rectness of our hypothesis ; and it will not be difficult for him 
who falls in with it, to apply the principles we have laid 
down, to the subject of Declamation, and other secondary sub- 
jects connected with Eloquence, of which we have not 
treated. 



THE END. 



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